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Taxing the informal sector poses a significant challenge to every tax authority. The task of 
designing a system to encourage voluntary tax compliance in the informal sectors of 
developing economies is a particularly important task given the relative sizes of these sectors 
in their domestic economies. Due to lack of reliable data about the operators of the informal 
economy it is difficult to comprehensively understand what produces tax non-compliance, 
and even less what motivates compliance, however, this information is critical to the design 
of effective policy. Most tax authorities resort to using blunt and often punitive measures 
designed to deter evasion rather than promoting long term voluntary compliance. 
Existing literature on informal sector taxation in developing countries is limited, and what 
does exist emphasises development of the tax system rather than understanding the taxpayer. 
This study draws on research designed for better understanding of taxpayer behaviour in the 
formal sector and apply it to informal sector taxpayers to explore the degree to which it may 
inform us of tax compliance motivations in this sector also. The study uses the Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) Responsive Regulatory Theory (RRT) to analyse the impact of a 
responsive regulatory tax administration on the tax compliance decision of informal sector 
operators.  
Three methods of data collection are used – face-to-face interview, survey and field 
observation to collect data from the informal sector operators and tax officers in Ghana. 
The findings from this study indicate that due to the difficulty in obtaining information about 
taxpayers and the ease in concealing taxable activities, adopting purely command-and-control 
and deterrence based compliance approaches such as intensive auditing and heavy fines will 
not promote voluntary compliance. The study thus finds that tax morale, relationship with the 
officials, trust, tax education/knowledge, and tax revenue usage do have significant influence 
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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
1.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents an introduction to this research and a general overview of the key 
issues addressed in this study. The initial stage deals with a definition of tax in general, the 
informal sector and more specifically presumptive taxation as the main approach for taxing 
the informal sector. The subsequent sections in the chapter present the problem statement, the 
research objectives, the significance of the study, the research methodology adopted, and the 
scope of the study. 
Taxation is the most significant source of income for most governments in the world and 
plays a key role in promoting economic growth in many countries.  Lymer and Oats (2015, 
p.3) defined taxation as ‘‘a compulsory levy, imposed by government or other tax raising 
body, on income, expenditure, or capital assets, for which the taxpayer receives nothing 
specific in return’’. However, it is important to note at this stage that not all payments to 
government are considered as taxes, for example, charges, tolls, and other levies that are paid 
to request specific services are not tax payments (Lymer and Oats, 2015, p.3). Apart from its 
fundamental function of raising revenue for the government, taxation plays other vital roles 
such as being a mechanism for income redistribution to bridge the inequality gap, acting as 
corrective instrument to influence consumption patterns, (for example, the high taxes on 
tobacco and alcohol in the UK to promote public health and to ease pressure on the health 
service,) or simply as a bait to encourage investors to undertake decisions they otherwise 
would find unprofitable. 
Implementing any tax strategy comes with one key challenge – compliance. Tax compliance 
involves complying freely and fully with all tax laws in one’s country. Cummings (2007) 
defined tax compliance as the degree to which a taxpayer complies with the tax rules of his 
or her country, for example, by declaring income, filing a return, and paying the tax due on 
time. On the other hand, tax non-compliance is the failure of a taxpayer to meet tax 
obligations whether the act is done intentionally or unintentionally (James and Alley, 2004), 
and this may include failing to file a tax return; under-reporting of taxable income; 
overstating tax claims such as deductions, reliefs and exemptions and failing to pay tax 
liabilities in a timely manner (Kirchler, 2007). 
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Although the level of tax compliance is influenced by many factors (Torgler, 2003), the 
nature of the economy, whether formal or informal may have a significant influence. Within 
every economy, taxing national and multinational corporations or businesses operating in the 
formal economy could be less problematic - ceteris paribus - the main option for avoiding 
taxes for such businesses is through exploiting ambiguities in the tax system (Garman and 
Forgfue, 2009), by resorting to activities that may not be necessarily illegal but may be seen 
as unethical practices.  For example, using tax credits and deductions with the view to 
reducing tax liabilities (Tooma, 2008). 
However, taxing individuals and businesses in the informal economy and other hard-to-tax 
activities a significant component of which is in the informal sector – presents a different 
challenge for tax administrators in both developing and advanced countries (Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).  Within this sector, tax evasion is relatively high and attempts to 
improve compliance are difficult and relatively expensive and therefore may be seen as 
unprofitable and less feasible to undertake in comprehensive, fair, ways. Individuals and 
small scale enterprises operating in the informal sector often resort to illegal practices to 
escape from taxation (Tooma, 2008). Here, taxable income and other receipts subject to tax 
are concealed or deductions are fraudulently claimed. For example, studies by Cobham 
(2005)1 found that developing countries lose about US$285 billion annually due to tax 
evasion in the informal economy.   
A key problem with managing compliance in this sector is the fact that tax administrators 
may have insufficient information about taxpayers and often very limited resources to 
manage the assessment and collection of taxes from individuals and businesses operating in 
this segment of the economy.  
While in advanced countries, the tax system can marginalise informal sector taxation as the 
sums at risk, the relative high cost of collection, and the range and number of taxpayers 
involved is relatively limited (albeit not unimportant), this is not so easily marginalised in 
developing countries where such revenue streams are of greater importance. This is because a 
significant percentage of employment and other taxable economic activities are undertaken 
within this sector in such economies, for example, Ghana has about 80% of its economic 
activities undertaken within the informal economy (GSS 2012). 
                                                          
1 The calculation is based on estimates of the size of the domestic informal economy by Schneider (2005). 
3 
 
Aryee (2007) argued that the approach to taxing this sector in developing countries cannot be 
the same as for the formal sector because of the low compliance culture in the sector and 
because of the limited resources available to tax authorities to address this issue. Due to these 
challenges, tax authorities often adopt a presumptive based approach to taxing the informal 
sector. 
Under presumptive taxation, most tax authorities in developing countries use blunt, non-
taxpayer responsive or individually orientated, punitive measures to deter evasion. Taxation 
under this system is based on ‘assumed’ or ‘estimated’ income using a number of factors as 
the basis for measuring the tax payable at any point or assessment period. The approach 
encompasses a ‘number of procedures under which a ‘desired’ base for taxation (direct or 
indirect) is not measured but is inferred from simple indicators which are more easily 
measured than the base itself’ (Ahmad and Stern, 1991 p. 276).  See chapter four for 
discussion on presumptive taxation. 
In response to the informal sector taxation challenges, researchers have also undertaken 
studies from various angles to help shape our understanding of the sector. However, these 
studies are mainly inconclusive. For example, recent work includes assessing the psychology 
side of operators in the informal economy (Kirchler, 2007); taxpayers and government 
reciprocities (Frey and Torgler, 2007); cultural differences and tax morale in the sector 
(Torgler, 2005; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2007); using 
taxpayer compliance programs to create compliance (Russell, 2010); law and policy effects 
on voluntary taxpayer compliance (Ongwamuhana, 2011). Besides, there have been 
numerous proposals put forward by the World Bank, UN, OECD, and the IMF about taxing 
the informal sector. For example, the UN suggests that promoting equity and transparency 
would improve tax compliance within the informal sector (UN, 2009), the World Bank 
proposes that countries adopt ‘incentive-orientated policies’ to encourage a formal sector 
operation by informal sector businesses (World Bank, 2010).  However, the IMF’s policy 
recommendations are that greater transparency, consultation, and visibility of public 
spending of tax revenue are the main drivers to promoting voluntary compliance among 
operators of the informal sector (IMF, 2011). 
It is interesting to point out that although these studies are conducted from different angles 
[albeit mostly within advanced countries’ settings], they all draw one conclusion - that the 
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informal sector is indeed a very complex tax segment to create compliance and to raise 
revenue from.  
A fundamental question to be addressed before reviewing this literature further, is what is 
meant by the “informal sector” and what types of activities are classed within its bracket?  
A study by Feige (1994) defined the informal sector as all economic activities which 
contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product, but which are 
currently unregistered.  Employment within the informal sector is mainly cash-in-hand 
(William, 2004), and traders operate on a ‘cash-only’ basis (Ofori, 2009). The sector may 
include activities such as the illegal production of trademarked goods, drug dealing, 
commercial vice and prostitution, illegal gambling, barter, loan sharking, the employment of 
illegal migrants, do-it-yourself projects, skimming of business revenue and tax evasion 
(Shelak, 1997 cited in Kirchler, 2007). Similarly, Smith (1994) described the sector as a 
market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal that escapes 
detection in the official estimates of GDP. Mirus and Smith (1997) provided some 
clarification on the constituents of legal activities (which forms the basis of this study) and 















Table.1.1 The taxonomy of the informal economic activities  
Type of 
Activity 
Monetary Transactions Non-Monetary Transactions 
ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Trade in stolen goods; drug dealing and 
manufacturing; prostitution; gambling; 
smuggling and fraud 
Barter: drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Produce or 
growing drugs for own use. 
Theft for own use. 





Wages, salaries and 
assets from unreported 
work related to legal 











Source: Mirus and Smith, 1997. 
Terkper (2003) offers a very simple definition to the informal economy describing it as 
‘taxpayers who often fail to register voluntarily’.  This view is supported by Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2007), who added that even when they do register, they generally fail to 
keep appropriate records of their earnings and costs, do not file their tax returns, and they 
frequently tend to be tax delinquent. 
In this study, the informal sector is defined as all [legally] taxable economic activities which 
are undertaken within the economy in reference to activities which are not undertaken in the 
formal regulated sector and which stand the risks of being either underreported (i.e. partial 
reporting) or fully concealed from the public eye. Illegal activities within the informal sector 
are excluded from this study since by their nature [of being illegal], tax authorities do not 
recognise them for tax purposes and therefore have no defined systems and approaches to 
bring them into the tax net. 
Studies on the informal sector taxation within developing countries are limited and the 
emphasis of most of the existing literature is based on the systems of taxation rather than 
understanding the taxpayers, and what motivates their compliance decisions.  
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This study is conducted in a developing country context [Ghana’s informal economy] with 
the central aim of exploring the tax compliance determinants of informal sector taxpayers 
undertaking legal activities. 
 
1.1. Research problem 
Prior research has indicated that in tax systems a variety of factors combine to create any 
single taxpayer’s compliance/non-compliance behaviour across the range of decisions that 
they are able to make in their interactions with the tax system. Firstly, tax knowledge and 
education are identified to be key variables when explaining tax non-compliance behaviours. 
As noted by Andreoni et al. (1998) tax compliance measurement research can usually make 
the assumption (often for modelling ease) that all taxpayers are of the same level of tax 
knowledge. This is not an accurate assumption as taxpayers’ understanding of the tax law 
varies and this influences their compliance behaviour (Torgler, 2003). Tax specific education 
or knowledge should not be mistaken for formal education as research has indicated that 
people with university or college degrees may not have sufficient tax knowledge to make 
them necessarily more or less compliant than those with lower formal education – although 
there is some evidence that formal education can also affect compliance (Loo and Ho, 2005). 
Therefore, to improve tax compliance, substantial tax education and ease of access to tax 
information to raise tax knowledge are required. 
Previous tax compliance studies have shown that non-compliance could also be attributed to 
the interactions with individuals in the taxpayer’s inner circle of contacts/peers. Taxpayers 
are ‘‘not simply independent, selfish and utility maximisers, they also interact with other 
people with different attitudes, beliefs, norms and roles” (James and Alley, 2000), which may 
subsequently influence their compliance behaviours. This interaction is what Lewis (1982) 
termed the tax subculture, and he argued that there is a strong likelihood that individuals 
whose peers do not pay taxes are less likely to comply.  Findings from other studies, 
(Torgler, 2003; Frey and Torgler, 2007) also support this idea that compliance behaviour 
increases when taxpayers know others are paying and vice versa. 
Furthermore, lack of trust in the tax authority and the absence of a strong legal system have 
been identified amongst the factors influencing tax non-compliance behaviours (see Torgler, 
2003; Frey, 2003; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; María-Dolores et al., 2010). These studies found 
that people, sometimes choose not to pay their taxes due to lack of trust in the state regarding 
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the use of tax revenues and weakness in tax law enforcement which fails to detect and punish 
tax evaders. 
A higher tax rate also increases tax non-compliance, as evasion becomes more ‘profitable’. A 
study by Clotfelter (1983), argued that high tax rates will evoke high non-compliance rates, 
and his findings have since been supported by several recent studies (Ivanova et al., 2005; 
Takats and Papp, 2008; Kirchler et el., 2010; and Matthews, 2011). They all concluded that a 
lower tax rate decreases the incentive for evasion or avoidance. The policy question this 
finding raise is ‘what tax rate is low’? As businesses and individuals have different income 
levels, and circumstances that affect their tax obligations, it becomes difficult to determine in 
practice which rate will be ‘low’ enough to boost compliance levels without adversely 
affecting tax receipts. 
While significant improvements have been made in effective tax system design in advanced 
countries, designing effective and efficient tax systems remains a difficult task for 
developing economies. This is because adequate data for decision making by the tax 
authorities is seldom available, or available in a timely enough fashion due to the difficulty of 
tracking economic activities in these countries. This is compounded in developing country 
settings by significant economic activities being carried out in the informal economy where 
cash transactions dominate (Grown and Valodia, 2010), and operators keep very minimal 
records.  
In seeking to better understand tax compliance in the informal sector, a key part of the puzzle 
that needs addressing is why operators in this sector pay taxes in the first place. Most 
neoclassical studies on tax compliance in the formal economy, conclude that there is far more 
compliance than such models would indicate should be expected, and that most people pay 
most of their taxes most of the time, (Alm, 2013). In formal systems, the percentage of taxes 
which are subject to thorough audit is generally small, often under 1 percent of all returns, 
and even where people are caught for tax avoidance, the penalties that can be imposed are 
not always imposed, or not often visibly imposed so are only known to the tax authorities and 
taxpayers, and may not be substantial as a percentage of the tax evaded (Alm, 2013, p4). This 
therefore suggests that the basic theoretical model of economics of crime first applied by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), and which posits that taxpayers are rational economic agents 
who weigh up the economic benefits of successful tax evasion against penalties for non-
compliance, cannot fully explain the reasons for the levels of tax compliance in any 
economy. Based on these utility maximisation theories, one can argue that most operators in 
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the informal economy (where information about tax operators and their activities are very 
difficult to track) should not be paying taxes at all. There is an element of tax compliance 
which cannot be explained by economic factors and, as suggested by Alm et al (2010, p.4), 
even in the least compliant economies, tax evasion does not exceed the levels predicted by a 
purely economic analysis, and in fact there are many [honest] taxpayers who pay all (or 
most) of their taxes all (or most) of the times, regardless of economic incentives or the 
enforcement activities by tax regimes.  
Previous studies have proposed several plausible compliance determinants. For example, 
studies by (Witte and Woodury, 1985; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; Slemrod, 1989) found that a 
perception of fairness regarding the tax system influences tax compliance decisions, the same 
way as the compliance process and cost (Copp, 20012; Evans and Tran-Nam, 2001; Smulders 
and Stiglingh, 2008).  Interestingly, recent research on tax compliance has shifted to a new 
paradigm of exploring the intrinsic motivation (moral) to help explain compliance decisions, 
(see Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 2009; Pope and McKerchar, 2011; 
Benk et al., 2011; Modugu et al., 2012). The tax compliance theories and models 
underpinning these studies are discussed in chapter four. 
As the emphasis is usually placed on the tax system rather than the taxpayer when examining 
informal sector taxation, the existing literature [on informal sector taxation] offers little to 
explain how the intrinsic motivations influence compliance decisions within that sector. This 
study thus seeks to contribute to this gap in the knowledge of informal sector tax compliance. 
 
1.2 Why Ghana? 
This study uses Ghana as a case study. Ghana is ranked by the World Bank as low middle 
income due to its $1,590 per capita GNI (World Bank, 2014). Also, both the IMF and the UN 
rank the country among developing countries. 
Furthermore, Ghana is still an active member of the debt relief programme targeted at 
developing countries; the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (UN, 2012; 
IMF, 2013, World Bank ,2014), and therefore qualifies as a developing economy.  
                                                          
2 Cited in (Evans 2003) 
9 
 
In addition, Ghana has an estimated 80% of all its economic activities coming from the 
informal sector (GSS, 2012). As the study seeks to assess tax compliance within the informal 
sector of developing countries, Ghana fits perfectly as a country for this study.  
Also, just as others at the same level of development, the country has a high illiteracy rate of 
about 40% (UNDP, 2011).  In addition, businesses in its informal sector operate on a cash-
only basis, employment within the sector is mainly based on cash-in-hand, operators have 
poor record-keeping (refer to earlier discussions in sections 1.0 and 1.1). There are little or no 
barriers to entry to most of the sectors in which informal businesses operate. Informal sector 
operators are often largely ignorant of the tax laws, and the country is dominated by a high 
corruption rate and poor administration (Aryee, 2007).  
Another key factor that contributed to the choice of Ghana, is the country’s stable economic 
and political environment. Unlike other developing countries, Ghana has a stable democratic 
system of government and has not had any political conflict for almost 40 years (BBC, 
2016). This implies that results from this study may be useful to or comparable with 
countries at the same level of development.  
Refer to chapter three for further discussion on Ghana’s informal sector taxation. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
In every tax compliance study, the underlying question is ‘What drives people to pay their 
taxes?’ As noted in section 1.1, one possible explanation to this question put forward by the 
literature is the impact of the deployment by tax authorities of ‘coercive strategies’ - i.e. 
those involving the use of deterring punitive measures to discourage tax non-compliance – 
taxpayers comply as they fear the consequences of non-compliance. Research work which 
explores this relationship includes the compliance model proposed by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) on the economics-of-crime theory. This study has since been developed 
further (for example Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001).  
However, Frey (1997) proposes that intrinsic motivation could be negatively influenced by 
external interventions, which in the case of taxation, may include issuing commands and 
imposing rules and regulations and carrying out punitive measures. Frey, therefore, proposes 
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a more co-operative model to encourage compliance where taxpayers are treated as clients 
and ‘served’ by tax authorities.  
Kirchler (2007, p.188) suggests neither the ‘cops and robbers’ approach as implied in the 
case of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) or the ‘service and client’ approach, (Frey 1997; Frey 
and Jegen, 2001) offer full explanations to the question of ‘why people pay taxes’ and 
indeed, may contradict each other in some cases.  
Therefore, studies on this question are shifting towards exploring ‘tax morale’ to help explain 
and understand tax compliance behaviours. Examples of work on tax morale include Torgler, 
2002 and 2003; Cummings et el., 2005; Frey and Feld 2002; Kirchler, 2007; Pope and 
McKerchar 2011; Alm and McClellan, 2012. All of these studies link tax compliances with 
‘intrinsic motivation’ (i.e. morale). 
Interestingly, existing studies on tax compliance within the informal sector, do not embrace 
this paradigm shift, and most tend to look at the systems of taxation rather than 
understanding the compliance needs of the sector operators. For example, tax compliance in 
the informal sector is based on a reciprocal arrangement with the state (Aryee, 2007), 
incentives to encourage tax compliance (Russell, 2010) or simply having workable laws and 
policies to regulate the sector (Ongwamuhana, 2011). 
This study draws on the utilitarian and tax morale research paradigms designed for better 
understanding of taxpayer behaviour in the formal sector and applies it to informal sector 
taxpayers, to explore the degree to which it may inform us of tax compliance motivations 
within this [informal] sector. 
To achieve the above objective, the study adopts the following specific research objectives: 
• Examine the effects of the relationship between the taxpayers and tax authorities on 
voluntary compliance in the informal sector. This objective is addressed by drawing 
on the Responsive Regulation Theory (RRT) first proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) to assess compliance decisions, by exploring the relationship taxpayers and tax 
authority in the informal sector and how this interplay manifests into tax 
compliance/non-compliance. 
• Assess how different compliance approaches influence compliance decisions of 
informal sector taxpayers. 
• Identify and analyse variables that make individuals and small business operators in 
the informal sector ‘‘difficult-to-tax’’. 
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• Assess the effectiveness of presumptive based taxation, as the dominant form of 
taxing informal sector economic activities in developing economies. 
• Analyse and compare the key tax compliance determinants of informal sector 
operators with those in the formal sector. This is done by comparing the study results 
with the findings from existing literature on formal sector tax compliance variables. 
 
1.3.1 Research questions 
To accomplish the research objectives above, empirical evidence is produced to answer the 
following questions: 
i. Are there more effective ways to tax informal sector economic activities in 
developing countries than are currently employed?  
ii. To what extent does the relationship between a taxpayer and the tax authority shape 
voluntary compliance decision of the informal sector taxpayer?  
iii. To what extent does moral obligation contribute to the tax compliance decisions of 
informal sector operators? 
iv. How effective is presumptive based taxation on the compliance decisions of operators 
in the informal sector? 
v. What key social/demographic variables influence tax compliance in the informal 
sector of developing economies?  
vi. What are the impacts of increased auditing mechanisms on voluntary tax compliance 
in the informal sector? 
Details of the research objectives and the questions are discussed under the methodology 
section in chapter five. 
 
1.4. Significance of the study 
There have been numerous works on personal and small business taxation in the informal 
sector [mostly in advanced countries] by several tax researchers in a bid to help understand 
tax compliance within this sector (see discussion in chapter two). There have also been 
several proposals from the World Bank, UN, OECD, and the IMF particularly targeting 
developing countries (see further discussion on taxing the informal sector in chapter two). In 
all these studies, as noted earlier, the emphasis has been placed on the tax system, which 
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conforms to the approach to taxing this sector by most tax authorities - presumptive based 
methods which take little or no account of the taxpayers’ needs. Such systems ignore two of 
the key fundamental principles of an efficient tax system – vertical and horizontal equity.  
This research adds to the literature on tax compliance, providing more insight into personal, 
small businesses and informal sector taxation in developing countries. Although there are 
significant volumes of work undertaken in business taxation, there is much less literature on 
the subject, particularly studies which assess individual taxpayer compliance variables in the 
informal sector. This study is the first to assess tax compliance in the informal sector within a 
developing country setting from two angles – Regulators’ / Tax officials’ perspective versus 
Taxpayers’ perspective.  
As noted earlier, this study contributes to the tax compliance discussion, by drawing on the 
Responsive Regulation Theory to assess compliance decisions, by exploring the relationship 
between taxpayers and the tax authority (the regulatory approach adopted) in the informal 
sector and how this interplay manifests into tax compliance/non-compliance. This discussion 
draws on the two key components (pillars) of the theory – (1) regulatory pillar of support and 
(2) regulatory pillar of sanctions, to provide an understanding of the actions by taxpayers. 
The theory advocates for graduated response [either in the form of support or sanctions] that 
considers the actions of taxpayers as the most effective way to engage taxpayers and improve 
compliance. 
Using the ‘responsive regulatory lens’ this study explores and analyses how tax compliance 
behaviour of the informal sector operators are shaped by a regulatory approach that 
recognises taxpayers’ actions and employs support/sanctions that are linked to the level of 
taxpayer’s commitments. 
More specifically, the study aims to: 
• improve understanding and suggest better mechanisms to create a ‘tax compliance 
culture’ among individuals and small businesses operating in the informal sector 
in developing countries; 
• shape our understanding of how responsive regulatory approach can influence tax 
compliance decisions of operators in the informal sector. 
• improve understanding of why individuals make decisions to be tax compliant (in 
part or whole) in developing countries; 
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• improve our understanding of how formal tax compliance process influences 
voluntary tax compliance in the informal sector in a developing country; 
• establish how the relationship between a taxpayer and the tax authority influences 
voluntary compliance. 
In addition to these academic contributions, this study has important policy implications as it 
suggests useful ways for governments and tax policymakers to redesign and administer taxes 
for individuals and businesses operating in the informal economy. 
A single study cannot be fully conclusive on taxation in developing economies, therefore, 
this work will also provide a useful platform for future studies on informal sector taxation. 
 
1.5. Research design and methodology 
As observed earlier (see sections 1.1 and 13), this study addresses the activities of individuals 
as well as small businesses operating in the informal sector. It also includes the tax 
compliance behaviours of those working in the formal sector but who have the chance to 
underreport their total incomes where some of it arises from informal sector activity. Ghana 
is used as a case study. 
This study uses interviews, observations, and questionnaire survey techniques to collect data 
from informal sector operators and tax officials in Ghana. To inform the results, the final part 
of the study also involves interviewing personnel from the international tax policy advisors, 
Adam Smith International.  
The interviews and survey questions targeted at the informal sector operators are designed to 
explore informal taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations (tax morale issues) on tax compliance 
decisions. The study also assesses taxpayers’ compliance decisions in relation to their: 
• the regulatory approach adopted by the tax authority and the overall relationship with 
the tax authority, including the perception of tax revenue usage; 
• tax knowledge - tax education and general awareness of their tax obligations and how 
to meet them;  
• perception of fairness and equity of the tax system, both horizontal and vertical;  
• tax compliance process and cost,  
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• perception of auditing probabilities and nature of fines,  
These themes emanate from prior tax compliance literature in advanced countries and relate 
to formal tax systems to explore the study proposition that a better understanding of these 
issues will help improve our understanding of tax compliance of the informal sector in 
developing countries and help establish the differences/similarities with those in the formal 
sector.  
The first stage of the study involved interviewing participants. The results of the analysis of 
the interviews informed the design of the survey instrument that sought to validate and 
extend the details from the interview responses. See chapter seven for a discussion of the 
study methodology. 
 
1.6. Scope of study 
The Ghanaian informal economy is used as the case study. The research comprises studying 
the tax compliance behaviours of informal sector operators in the country’s two largest 
regions by population and which have the highest informal sectors (Aryee, 2007). The 
decision to limit the study to these two out of the ten regions in the country is because there 
are no significant differences concerning taxable economic activities in the informal sectors 
of the other eight regions based on the classifications given by Aryee (2007) which form the 
basis of the sampling for this study. Therefore, selecting these two will provide a true 
representation of the country’s informal sector businesses.  
As it is a study limited to the informal sector; taxable activities and individuals which are 
purely formal and undertake a formal tax assessment are excluded. 
 
1.7. Content of the thesis 
Chapter one of the study outlines the objectives of the study which are to explore the design 
of informal sector taxation in developing countries and also to identify the key tax 
compliance determinants of the informal sector operators.  
Chapter two is devoted to analysing the concept of the informal economy. The section makes 
a distinction between the types of informal economy – illegal underground activities (exempt 
from this thesis) and economic activities in the informal economy which generates taxable 
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incomes (which is the focus of this study).  This chapter also discusses some of the common 
forms of presumptive taxation approaches as the common form of taxing informal sector 
economic activities. 
Chapter three discusses the tax administration in Ghana. More specifically, the tax system of 
the country is analysed with a particular emphasis on the approaches used by the Ghana 
Revenue Authority (GRA) to tax economic activities in the informal sector.  
Chapter four looks at the concept of tax compliance. The reasons why people pay taxes are 
discussed alongside the drivers for tax noncompliance. In this section, responsive regulation 
and tax morale as an area of modern tax compliance research are further discussed.  
Chapter five systematically describes the research design and the methodology employed to 
find answers to the research questions, which includes survey methodology and face-to-face 
interviews. 
Chapter six describes and presents the results of the data collected. The initial part of this 
chapter analyses the data gathered through the face-to-face interviews with the three main 
participant groups described in chapter seven. The rest of the chapter presents a descriptive 
analysis of the questionnaire data and detailed accounts of the field observations and tax 
expert interviews. 
 Chapter seven undertakes a detailed discussion of the results of the study in relation to 
existing literature. This discussion is based on the objectives of the study and answers each of 
the research questions posed for this study.  In addition, the chapter discusses theoretical 
issues which emerged in relation to the data and the literature on informal sector tax 
compliance. 
This final part, chapter eight presents the summary of the study, the academic contributions, 







THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the concept of the informal economy. It begins by analysing the 
various definitions and measurements of the sector from different prior studies. The section 
also draws a distinction between the two broad divisions of the informal economy – (a) those 
involving illegal activities such as prostitution and drugs and, (b) those involving legal and 
taxable economic activities. Also, this chapter the vital question for informal sector taxation 
studies that researchers have over the years attempted to answer - should the informal sector 
be formalised for tax purposes?  
Finally, this chapter discusses presumptive taxation. As a pre-transactional tax and one of the 
simplest form of taxes to administer, presumptive taxation is the most common type of tax 
used for the informal sector, particularly in developing economies (Thuronyi, 1996, p.1; 
World Bank, 2011, p.130) 
 
2.1. What is the informal sector? 
Within the existing literature, the term ‘informal sector/economy’ has been differently and 
sometimes loosely defined and under different names (Misati, 2007). For instance, previous 
researchers have used names such as; unofficial, irregular, parallel, shadow, informal, 
subterranean, invisible, unrecorded, moonlighting, informal or hidden economy/sector 
(Torgler and Schneider, 2007) or simply grey economy, non-observed, clandestine or the 
black economy (Abiodun and Larry, 2007).  
Even though different researchers have described the sector in different ways, they all 
directly or indirectly refer to activities which are not formal and therefore are either only 
partially regulated, or not regulated at all. Usually, the meaning attached to this term is 
determined by the nature or purpose of the study (Abiodun and Larry, 2007). Crucially, some 
of these studies have identified the distinction between legal and illegal activities within the 
informal economy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Smith, 1994; Mirus and Smith 1997; Eilat and Zinnes, 2004); however, the terminologies 
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used to refer to the informal sector have always remained the same. In this study, as 
discussed in chapter one, informal economy is used in reference to [legal] activities or the 
actions of people which generate taxable economic activities but are either underreported or 
fully concealed from authorities.  
Knowing what aspect of the informal sector this study focuses upon, the key question is now 
to define ‘what constitutes the informal economy?’ What are the characteristics or what 
shapes informal sector activities? What motivates people to operate in the informal sector?  
Finding answers to these questions in the existing literature begins with the need to define the 
concept of ‘informality’ in the economy. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defined the term “informal economy” as all 
economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not 
covered, or insufficiently covered, by formal arrangements. ‘Their activities are not included 
in the law, which means that they are operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they 
are not covered in practice, which means that, although they are operating within the formal 
reach of the law, the law is not applied or not enforced, or the law discourages compliance 
because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or imposes excessive costs’ (ILO, 2002, p.53). 
Similarly, Palmade and Anayiotis, (2005) state that the informal economy is a common 
terminology used to describe the output and workforce of firms not registered with the 
government as well as the unreported activities and workforce of registered firms. 
Feige (1994) defined the informal economy as involving all currently unregistered economic 
activities which contribute to officially calculated GNP in the country/economy. Smith 
(1994) extended this definition by arguing that the informal economy is the market-based 
production of goods and services, whether they are or not legal, which are not detected in 
estimating the official Gross Domestic Product of the country. 
Earlier on, the ILO (1993) described the informal sector as broadly consisting of units 
engaged in the production of goods or services with the core aim to generate employment 
and incomes to the persons concerned. These units, according to the ILO (1993), usually 
operate at a low level of organisation, on a small scale and in most cases, there is little or no 
distinction between labour and capital, as the factors of production are fused. Therefore, 
labour relations are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social 
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. Clearly, operating in 
an environment where capital and labour are fused and where there are no formal enforceable 
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contracts or appropriate labour regulations, will prove a daunting task to any policymaker in 
getting the required information for decision making.  
 
2.2. Theories of the informal sector 
The relationship between the formal and the informal sector is varied but can be broadly 
categorised into three main views. Some studies identify a fourth causal theory seeking to 
explain the informal economy, for example (Maloney 2004). However, the discussion in this 
section adopts the views adopted in the World Bank’s study in 2004. This study suggests that 
there are three3 main schools of thought regarding the relationship between the formal and 
informal economies. 
 
2.2.1. The dualists’ view of the informal economy 
The underlying causal theory of the informal economy, according to the dualists view, is that 
it is created due to exclusion from the economic opportunities in the formal economy. This is 
the result of the imbalances between population growth and industrial employment, and 
people’s skills in relation to the structure of the economic opportunities presented as a result 
of that growth. 
The dualists’ view sees the informal economy as a separate, marginal economy which is not 
directly linked to the formal economy, and which provides income or a safety net for the 
poor (ILO, 1972). The concept of the informal economy was originally derived from the 
literature on the problems of developing countries (Gerxhani, 2006), and it was thus believed 
that this economy existed within the formal economy to absorb excess labour, those who 
would otherwise be unemployed and would have no means of survival. Researchers who 
share this notion, believe that referring to the informal sector as ‘informal’ or hidden or 
illegal, is inappropriate as it simply represents an alternative approach or strategy to 
achieving survival needs (Schneider, 2005; Abiodun and Larry, 2007). According to this 
notion, the study of the informal sector/economy specifically becomes less relevant, it exists 
mainly for providing basic needs, with no profit motive in mind, and therefore operators have 
one basic interest – subsistence. However, a major drawback to this argument is that 
                                                          
3 These schools of thought were adapted from the World Bank Group report (2004) – ‘Fact finding study on the 
informal economy’, (WBG, 2004; p10). 
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informality does not apply only to poor or developing countries, but it is a phenomenon that 
is also present in advanced economies, where subsistence could not be the main driving force 
since there exist in these countries social security (benefits) systems, which provide for basic 
needs. The ILO’s stance on the nature of the informal economy has consistently adopted the 
dualist view as its predominant motivation. All its studies relating to the informal economy, 
notably (2002) and most recently, (2010) are concerned with reducing poverty in order to 
reduce the size of the informal economy in developing countries. Other studies that support 
the dualists’ views, for example, Elijah and Uffort (2007), and Schneider (2009) also propose 
that the rates at which the informal economy increases are in line with countries’ poverty 
levels. 
From the standpoint of the dualists, one can argue why tax compliance is a big challenge 
within this sector – after all survival and not profit is the main drive for operating in the 
sector. 
  
2.2.2. The structuralists’ view of the informal economy 
Adopters of this view conform to the premise that the informal economy comes about due to 
the growth of capitalism and firms’ desire to reduce costs and/or gain competitive advantage 
(WIEGO, 2016). 
The structuralists, for example, Castells and Portes (1989), believe the informal economy to 
be subordinate to the formal economy. To reduce costs, privileged capitalists seek to 
subordinate small producers and traders (Moser, 1978). In addition, the influence of powerful 
labour unions and stringent state regulations such as taxes, health and safety, and other social 
regulations encourage formal organisations to engage in informal operations (Chen, 2012). 
These formal businesses see the ‘loose’ regulation in the informal sector by the government 
compared to the formal sector as an opportunity to increase revenue and reduce tax liabilities. 
The structuralists assert that the informal sector is influenced by and directly linked to the 
activities of formal sector operators.  This view sees the informal sector as existing to provide 
goods and services ‘on the cheap’ to the formal economy. These arrangements usually take 
the form of casual employment and sub-contracting to ‘informal businesses’ and individuals 
by formal local organisations or off-shore industries. The structuralists also suggest that the 
large firms which engage in informal sector operations do so not only to avoid the stringent 
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regulations by the government but also to enrich themselves by deliberately dominating and 
exploiting the informal sector labour force (Chen, 2012). 
The low level of tax compliance in the informal sector may be explained by the motive that 
drives individuals and businesses to operate in the sector. From the structuralists perspective, 
operators of the informal sector are mainly influenced by the less regulation in the informal 
sector and the over regulations in the formal sector including tax laws. This suggests that tax 
avoidance and evasion are central to the initial decisions by the sector operators to engage in 
informal economic activities.  
 
2.2.3. The Legalists’ theory of the economy 
The stance of the legalists is based on the premise that a hostile legal system creates informal 
economic activities. The cost of becoming formal, including registration and licensing, as 
well as the cost of maintaining a formal status such as compliance to taxes and other formal 
arrangements, encourages some business to remain informal. To legalists, informal work 
arrangements are a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by 
government bureaucracies (De Soto, 1990). In this sense, they argue that a high tax burden, 
inefficient or excessive economic regulations, and high and unnecessary bureaucracy, lead to 
growth in the size of the informal sector in most economies. 
Rao and Walton (2004, p.10) provided some interesting twist to the debate on informality 
claiming some native cultures are not compatible with a modern market economy. They 
propose that some societies have large informal economies because their cultures develop in 
such a way that the informal economy is a natural manifestation, and thus, their people 
actively shy away from the form economy. Therefore, in such economies, indigenous 
institutions may not be compatible with a modern market economy, indicating that a culture 
change is required to make people accept reforms for formality. 
In a comparative study of the informal sectors of Peru, Egypt and Tanzania, from the 
legalists perspective, Rogers (2009) refutes the culture argument, and asserts that culture and 
history influence the way people adapt to the market but these factors do not suggest that 
they are incapable of participating in a modern market economy (i.e. formal sector setting). 
Rogers (2009, p.39) concludes that ‘majority of people are restricted to participation in the 
informal economy because the regulations of the formal economy do not permit them to 
easily carry out all the functions necessary to realize daily economic transactions’. Just as the 
21 
 
structuralists view, the legalists stance indicates that regulations including tax payment could 
explain the size of the informal economy. 
 
2.2.4 Informal sector policy recommendations from the three theoretical standpoints 
The dualists, structuralists and the legalists offer various policy recommendations for the 
informal sector. 
As noted in section 2.2.1, the Dualists subscribe to the notion that informal sector operators 
and their activities have limited (if any) linkages to the formal economy. The units and 
activities within the informal sector operate as a distinct separate sector of the economy and 
that the informal workforce, who are largely self-employed and believed to be the less 
advantaged of the labour market, pay relatively little attention to the links between informal 
enterprises and government regulations (ILO, 1972; Chen, 2012). For the informal sector to 
be an active sector in poverty alleviation strategies and as a source for revenue mobilisation 
to the state, it is recommended that the government creates more jobs and provides social 
services, infrastructure and credit, and business development services to informal operators 
(Chen, 2012). 
The Structuralists who see the informal and the formal economies as intrinsically linked 
believe that both informal enterprises and informal wage workers as subordinated to the 
interests of capitalist development, providing cheap goods and services. The structuralists 
argue that governments should address the unequal relationship between “big business” and 
subordinated producers and workers by regulating both commercial and employment 
relationships (Moser, 1978; Castells and Portes, 1989; Chen, 2012). 
The Legalists assert that excessive regulations and complex bureaucratic systems within the 
formal sector increase the informal sector (see section 2.2.3). A hostile legal system, 
according to this view, leads the self-employed to engage in informal operations. The 
legalists argue that to reduce the size of the informal sector, and/or to ensure its proper 
functioning, governments should have less regulation within the formal sector, particularly 
within the labour market (Swaminathan, 1991). The legalists also propose more free-market 
policies to facilitate the growth potentials of the entrepreneurs within the informal sector (De 
Soto, 2000).  Besides, governments should introduce ‘simplified bureaucratic procedures to 
encourage informal enterprises to register and extend legal property rights for the assets held 
by informal operators to unleash their productive potential and convert their assets into real 
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capital’ (Chen, 2012). Appendix 1 presents a summary of policy recommendations for the 
three theories of the informal sector 
This study focuses on all three views of the informal sector – The Dualists, the Structuralists, 
and the Legalists. Even though the dualists’ view asserts that there are no profit intentions 
among operators of the informal sector and that people operate in this sector for subsistence 
needs making it difficult to assess the tax compliance determinants. However, most 
developing countries adopt presumptive based taxation systems (see further discussion in the 
last part of this chapter), which do not consider profits made by individuals and businesses. 
By these [presumptive taxation] systems, all individuals undertaking income generation, and 
not necessarily taxable economic activities fall within the tax net, regardless of their income 
levels, therefore omitting the dualists’ view could make the findings inconclusive. In spite of 
the varying views about the informal sector, it plays a vital role in the national economy. The 
next section (2.3) assesses the role and impact of the informal sector. 
 
 
2.3. The size and role of the informal sector 
The size of the informal sector and its contribution to developing economies, has long 
attracted the attention of both policymakers and scholars alike (Ishengoma and Kappel, 
2006).   The informal sector is a very important part of the economic activities of developing 
economies, and forms a significant part of the tax revenues and the GDPs of these countries, 
as compared to the advanced nations where the size [of the informal sector] relative to the 
overall economy is small albeit significant, for example the OECD nations. Figure 2.0 and 
2.1 show the size of the informal sector as a percentage of the GDP of elected developing and 





































Figures 2.0 and 2.1 show the size of informal economies in developed versus developing 
countries. Countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia have mostly similar and the largest 
size of informal economies compared to those in Europe, North America, and Eastern Asia. 
To assess the importance of the informal sector in the developing economies, it is first 
important to ask the question; do the governments of the developing countries such as those 
in Sub-Saharan Africa pay unemployment or any form of direct [cash] state benefits to the 
disabled, the elderly or the unemployed? The answer to this question is certain – No. How 
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then do these categories of people and others in the developing world who have no formal 
jobs and any form of [formal] continuous incomes survive over time? 
The informal sector is known to be less regulated, with no or minimal barriers to entry and 
with most activities in the informal economy requiring minimal capital, people easily find 
themselves there to earn a living which otherwise would have been difficult to achieve.  This 
is the view of the informal economy mainly held by the dualists (ILO 1972) which has since 
been supported by several studies (Gerxhani, 2004; Schneider, 2005; Abiodun and Larry, 
2007). 
In developing countries, many people survive from small trading activities such as street 
hawking of small volume items such as water or sweets or simple services like shoe shining, 
up to larger ventures such as grocery shops and taxi cabs, and informal car garages (World 
Bank, 2004). Misati (2007), in support of the structuralists’ ideology of the informal 
economy, found that in most developing economies neither the public sector nor the formal 
private sector is able to provide adequate employment prospects to cater for the rise in the 
labour force, leaving informal sector work (usually in the form of self-employment) the only 
obvious choice.  Self-employment could simply represent any form of activity that the 
operators could engage in for survival. Judging by such simple justification, would it be 
worth having stiff policies to regulate the sector? Could the people in the informal sector who 
are without formal jobs [in the absence of social benefits] still survive? Any form of stiff 
regulation of the sector in such circumstances would be counterproductive in the long term as 
the formal economy just cannot absorb them (at survival rates of pay at least). In addition, the 
dynamism and entrepreneur spirit within the informal sector which is the result of 
competition, innovation and higher efficiency due to the low level of regulation, (Schneider 
and Klingmair, 2004) could be lost if the sector becomes over-regulated. 
Realistically, no matter how small the tax rate will be, taxing all activities within the informal 
economy is an impossibility. Since most tax authorities use presumptive based approaches 
which take no consideration of one’s profit/income in determining tax liability, there is a 
high possibility that the taxes raised could be higher than the income generated by some 
operators. Therefore, from the dualists’ perspective, a clear distinction should be made by 
policymakers about what activities are regulated but untaxed and what are both regulated and 
taxed accordingly.  
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In terms of its contribution to the overall economy, some researchers believe that the sector is 
characterised by activities that have negative social and economic consequences, and that the 
state must discourage the operation within the informal sector (for example, Grabiner, 2000; 
Gallin, 2001). Others support the promotion of the development of the sector especially those 
adopting the dualist’s perspective (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Palmade and Anayiotis, 2005; 
Williams et al., 2007; Feld and Schneider 2010). 
The informal economy has a crucial role to play in the economic growth of countries 
particularly the economies of the developing world. As noted earlier, whereas opponents of 
the positive role of the informal sector argue that governments should institute programs to 
encourage operators to move to the formal economy, supporters have strong opposing views. 
For instance, Misati (2007) believes that there should be no need to design policies aiming to 
bring the informal sector to the fold of the formal economy because there will always be an 
informal economy even in heavily industrialised and advanced nations (Gërxhani, 2014). 
Misat (2007) further states that if a government tries to introduce restrictions in one area of 
the economy, an informal market is created in the other. For instance, if the government tries 
to protect domestic producers by imposing restrictions on foreign goods, such barriers will in 
effect create an incentive for smuggling of the banned goods into the economy by illegal or 
informal means, meaning a new informal economy is created for the banned goods4. This 
does not suggest that the informal sector should not be without any form of regulation. Singer 
(1992) suggested that the informal sector is not homogeneous and grouped the activities of 
the sector into two parts. These are the upper layer or the intermediate sector and the 
working poor. The upper layer are businesses and activities of individuals which are for 
profit-seeking whilst the working poor are those engaged in the sector purely for survival 
needs. This classification conforms to the structuralist idea (intermediate sector – profit-
seeking) and the dualist’s view (working poor, for survival needs). This indicates that no 
single policy for the informal sector will be appropriate. Singer (1992, p.77) therefore 
suggested a two-fold policy approach for the informal sector – (a) policy for the upper layer 
or the intermediate sector should be directed towards promoting productivity, linkage and 
integration with the formal economy and (b) policies for the ‘working poor’ part of the 
informal economy should aim at poverty alleviation and welfare promotion.  
                                                          
4 Misati, (2007) gave this example to explain the impact of stringent regulations on the informal sector – (i.e. 
adopting a legalist perspective on the justification for an informal sector). 
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Ishengoma and Kappel (2006) added that the informal sector plays a very crucial role in the 
overall economy, from job creation to producing goods otherwise would not be made 
available by the formal sector. They also share the structuralists view and argued that the 
informal sector has a strong intermediary role as it provides production linkages that help 
both the informal and the formal sectors, and which subsequently affect the aggregate 
economy. This relationship, according to Ishengoma and Kappel (2006), occurs most 
commonly in a forward linkage - where the informal sector operators supply to businesses in 
the formal sector, and this type of relationship usually helps the informal sector supplier in 
return. However, as identified by (Arimah, 2001), where this occurs there may be concerns of 
exploitative linkage as there are minimal regulations protecting the businesses in the informal 
economy. This exploitative relationship offers one of the reasons why policies may be 
required to regulate the informal sector, not only for tax collection purposes but also to help 
protect its operators and increase their capacity to produce. 
In summary, the informal sector offers a range of support and links to the formal economy 
which finally impacts on the aggregate economy. These range from supplying scarce 
products and services to offering employment opportunities to the disadvantaged. Also, as 
concluded by Misati (2007), there will always be an informal sector as an attempt to 
formalise one area will undoubtedly lead to the creation of a new informal economy.  There 
is also evidence of a positive relationship between informal sector activities and investment, 
and as suggested by Singer (1992) also see (Misati, 2007), the creation of wealth and 
reduction of poverty among developing economies particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa is 
directly linked with having a larger informal sector.  
 
2.4. Mechanisms to support informal sector operation 
Policymakers should not only be concerned about what they get directly from the informal 
sector in the form of business and other direct taxation, but it is vital that the sector is viewed 
from a positive angle, as a direct partner to the formal sector in all poverty reduction 
strategies in the long run (Singer, 1992).   
If possible, adopting an appropriate macroeconomic policy that suits both the informal and 
formal sectors could be ideal. In most instances, and because of the negative lenses through 
which most policy makers and scholars view the informal sector, policies that regulate the 
27 
 
overall economy seem to always favour the formal sector. As discussed earlier, looking at the 
interrelationships that exist between these two sectors, in certain circumstances, in theory, 
combined policies could be designed to suit both. However, in some situations where they 
serve completely different purposes (i.e. if some aspects of the informal sector follow a 
dualist motivation) there should be appropriate policy adjustment (Singer, 1992), to ensure 
that enterprises in the informal sector are not disadvantaged, and that there is adequate 
motivation for firms to operate in the informal economy just as in the formal sector. The 
study by the UNESCAP (2006) demonstrates this positively and concludes that 
macroeconomic policies which aim to promote pro-poor growth and are also sensitive to 
gender-related issues, would suit the informal economy. 
Another difficult hurdle faced by informal sector operators is the availability of capital, a 
factor which usually impedes their ability to reach their full potential or to raise productivity. 
As businesses may operate under capacity, it implies that they do not generate enough 
capital, in the course of their operation, to be able to provide for suitable reinvestment.  Also, 
due to limited capital, they may have less opportunity to buy materials or resources in bulk 
and therefore at cheap prices. To obtain capital for reinvestment, according to the study by 
UNESCAP (2006), informal sector operators tend to borrow from friends, families and 
informal lenders, however, the informal sector participants may be better off if they were to 
obtain such capital from formal sources such as the commercial banks. The study further 
cited a lack of awareness among the operators of the informal sector regarding the 
availability of credit facilities in the formal economy, in addition to the levels of collateral 
normally demanded by these banks to grant credit facilities, as the main obstacles denying 
them from obtaining larger capital for investment (UNESCAP, 2006). 
Education and training have a positive impact on the performance of a worker (King, 2011), 
and governments could consider making training facilities and programs accessible to 
informal sector operators. Informal sector workers often have limited or no formal education, 
and as described by Rafiq (2010) low educational levels can affect not only productivity but 
also the awareness and understanding of their contribution to the state [about the need for, 
when and how much] in the form of payment of taxes. The state could provide education and 
training programs which could be tailored to enhance the skills and productivity of the 
informal sector worker (World Bank, 2004), which would subsequently have a positive 
impact on the aggregate economy by enhancing the net contributions of the sector through 
job creation and taxes.  
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Besides, it would be very important to have formal regulations, labour rights, and effective 
legal systems available to the informal sector operators, so law enforcement and contracts are 
respected just as within the formal sector. Workers in the informal sector may be poorly paid, 
work in unsafe environments or be more susceptible to being cheated due to a lack of formal 
contract or their lack of awareness of the legal services available to them, (Broadman and 
Isik, 2007). 
Furthermore, physical infrastructure has always been a major problem for informal sector 
participants. Most informal sector participants operate in areas with poor infrastructure, in the 
form of roads, storage facilities, electricity, and water, (World Bank, 2004). Farmers of 
perishable goods for example, who have no access to the better means of transport, may lose 
out as their produce could get damaged before reaching the market. In addition, with most 
areas having unstable power, businesses relying on electricity will not be able to operate at 
certain periods. Improving access to infrastructure could enhance productivity and reduce 
operational costs, therefore, to integrate the informal sector within the overall economy, 
physical infrastructure is one of the key areas that policymakers need to address (UNESCAP, 
2006).   
Among others, the ILO, taking the dualist perspective, recommends the promotion of the 
bargaining power of small enterprises in order to manage growing opportunity and risks, and 
the expansion of formal entrepreneurship and access to markets by streamlining registration 
and other bureaucratic processes, the reduction of transaction costs and the need of making 
available tax incentives for micro-enterprises (ILO, 2012, p.2). The ILO’s (2012) study, also 
argued from the legalist perspective. It stressed that strengthening the legal framework to 
ensure respect for informal sector workers such as freedom of association, and eradication of 
forced labour, as well as improving labour legislation and codes of practice, are some of the 
effective measures that could help integrate the informal sector to the overall economy.  
 
2.5. Informal sector taxation challenges - evidence from existing literature 
Having explained the fact that developing countries need to obtain tax revenue from their 
informal sectors [and that the process and discipline of tax application on this sector have 
other benefits to the country beyond its tax-raising contribution alone] this section explores 
some of the challenges facing tax authorities in taxing the sector. 
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The key challenge faced by developing economies to having an effective tax system in the 
informal sector is tax administration, due primarily to the diverse and complex nature of the 
activities within the sector and the difficulty of obtaining relevant data for decisions as 
operators seldom keep records. 
Studies have suggested various ways of tackling the problem, but the pressing issue is 
whether we could have a ‘fix it all’ approach that developing countries could adopt. 
For instance, on tax policy for developing economies, the United Nations (2009) proposes 
broadening the tax base as a solution to bringing the informal sector into the tax net. In 
administration, the UN suggests equity and transparency are the two main strategies to 
encourage greater tax compliance. On the expenditure of tax revenue, it proposed that 
governments should target to address key challenges and development priorities; and must be 
transparent, as this will gradually cultivate a compliance culture.  
A study by the World Bank (1997) found that operators of the informal sector are poorly 
protected by the legal system; they have limited access to capital markets  and mainly find 
themselves disadvantaged and distant from the use of public services such as skills training 
programmes and government-sponsored credit facilities (i.e. some aspects of the legalist 
perspective can be said to apply in such situations). Such disadvantages faced by these 
operators in the informal sector may thus influence their commitment levels to the state and 
could explain the low compliance rate or their resistance to tax. In a more recent study, also 
proposing legalistic perspective solutions, the World Bank (2010) suggests that removing 
factors which encourage individuals and businesses to operate in the informal sector, and 
bringing more of the informal taxable activities into the fold of the formal economy, could 
systematically reduce the hurdle of dealing with a culture of low tax compliance. However, 
this study fails to reflect the fact that it is impossible to reduce the informal sector to zero as 
that there will always be informal sector operators (Misati, 2007). Therefore, policy 
instruments should be specific for the informal sector operation and should not seek ways to 
bring them into the fold of the formal sector since dualist and structuralist perspective 
policies may be required in certain circumstances. No matter how attractive the formal sector 
will be, there will still be individuals or businesses who may find the informal sector more 
attractive for their businesses to operate within. Thus, individuals and businesses who operate 
in the informal sector do so, either for survival needs as proposed by the dualists’ theory 
(ILO, 1972), or to escape the stringent state regulations of the formal economy, as suggested 
30 
 
by the structuralists (Castells and Portes, 1989).  This implies that attempting to make the 
formal sector attractive is not likely to be the only approach to bringing the informal sector 
operators into the tax net.  
There is an argument in the literature that building capacity in core tax administration 
functions such as registration, filing and payment enforcement, debt collection, audit, 
taxpayer services, and the processing of appeals will promote voluntary compliance (e.g. 
Russell, 2010). Russell (2010) however, recognised the impact of technology in promoting 
compliance tax stressing that information and communications technology are increasingly 
playing a critical role in compliance management. He argues that the use of ICT, especially 
in the informal sector is crucial, stating it could promote detection and compliance through 
the automatic gathering of third-party information as a by-product of natural business 
processes. 
Ongwamuhana (2011), adopts the legalist perspective and argues that low tax compliance 
could be attributed to the failings of government which include corruption, authoritarianism, 
wastefulness, and unfairness in the tax system. He states that some people use these failings 
of the state to claim legitimacy for tax non-compliance. Ongwamuhana (2011) again argues 
that when people find the tax rates unfair and there is evidence of state failings, they will 
avoid tax completely or in worse situations, will opt for payment of bribes to corrupt tax 
officials to escape big payments to the government. In his view, a tax policy will be much 
more effective for informal sector elements that are created by legalistic perspective concerns 
if it first addresses these issues (government failings) and works towards building trust in the 
government and the legal system then the result will lead to promoting improved voluntary 
compliance. 
Even though all these proposals may be suitable in their own right, what they fail to address 
is the extent of support that revenue authorities could/should offer to individuals to promote 
voluntary tax compliance, either from the dualist, structuralist or the legalist perspective. For 
example, what impact could a ‘free tax skills training’ or workshops have on compliance? 
Such training could be effective as small businesses and individuals may not have to rely on 
payment to tax experts (at their own cost), to be compliant. Also, what effect could a local 
government funding tailored to tax registration and the formalisation of business operation 
have on small businesses and individuals operating in the informal economy? Such a scheme 
could promote tax registration, payment, and subsequently promote compliance as businesses 
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and individuals try not to conceal activities to qualify for subsequent assistance. However, 
these could be difficult to achieve within a developing country.  
Difficulties in understanding the tax laws could also explain why there’s low compliance, 
especially among informal sector operators. In response to tax law complexities, many 
countries have responded by simplifying their tax laws. New Zealand for example, opted to 
write their tax law in ‘plain English’ in response, but no change could be attributed to 
compliance as a result (Kirchler, 2007). What constitutes a ‘‘plain language’’ in most 
developing countries which have diverse communities with high disparities in literacy rates 
and numerous dialects? 
Aside from this, most of these developing economies, especially those in Asia and Africa, 
face the problem of language [and this coupled with the high illiteracy rate could be a 
potential explanation to the misunderstanding of existing tax laws]. For example, there are an 
estimated 2,000 different languages spoken among just 53 African nations with Nigeria, 
Angola, Ghana, Zambia, Cameroon, and Chad having over 150 on average, of existing and 
spoken local dialects (ACALAN, 2012)5. A policy challenge, which confronts these 
countries, is how easy it would be for tax authorities to publish tax information in succinct of 
these languages to provide adequate coverage with its population. 
Again, the existing tax compliance literature has been silent on one of the biggest challenges 
many developing economies face, adult illiteracy6, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa7, the 
Caribbean, West and South Asia and North Africa, which account for an estimated 79% of 
the world’s illiterate adults, (UNESCO, 2008). 
Corruption is another obstacle preventing developing countries from not only the design of 
optimal tax policy in the informal sector but also in raising the substantial tax revenue. The 
corrupt practices of tax officials, including the taking of bribes from business owners, is a 
major drawback to achieving an effective and efficient tax system in these sectors. The 
influence of bribery and corruption constantly affects the success of tax policies, therefore 
strengthening the legal framework to counter corruption is important, but ensuring an 
                                                          
5 ACALAN is the acronym for African Academy of Languages which is an affiliate of the African union. 
details of this data is also available at: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/african_languages.htm 
6 (UNDP, 2011) defines Adult literacy rate as the percentage of the population ages 15 and older who can, with 
understanding, both read and write a short simple statement on their everyday life. 
7 A recent survey even reveals much worse situation for these countries and shows about 60% of adult to be 
literate (UNDP, 2011). 
32 
 
effective and vigorous application of those laws is essential to detect, deter and prosecute 
corrupt practices, (OECD, 2009). The key prepositions identified in this chapter (much of 
which have not been addressed in the informal sector in the developing countries context) 
form the basis of this study and are tested empirically. 
As observed earlier in this chapter, due to the challenges posed by the informal sector, and 
for administrative convenience, most countries adopt presumptive tax approaches to taxing 
this sector.  The subsequent sections of this chapter discuss some of the presumptive based 
taxation approaches normally used for the informal sector. 
 
2.6 Presumptive Taxation 
2.6.1 Introduction  
Presumptive taxation involves the use of an indirect means of ascertaining tax liability, which 
is different from the usual rules based on the taxpayer’s accounts. The term “presumptive”, is 
used to indicate that there is a legal presumption that the taxpayer’s income is no less than 
the amount resulting from application of the indirect method (Thuronyi, 1996, p.1; World 
Bank, 2011, p.130).    
Adopting presumptive taxation helps to combat tax evasion by those taxpayer groups who do 
not keep accurate financial records or completely fail to keep any financial records for tax 
purposes, as it allows the authorities to presume their incomes and assign an appropriate 
amount of tax.  
Presumptive taxation is sometimes seen as a ‘win-win situation’ for both tax authorities and 
taxpayers. It at least partly addresses the concerns of both parties by providing a simplified 
tax compliance process without full financial transparency and without involving excessive 
tax compliance or administration costs (World Bank, 2011).  
Achieving the optimal aim of every tax regime – promoting fairness in the form of vertical 
and horizontal equity - is a challenge when adopting presumptive taxation, however, there 
are a number of factors which influence the widespread use of presumptive based taxation in 




2.6.2 Why use Presumptive Taxation? 
As opposed to the conventional form of taxation where tax paid is based on specific tax rates 
levied on income or profit made, or a flat figure (in the case of VAT and duties), presumptive 
taxation takes a different approach to tax income. Taxation under this system is based on 
‘assumed’ or ‘estimated’ income using a number of factors as the basis for measuring the tax 
payable at any point or in any particular assessment period. Presumptive taxation 
encompasses a ‘number of procedures under which a ‘desired’ base for taxation (direct or 
indirect) is not measured but is inferred from simple indicators which are more easily 
measured than the base itself’ (Stern and Ahmad, 1991, p.276).  
The hard-to-tax, which normally comprises of small retail establishments, professionals, and 
farmers, are of particular importance to developing countries, however, they are the category 
of taxpayers who require a different treatment to the refined method of tax administration and 
provisions in the revenue code, which are those often directly drawn from industrialised 
countries (World Banks 1987, p.253). For these types of businesses, the World Bank’s 
publication (1987) suggested that using presumptive taxation is the most realistic approach of 
bringing them to the tax net. 
Jacobs (2013) argued that small businesses, farmers and the self-employed represent a 
substantial number of the taxpaying public in developing economies, but are the segment that 
mostly lacks the ability or the desire to comply with tax obligation voluntarily. These groups 
of taxpayers may not keep proper books and accounting records to self-assess their tax 
liabilities. They are the group that poses to every tax authority the greatest difficulty - they 
are the most expensive to properly, and efficiently, administer to collect the desired amount 
of taxes. Consequently, in most cases, many taxpayers may elude the tax net and may 
completely escape being taxed altogether (Jacobs, 2013). These groups of taxpayers are 
therefore best served by the tax authority designing, promoting and establishing an optional 
presumption scheme (Jacobs, 2013, p.12). Typical options proposed for the design of a 
presumptive tax system include; 




• estimated income -  presumption taxation based on assessments of indicators or 
proxies of wealth which are specific to a particular activity or occupation – indicators 
may include business location, employees or capacity/size of business;  
• minimum taxes – fixed minimum tax liability regardless of the taxpayers’ income or 
activity; and,  
• gross turnover/receipt - lump-sum presumptive taxation based on business turnover 
declared and filed.  
 Presumption taxation is one of the most common approaches to taxing informal sector 
activities, not only in developing countries but it also can be found in more advanced 
economies such as France (Stern and Ahmad, 1991, p.276; Makedonskiy, 2005). The main 
justification for the widespread use of presumption taxation in the informal sector is partly 
attributed to the high collection cost, capacity constraints, and incentive constraints8 
(Brautigam et al., 2008). The following section looks at different presumptive taxation 
approaches usually used to tax the informal sector. 
 
2.6.3 Methods of Presumptive Taxation 
The type of presumptive income taxation approaches which may be adopted by a tax 
authority may include standard assessment, estimated assessment, visible signs of wealth, the 
value of assets, and change net wealth. These methods which are used in deciding the 
applicable presumptive tax payable by a particular taxpayer group in a country are discussed 
below. Also, see appendix 5 for list of presumptive taxes in selected countries. 
  
2.6.3.1 Standard Assessment 
The standard assessment method is the most widely used in presumption taxation regimes. 
The standard assessment method of presumption tax involves assigning lump-sum taxes to 
taxpayers based on their occupation or business activity (Jacobs, 2013). 
                                                          
8 Educated Tax Officials may not find patrolling poorer areas to identify tax evaders an attractive compared to 
working in other areas of tax enforcement such as VAT or Customs; or sometimes officers may just dislike 
dealing with illiterate operators, dangerous and violent tax payers, a feature which is predominant within the 
informal sector and more importantly associated with Presumptive Taxation.  
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The standard assessment presumption taxation is established by first identifying the average 
taxable income of a few individuals and businesses selected at random which is normally 
determined by establishing the average hour’s input, with an average level of effort, 
undertaken with an average level of risk (Valevich et al., 2004). For example, Ghana adopted 
these steps to determine the tax liabilities for taxpayers when it first introduced a standard 
assessment in the 1970s (World Bank, 2011).  
The standard assessment method is open to less corruption compared to the estimated 
assessment method (see section 2.6.3.2 below), however, the issue of equity is difficult to 
address with this approach. 
Despite its simplicity, the standard assessment does not always produce the desired results. 
For example, Ghana’s 2002 budget indicated that the standard assessment tax collected from 
the Small and Medium Taxpayers (SMT) group was over 75% short of the potential revenue 
target (Terkper, 2003, p.213). 
A study by the World Bank (2011) also recognises the shortfall of the standard assessment 
presumptive method and suggests that it could be a poor way to mobilise revenue unless the 
fixed payments are indexed to inflation, and that taxpayers are regularly assessed and, where 
necessary, are moved to different tax categories as their taxable incomes change. Without 
these measures, the standard assessment may not be horizontally equitable and may be 
generally regressive, as taxpayers in the same category but with different situations9 and 
incomes may pay the same amount. 
 
2.6.3.2 Estimated Assessment 
The estimated assessment is also another common method of the presumptive tax system 
which is used predominantly in sectors or activities which are hard to tax. 
In designing this type of tax, tax authorities establish criteria which relate to the use of 
indicators such as labour, physical input, location, and floor space to determine the amount of 
taxes a taxpayer should be liable to (Ahmad and Stern, 1991). This approach is used to tax 
individuals and businesses who do not keep any accurate financial records. France 
administers this through the Forfait system where the tax authority involves sector 
representatives on deciding the coefficients and indices (IMF, 1996; Thuronyi, 2004). 
                                                          




Switzerland also has a ‘lump sum’ (same as the Forfait) taxation which is based on the 
annual rental value of a taxpayer’s residential property. South Korea and Israel have similar 
systems called ‘tachshiv’ presumption (Ahmad and Stern, 1991; Thuronyi, 1996). 
The Israeli Tachshiv is an estimated assessment presumption tax designed around sets of 
objective indicators to estimate the income of taxpayers in different occupations. To arrive at 
a more representative figure, the Tachsiv is prepared for each industry, usually after years of 
extensive research and visits to sample businesses. This then follows a discussion of the 
average profit of a particular industry and its relationship with the assigned indicators with 
industry representatives before the final tax to be paid on the assessment is issued. Typical 
indicators may include business location, seating capacity (in the case of a restaurant) or a 
number of employees (for factories/shops) (Valevich et al., 2004, p.3). 
 
2.6.3.3 Changes to Net Wealth Presumption Taxation  
This type of presumption tax involves determining the differences between the beginning and 
end of year net wealth for tax purposes (Ahmad and Stern, 1991). However, compared to 
other methods of presumption taxation, it is not popular due to the difficulty and the 
complexity of establishing net wealth and the two points. It was once a common form of 
taxation among many South American countries such as Columbia, Mexico, and Argentina, 
but the difficulty in administering the ‘net wealth’ over the period of assessment led to its 
widespread abolition in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Bird, 1991, p.323).  
With high inflation in developing countries, estimating net wealth will always be 
problematic. Furthermore, a system based on net wealth also has the potential of encouraging 
taxpayers to increase their liabilities to reduce taxable net wealth. Tanzi (1985, p.235)10 states 
that the administrative constraints within developing countries render the application of net 
wealth taxes unproductive and inequitable and that it has proved rather costly to those 
developing countries which tried to implement it. Therefore, it is not now a widely-used form 
of taxation in developing countries. 
 
                                                          
10 Cited in (Bird 1991, p323) 
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2.6.3.4 Value of Asset Presumptive Taxation 
The values of certain types of assets are used to estimate the amount of taxes that the owners 
of such assets should pay in some tax regimes (IMF, 1987). 
This is very common in some South American countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and 
Chile, and despite the issue of valuation inaccuracies, it is argued that this approach leads to a 
more accurate application of tax since it is based on income generated by the asset over the 
year (Thuronyi, 1996, p.15). In Chile, farmers who do not have accurate financial records for 
tax purposes, pay a 10% fixed rate of tax on the assessed value of their farm for the year. 
However, farmers are allowed to challenge such taxes if they are able to demonstrate a lower 
income than that estimated (i.e. usually rebuttable). Columbia, on the other hand, adopts the 
irrebuttable system and levies an 8% rate on all taxpayers without any possibility to 
challenge it (IMF, 1987). 
Taxing on the value of assets is useful in countries which experience high economic 
downturns, particularly those with persistently high inflation.  It is argued that taxes on 
enterprises cannot generally be relied upon during periods of high inflation, due to the fact 
that viable businesses may declare losses to the inflation effects, thereby eroding the tax 
revenue otherwise generated (Sadka and Tanzi, 1993). In this instance, the system of taxation 
is based on the value of assets and it disregards other macroeconomic effects on businesses. 
The idea of a tax on the value of assets has been in place for several years, believing to be 
first introduced by the Romans in Milan back in the 17th Century.  It replaced the net wealth 
taxes in Argentina and Mexico from the 1990s partly to ensure that businesses contributed 
their fair share to the Treasury and also to promote efficiency among business enterprises 
(Sadka and Tanzi, 1993). A challenge to this form of taxation is whether the tax liability 
should be based on the net or gross value of the assets and if there should be a consideration 
for indexation (in this case depreciation of the asset’s value) over time. 
 
 
2.6.3.5 Gross receipts / Turn-over 
This is an approach which involves the application of a fixed minimum income tax (OECD, 
2009, p.127) regardless of the size of the business or the level of its activities (Reinikka and 
Collier, 2001, p.286). This is credited against the actual business tax; however, it does not 
allow any refunds in the event of shortfalls in income or profit made. 
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Under a gross receipts presumption tax, businesses are required to pay a fixed amount of tax 
on gross incomes received without any consideration to costs incurred in relation to that 
receipt for which the payment is due (Reinikka and Collier, 2001). In most countries where 
there exists gross receipt presumptive taxation, there also exists a minimum tax. Put simply, 
some schemes specify a tax burden or minimum tax irrespective of the taxpayer's level of 
income or economic activity; others levy the tax as a relatively low percentage of turnover or 
assets, and where both systems exist, businesses tend to pay the larger of the two (World 
Bank, 2011).  
From January 2013, the Seychelles Revenue Commission (SRC) adopted a gross receipt 
presumptive tax system in an attempt to improve voluntary compliance through a simplified 
compliance tax process. This system is for businesses with an annual turnover not exceeding 
SR 1 million (approximately £51,505)11. The SRC justifies the rationale for this tax regime 
stating, ‘we want to make it easier and cheaper for businesses to comply with their 
obligations as taxpayers with a system that reduces compliance burden in terms of time, 
money and effort required’ (SRC, 2013). The rate is capped at 1.5% of the business’ annual 
turnover12. The annual turnover is determined on a cash basis on gross receipts derived from 
its activity. Businesses expenses are not taken into account, and businesses are put into 
brackets. The actual business receipt is not used in determining the tax liability; instead, the 
SRC uses the previous year’s gross receipts as the tax base for the current year. The 
presumptive tax return of these businesses is done once a year on a simplified ‘one-page’ 
document, compared to the multiple page tax returns required to be completed by small 
business owners in previous years (SRC, 2013). 
 
2.6.3.6 Visible signs of wealth 
This is a type of presumptive tax approach which involves the tax authority using certain 
indicators as a presumption to determine the amount of tax to be paid by a taxpayer. Using 
this approach, the tax authorities for example in Italy, France, and other Francophone African 
countries, build tax codes using these visible signs to determine the cash income equivalence 
(Ahmad and Stern, 1991, p.278). Indicators used may include the main or secondary 
residence, air travels, electricity consumption (Thuronyi, 1996). The challenge with this 
                                                          





approach is obvious – how does a tax authority codify a cash equivalence of a particular sign 
of wealth? In addition, do all signs of wealth necessarily equate to wealth? For instance, 
someone may have a servant in the house for disability needs rather than being rich or may 
travel for family or health reasons rather than business or holidays, etc.  
Furthermore, this approach may encourage illegal activities. For example, a tax authority 
which adopts the visible signs of wealth rather than physically conducting an assessment to 
determine real wealth may be encouraged to tax illegal activities such as drug dealing – 
attention may be shifted to the tax revenue rather than assessing the legality of the activity 
being taxed. 
 
2.6.4 Presumptive taxation systems in selected advanced and middle-income countries 
Although presumptive taxation schemes are popular around the world, there are differences 
in the systems used across countries as almost every tax regime tries to operate the system in 
a different way.  Studies by Engelschalk, (2005, p.5) a outlined number of presumptive taxes 
practices across different countries. For example, Albania uses gross turnover tax where 
taxpayers with income of £13,500 - £55,00013 pay 4% on their gross receipts. On the other 
hand, Lithuania operates optional presumptive tax system where taxpayers with income 
under £19,500 pay a fixed amount or undertake formal assessment. Russia uses a number of 
factors to determine the tax liability under its presumption tax system, such as type of 
industry, number of employees and type of ownership (i.e. entrepreneur or company). France 
operates a more complex lumpsum presumptive taxes system where a taxpayer must furnish 
information with respect to the preceding year: purchases, sales, the value of closing 
inventory, number of employees, amount of wages paid, and number of cars owned by the 
taxpayer, etc. to determine the tax liability. See appendix 5 for common presumptive taxes in 
selected countries. 
The differences among the types of the presumption taxes may be explained by both the 
economic and the general business environment of the countries, however, Engelschalk 
(2005) pointed out that largely these presumptive tax systems are the result of 
recommendations from key donors and policy advisors such as the World Bank and IMF. 
Apart from revenue generation, some of the key motives for these presumptive tax regimes 
                                                          
13 Turnover 2-8 million Lek. Exchange rate: £1 = 144.5 Lek on 24/05/18 from www.xe.com  
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are the improvement of the business environment or the simplification of tax administration 
and the fight against the informal sector as noted by Engelschalk (2005). The next sections 
analyse some of the forms of presumptive taxation. 
 
2.6.5 Forms of Presumptive Taxation 
Presumptive taxation may take different forms. The form a particular country adopts depends 
on the rights and involvement of the taxpayers. While some systems allow a degree of 
taxpayer involvement, others have full control of the system vested in the hands of the tax 
officials/authority. 
Presumptive taxation is evident in almost every tax jurisdiction, even in advanced economies, 
but it’s very much a common feature of developing countries where large informal sectors 
are present and difficult to tax (World Bank, 1987). The different types and forms of 
presumptive taxation have different motives which include incentive effects, revenue effects, 
distributional consequences, and administration costs considerations which are discussed 
below;  
 
2.6.5.1 Rebuttable Presumption Taxation 
The rebuttable presumption taxation approach adopts an administrative process to reconstruct 
the taxpayer’s income in the event of a perceived discrepancy in the tax to be otherwise paid 
by the taxpayer (Thuronyi 1996, p.403). Under a rebuttable presumption tax system, if a 
taxpayer disagrees the tax levied, there exists an arrangement for the taxpayer to appeal by 
providing the actual income for the period and proving that the tax to be paid under normal 
assessment is less than the one levied under the presumption arrangement. The rebuttable 
arrangement is thus seen as not much of a departure from the normal rules of assessing tax 
liability. It encourages taxpayers to disclose actual incomes and may be useful in taxing those 
who may otherwise deliberately conceal incomes in order to evade taxes, for example, where 
structuralists’ motivations may exist for the operation of the informal sector. 
The simplified taxation system in Russia and the forfait system in France are examples of 
rebuttable presumptive tax systems as in both jurisdictions taxpayers have the right to choose 




2.6.5.2 Irrebuttable Presumption Taxation 
The irrebuttable presumption taxation, on the other hand, does not allow for any adjustment 
to taxes levied under the presumption system and any amount levied by the tax authorities 
cannot be challenged. Thus, irrebuttable presumption taxation imposes restrictions on the 
rights of the taxpayer under special treatment by them being unable to contest a tax liability 
imposed, therefore this approach requires greater precision in terms of the legislative 
determination of the procedure for the application and accrual of the tax (Makedonskiy, 
2005, p.7). 
The irrebuttable approach has some key features which differentiate it from the rebuttable 
system. For example, an irrebuttable presumption tax system may have a ‘minimum tax’ 
element, which implies that a taxpayer will not have a tax liability less than that determined 
under the presumption rules; and an exclusive system where tax liability is determined under 
the presumption alone, even if the regular rules might lead to a higher liability (Thuronyi, 
1996). An example of the exclusive arrangement of presumption taxation may be a fixed tax 
on a farmer based on the estimated value of the land rather than the harvest proceeds for the 
year. An exclusive presumptive tax does not depend on actual income, it encourages the 
taxpayer to strive for additional income, due to the non-taxable marginal yield.14 
 
2.6.5.3 Mechanical and Discretionary presumptive taxation 
Presumptive taxation can also be identified by two main approaches, based on the degree of 
freedom exercised by the tax authorities in determining the tax liabilities. These are 
mechanical or formal and discretionary approaches. 
 
2.6.5.3i. Mechanical / Formal Presumptive Taxation 
A presumption tax may take the form of a formal or discretionary. Under this system, the tax 
liability is determined by an established set of rules. These rules may be specific to a 
particular tax regime, country or the nature of the activity to be taxed under presumptive 
arrangements. Tax officials in such circumstances apply no discretion in determining tax 
liabilities. Makedonskiy (2005) argues that the mechanical presumptive tax system may lead 
                                                          
14  Since the taxes levied under this system, does not depend on actual income, the major drawback of the 




to excessive taxation, as the system does not consider the specific circumstances of 
individual taxpayers. However, in situations where the tax authority does not have the 
administrative capacity, this approach becomes the most viable option for reaching those 
whom they find it difficult to tax.  
 
2.6.5.3ii. Discretionary Presumptive Taxation 
In contrast to formal rules establishing tax liabilities, under the discretionary presumptive tax 
system, the tax official is allowed to employ a high degree of discretion in determining the 
tax liability at any point. This presupposes that the formal process is less prone to corruption, 
favouritism and general tax frauds, compared to the discretionary system which could be 
exposed to several loopholes. For instance, taxpayers with strong negotiation skills may 
benefit from this approach and this may not be a fair and balanced system due to a high 
possibility of bribery and the abuse of tax officials’ discretionary powers. 
 
2.7. Summary 
This chapter discussed the concept of the informal economy and distinguished between the 
two main divisions of the informal sector - illegal activities (excluded from this study) and 
legal/taxable economic activities (the focus of this thesis). 
This chapter also presented the three schools of thoughts of the informal sector – dualist, 
legalist and the structuralist ideologies and the policy recommendations of each theory for 
the informal sector. The discussion points out that designing a standard policy to deal with 
the informal sector is not realistic and that different elements of the informal sector may 
suggest a particular or a combination of policy responses from different theoretical 
perspectives. 
Finally, this chapter reviewed some of the existing literature on presumptive taxation as the 
dominant form of taxing informal sector economic activities in many countries.  
Evidence from the literature suggests that despite the challenges associated with presumptive 




Although a well-designed and effectively administered presumptive taxation scheme can help 
reduce corruption, it could promote the discretionary power of tax officials, which may breed 
corrupt practices (Shukla et al., 2011, p22).  As noted in this chapter, most of the 
presumptive tax approaches involve at least some element of the discretionary procedure to 
determine tax liabilities. Terkper (2003, p.230) concludes that ‘failed presumptive tax 
systems result in corruption of officials, arbitrary use of powers, and decline in inspections’.  
Ghana, like most developing countries, adopts presumptive taxation for its informal sector, 
and over the years this has undergone several changes. The next chapter describes Ghana’s 




















INFORMAL SECTOR TAXATION IN GHANA 
3.0. Introduction 
As discussed in chapter one, Ghana has been chosen as the case country for this study. This 
chapter, therefore, reviews details of Ghana as it relates to an understanding of its socio-
economic makeup and an understanding of the formal versus informal sectors.  
The chapter first discusses the tax administration in Ghana and the country’s informal sector.  
A brief background of the country is given in the first part, which is followed by a discussion 
of the country’s tax system and its informal sector. Here, the discussion is limited to the 
nature of activities within the sector, its size, contribution to the economy and its general 
composition. The types of taxes administered in the country are also discussed with particular 
attention to informal sector taxation approaches. Finally, notable tax offenses and their 
associated penalties are also addressed. 
 
3.1. Ghana – Country background 
Located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana has a population of 24.6 million (GSS, 2012) and 
geographically, the country is divided into 10 regions15 
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The population of Ghana is made up of 97.6% Ghanaian nationals, while 2.4% are Non-
Ghanaians.  
The overall literacy rate in the country is 74.1% whilst English literacy [the official national 
language] rate stands at 67.1% (Unicef, 2012; GSS, 2012). Literacy is defined by the Ghana 
Statistical Services as the ability to read and write in any language (GSS, 2012). 
The country has a diversity of religious denomination but it’s dominated by people of 
Christians faith (71.2%)16, followed by Islam (17.6%), traditional religion (5.2%), and the 
non-religious including Atheists (5.3%) (GSS, 2012).  
In the discussion and conclusion chapters, these demographic variables are analysed to assess 
their possible influence on the tax compliance decisions of the informal sector operators in 
the country. 
 
3.1.1. Ghana’s employment sector 
The Ghana statistical services (GSS) records indicate that the employment sector of 
employed persons in the country is dominated by the informal economy which accounts for 
86.1% (GSS, 2012). The minimum wage stands at GH¢4.48 per day (MOFEP, 2012), the 









                                                          
16 Christianity is an umbrella term in this sense comprising of Pentecostal/Charismatic 28.3%, Protestant 18.4%, 
Catholic 13.1%, other 11.4% 
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3.2. Tax Administration in Ghana 
The Gold Coast, now Ghana, became an official British colony in 1874 (Brown University, 
2014) following the Treaty of Fomena which ended the third war between the British and the 
Ashantis, the main rulers and dominant force in the country (Crawfurd, 1996). Although 
Thomas Windham made the first English recorded trading voyage to the Coast back in 1553 
(IBP USA, 2002), it was in 1821 when the British Government took control of the British 
trading forts on the Gold Coast (Noble, 2012, p.192). 
The British appointed colonial officials were headed by a governor to rule the colony. The 
Colonia officials established a legislative council, which included appointed representatives 
(from 1889) and elected members (from 1925), (Brown University, 2014). The governor 
replicated the British system of governance in the Gold Coast in all areas, and even though 
Ghana gained its independence from British rule in 1957, the country still maintains many of 
the fundamental administrative systems established during the colonial era, and tax 
administration is an example. 
Taxation started in Ghana back in April 1852 when the then British Empire passed the Poll 
Tax Ordinance under which each man, woman or child in districts under British protection 
paid one shilling per head per year to raise money to finance the increasing cost of British 
Administration (Ali-Nakyea, 2008, p.3). Formal taxation was introduced in the Gold Coast in 
1943 by the British Colonial Government, in the heat of World War II, the Income Tax 
Ordinance (No. 27) of 1943 and it was administered by the Income Tax Department (Ali-
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Nakyea, 2008). Between 1961 and 1963, different taxes and duties were introduced and the 
name of the tax administration office of the Government was changed to the Central Revenue 
Department. 
Since the 1980s, the Ghanaian tax system has undergone several reforms to improve revenue 
collection. The Ghanaian government in 1986, introduced the National Revenue Secretariat 
(NRS) (Devas et al., 2001). The NRS worked with the Ministry of Finance in policy 
formulation in areas relating to revenue.  Two separate revenue authorities were created 
under the NRS to give operational autonomy. These two authorities were, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). 
In addition to its role of formulating revenue policies and managing tax reforms, the NRS 
was responsible for supervising the activities of the two tax bodies (CEPS and IRS) (ATRN, 
2014). Following several challenges, opposition and policy conflicts, the two separate tax 
authorities were brought under the control of the Ministry of Finance in 1991. In 1998, the 
country introduced a Value-Added Tax (VAT), also, the Value-Added Tax Service (VATS) 
was introduced as a division to oversee all consumption taxes. In the same period, Parliament 
passed a law to create the Revenue Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) to provide 
supervisory services to the VATS, CEPS, and the IRS and this replaced the NRS (ATAF, 
2013).  
In its recent restructuring, the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) was established by an Act of 
Parliament, Act 2009 (Act 791) to merge all the three tax revenue agencies (i.e. VAT, CEPS, 
IRS) and the RAGB.  The GRA is tasked with three main responsibilities, to: 
• integrate Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Value Added Tax Service (VATS) into 
domestic tax operations on functional lines. 
• integrate the management of Domestic Tax and Customs 
• modernise Domestic Tax and Customs operations through the review of processes 





To promote operational efficiency and to cater for taxpayers’ specific needs, in 2013, the 
GRA segmented taxpayers into three main categories (GRA, 2016). The categories [and 
the total number of each in the country] are: 
a) 1 Large Taxpayer Office (LTO), with a commissioner as general overseer. 
b) 15 Medium Taxpayer Offices (MTO) headed by an assistant commissioner and, 
c) 50 Small Taxpayer Offices (STO) headed by chief revenue officers 
 
3.2.1. The GRA integration  
The integration, according to the GRA (2016), aims to: 
 reduce administrative and tax compliance cost and to provide better services to 
taxpayers; 
 provide a one-stop service for taxpayers for the submission of returns and payment of 
taxes; 
 provide common tax procedures that enable tax payers to be governed by a single set 
of rules; 
 improve information linkage and the sharing of information among the Divisions of 
the Authority 
 
3.3. Formal Sector taxation in Ghana 
Various forms of taxes are administered within the formal sector. The main taxes include 
Personal Income and Corporation Taxes, Value Added Taxes (VAT), Rent and Property 
Taxes, Social Security Contributions, Capital Gains, and Gift Taxes. 
 
3.3.1. Income taxes 
The GRA splits income taxes into three; 
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• Corporate income tax - This is the tax paid by companies on their profits in the year. 
The current tax rate is 25%. (see appendix 3). 
• Personal Income Tax – This is paid by self-employed persons who pay at graduated 
rates in four equal installments during the financial year. 
• Pay As You Earn (PAYE) - The PAYE contributions are withholdings from salaries 
of employees in order to satisfy their income tax responsibilities. The PAYE is 
computed with the Personal Income Tax rates (as shown in Appendix 2). 
The Domestic Tax Revenue Division administers various taxes as the PAYE, Personal 
Income Tax, C orporation and other forms of taxes such as the Value-Added Taxes (VAT), 
Gift Taxes, National Health Insurances and various duties and levies (GRA, 2016).  
Appendixes 2 and 3 show details of income tax rates and bands paid by individuals and 
companies in the country. 
In addition, for resident individuals, there is a general 5% withholding tax on payments for 
contracts for the supply or use of goods or property or services of any kind and for the supply 
which involves a resident person and another resident person – on account of tax liability 
(KPMG, 2012, p1). Non-resident individuals are, however, subject to a range of withholding 
taxes on incomes accruing in Ghana or derived from Ghana. 
Non-resident companies pay different rates of corporation taxes compared to resident 
companies and their rates are presented in appendix 3. 
 
3.4. Taxpayer identification 
Currently, Ghana has no national identity card system (although there are ongoing steps to 
start one soon), therefore the Taxpayers Identification Numbering (TIN) system was 
introduced by the Taxpayers Identification Numbering Systems Act 2002 (Act 632) with the 
view to enabling better identification of taxpayers (Ali-Nakyea, 2008). 
The TIN is required by and issued to, anyone liable to pay taxes. Thus, any person who is 
‘liable to pay tax, or from whom taxes are withheld at source by employers or agents through 
payroll deductions and /or other business transactions under any enactment is required to 
register’ (GRA, 2016).  The TIN does not carry any direct welfare benefits; however, it can 
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be likened to the National Insurance Number (NI) in the UK. The TIN, just as the NI allows 
the tax authority to assess the tax status of all taxpayers, such as tax under or overpayment. 
 
3.4.1 Usefulness of the TIN 
To make the TIN useful and to enable the tracking of transactions, the GRA states that 
anyone without the unique registration number [TIN] is not allowed to undertake certain 
transaction (GRA, 2016, also see Ali-Nakyea, 2008, p.59) such as: 
• clearing any goods in commercial quantities from any port or factory in the country, 
• registering any title to land, any interest in land or any document affecting land, 
• obtaining any Tax Clearance Certificate from the Internal Revenue Service, Customs 
Excise and Preventive Service or the Value-Added Tax Service, 
• obtaining a Certificate to commence business or a business permit issued by the 
Registrar-General or a District Assembly, 
• receiving payment from the Controller and Accountant General or a District 
Assembly in respect of a contract for the supply of any goods or the provision of any 
services. 
 
3.5. Ghana’s informal sector 
Like many developing economies, Ghana’s informal domestic economy is large and very 
heterogeneous. The sector involves activities which include businesses in cities as well as 
small activities in the rural communities which receive minimal regulation. The activities 
taking place within this sector are diverse and as identified by (Aryee, 2007) may include 
activities such as trading, agriculture, transport, tailoring, Susu (i.e. credit facilities), 
herbalists, distilleries, corner shops, hawking, shoe-makers, food preparation vendors, see 
sample list in table 3.1 below. The list in table 3.1 shows a number of informal associations 
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which relate to some of the activities of the sector and which form the basis of the informal 
sector taxation in the country discussed in section 3.6. Looking at the list in table 3.1 below, 
though the list is not exhaustive, it at least gives an indication of the enormous size of the 
informal sector which makes it extremely difficult for tax planners to design a tax system to 
suit this heterogeneous sector. As most transactions in this sector involve unofficial credit 
arrangements or cash exchanges, determining the income of businesses in this sector for tax 
purposes is a very hectic task. 
 
 Table 3.1 Some of the Informal Organizations in Ghana 
  (Source: Aryee, 2007) 
1. Ghana Private Road Transport Union 
(GPRTU) 
2. Ghana Cooperative Transport Society (GCTS) 
3. Progressive Transport Owners Association 
(PROTOA) 
4. Ghana National Chemical Sellers Association 
5. Ghana National Tailors and Dressmakers 
Association 
6. Musician Union of Ghana 
7. Phonogram Producers Association 
8. Ghana Tape Recorders Association 
9. National Drinking Bar Operators Association 
10.National Garage Owners Association 
11. Greater Accra Second Hand Spare Parts 
Dealers Association 
12. Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning 
Workshop Owners Association 
13. Chop Bar Keepers and Cooked Food Sellers 
Association 
14. Hair Dressers Association of Ghana 
15. Susu Collectors Association 
16. Traditional Healers, Fetish Priests, Mallams 
and Drug Peddlers Association 
17. Sandcrete Block Manufacturers Association 
18. Ghana Gold and Silver Smiths Association 
19. Second Hand Clothes Dealers Association 
20. Radio and Television Repairers 
Association21. Ghana Cooperative Distillers 
Association Ltd 
22. Cornmill Owners Association 
23. Licensed Diamond Winners Association 
24. Ghana Association of Private Sports Papers 
25. Ashiaman Livestock Breeding and Traders 
Association 
26. Butchers Association 
27. Ghana Livestock and Meat Marketing 
Association 
28. Video Operators Association 
29. Ghana Private Schools Association 
30. Day Care Centres Association 
31. Akpeteshie Distillers Association 
32. Second Hand Car Dealers Association 
33. Ghana Union Traders Association (GUTA) 
52 
 
Despite the large informal sector, a study by the African Tax Research Network (ATRN) 
shows that the sector accounts for 2.4% of domestic (income) tax revenue while large 
enterprises, which make up less than 1% of the country’s businesses, contribute 74.4% to 
domestic tax revenue. The remaining 23.2% make up the contributions from the medium 
scale enterprises (ATRN, 2014). 
 
3.5.1. Classification Ghana’s informal sector businesses for tax purposes 
In 2006, for tax purposes, the GRA grouped Ghana’s informal sector businesses into the 
following categories (Table 3.2). This was the initial classification17 and a more recent 
classification of businesses for presumptive tax purposes is shown in table 3.3. Each of these 
categories is subsequently placed in a (presumptive) tax bracket. The tax paid in each bracket 
is a flat rate. This classification forms the basis of Ghana’s presumptive tax system. See 











                                                          
17 Details of this classification is also available on the GRA website: 
http://www.gra.gov.gh/docs/info/guide_tax_stamp.pdf . The GRA has types 2-8, and no records of type 1 
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Table 3.2 GRA initial Informal Sector Business Classification  
Class of persons  Sub-Class of Persons  
  
Quarterly18 
Amount of tax 19  
Type 2 - Dressmaker/ Tailor  Category A- Large Kiosk  
               B –Medium        
               C -Small          
GH¢ 15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢   5 
Type 3 - Susu Collectors  Category A- Cities  
              B-  Urban   
              C-  Rural  
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢   5 
Type 4 - Chop Bar Owners/ Cooked Food 
Sellers 
 Category  A- Large Kiosk  
                  B- Medium     
                 C - Small           
                 D - Table Top  
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢   5 
GH¢   3 
Type 5 – Butchers Category A- Large Kiosk  
               B Medium   
               C  Small      
               D Table Top  
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢   5 
GH¢   3 
Type 6 - Hairdressers and Beauticians/ 
Barbers  
Category  A- Large Kiosk  
                 B-Medium  
                 C- Small       
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢   5 
Type 7 - Garage Owners  
 
Category  A -Cities  
                 B -Urban   
                 C –Rural  
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
GH¢  50 
Type 820 - Diamond/Gold Winners and 
Sellers 
Category A - Licensee 
                B – Sub Agent 
GH¢  15 
GH¢  10 
Source: (GRA, 2006, p.4)  
Table 3.2 above shows the initial business classification for the stamp duty introduced in 
2005. The most recent classification is in table 3.3. 
 
3.5.2. GRA classifications of informal sector businesses 
Most recent classifications of the GRA of the informal sector businesses use categories A, B, 
and C, with each having a different tax stamp colour for identification purposes (see table 3.3 
for the colour of categories) (ATRN, 2014). The tax stamp, which has to be displayed 
                                                          
18 The tax is paid quarterly in advance i.e. 15th January-15th April, 15th July and 15th October. 
19 Exchange rate is based on (equivalent) redenomination rate in May 2006 of £1 = GH¢ 1.71 (i.e. GHs 17,100). 
Where ¢10,000 = GH¢ 1 (GNA) stated on (Ghanaweb.com, 2006). 




throughout its validity, contains basic taxpayer information such as name [of a person or 
business], validity period, and the amount paid. To prevent duplication, there are security 
features embedded in these round-shaped stamps. Below are some sample pictures of the tax 
stamps. 
 






                    
            Source: (GRA, 2016) 
 
 













                         
                                                    Source: (GRA, 2006) 
 
All operators of the informal sector are required to purchase the tax stamp quarterly22 from 
the domestic tax revenue division, and the stamp which is a form of estimated presumptive 
                                                          
21 Amount shown in tax stamps indicate Ghana currency before redenomination in 2007.Ghana redenominated 
its currency, the cedi by setting ten thousand cedis to one new Ghana Cedi (GH¢). That is ¢10,000=GH¢ 1. The 
rate at redenomination was ¢17,400 = £1 (Bank of Ghana, 2007).  
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tax system, must be ‘conspicuously displayed at the business premises or carried along (in 
the case of itinerant traders) for inspection at any time’ (GRA, 2014). The tax stamp forms 
the main basis of the collection of taxes through the presumptive system.  
The Small Taxpayer Office (STO) of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) administers the 
tax stamp. The STO administers the taxes of all [small] businesses with an annual turnover of 
up to GH¢90,000 (i.e. approximately £16,000)23. Businesses which operate a permanent 
structure (e.g. with a fixed location) which fall under this income threshold and are 
registered, go through the formal assessment process, however, those falling within this 
income level but do not meet the ‘permanent structure’ and are unregistered, are taxed under 
the tax stamp system. The tax stamp was introduced in 2004, although it came into effect in 
2005, it aimed to expand the tax base by bringing such businesses hitherto untaxed into the 
tax net (Danquah and Osei-Assibey, 2016, p.16). 
 
 
Table 3.3 Quarterly presumptive tax rates of selected informal sector operators 
Category Rate per quarter (GHȼ) Rate per quarter in (GBP £)24 
 
A 
Large 45 8.04 
Medium 30 5.36 
Small 10 1.79 
Table-Top 3 0.54 
B 
Large 35 6.25 
Medium 20 3.57 
Small 5 0.89 
Table-Top 3 0.54 
C 
Large 25 4.46 
Medium 15 2.68 
Small 3 0.54 
Table-Top 3 0.54 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011). 
3.5.2a. Category A activities  
This group comprises of businesses specialising in commerce - retail trade; “Susu 
collectors25’’, pubs and ‘chop bar26’ owners. This group may also include bakeries, Internet 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Ghana tax year begins on 1st January and ends on 31st December (KPMG, 2017). 
23 Danquah and Osei-Assibey (2016).Exchange rate: £1 = GH¢ 5.6 (FxExcchange, 2017) 
24 Exchange rate: £1 = GH¢ 5.6 (FxExcchange, 2017). Rate on year of article publication, 2011 was £1 = GH¢ 
2.57 (FxExcchange, 2011) 
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cafés, rental agents, building block and terrazzo (e.g. tiles) sellers, sand/stone sellers, and 
contractors. Finally, this segment of taxpayers may also include the activities of licensed 
diamond and gold sellers/buyers (ATRN, 2014). 
 
3.5.2b. Category B activities 
 This category consists of individuals and businesses engaged in vocational activities such 
as tailors and seamstresses; barbers/salon and beauty shops, artisans; hiring services; 
photographers; and car washing bays (ATRN, 2014).  
 
3.5.2c. Category C activities  
This group consists of agriculture-related activities such as charcoal and firewood sellers, 
traditional doctors (healers), butchers, corn millers, and other businesses determined by the 
Ministry.  
Also, all businesses, other than hawkers, operating in the city, are classified as large, whilst 
those businesses in bigger towns that are not categorised, are classified as medium. Those 
businesses in rural areas and small communities are grouped under the ‘C’ category.  
(ATRN, 2014).   
 
3.5.3. Challenges to effective taxation of the informal sector in Ghana 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the difficulty in designing and successfully implementing 
an effective tax for the informal sector emanates from the fact that most businesses operate 
on a cash-only basis, as noted by Ofori (2009), and may not accept cheque or any other form 
of payments. This payment method provides the opportunity for enterprises not only to 
record inaccurate figures for tax avoidance but also to eliminate any form of third party 
information that could lead to them being caught on any underreporting activities and thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
25 Thrift and credit businesses. 
26 Local /mini restaurants 
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aid such businesses to conceal their taxable profits. This justifies the current presumptive 
approaches. 
No active record keeping implies that tax authorities are not able to determine the tax 
liabilities of businesses in this sector in the  way of typical formal sector taxation where the 
incidence for determining tax liability is based on the proper assessment of a business’s 
internal records. At one level, it can be argued that this could perhaps be attributed to the 
high level of illiteracy among informal sector operators (as discussed in chapter 2). However, 
this is likely to be only partly an explanation for poor record-keeping. 
The difficulty in establishing an appropriate tax system in Ghana informal sector is not due 
just to the lack of data to assess tax liabilities, rather the tax officials sometimes lack the 
morale and motivation to engage with the informal sector. Some tax officers believe that the 
sector is unrewarding, demeaning of their status or potentially a dangerous area to enforce 
compliance in some circumstances (Joshi and Ayee, 2006). 
In certain situations, tax officials patrol these informal sectors to collect and also to identify 
tax evaders, with minimal resources, (e.g. walking long distances). Such conditions are 
disliked by many educated officials who also do not want to interact with the illiterate poor, 
disenchanted and at times violent citizens who see little or no reason for paying business 
taxes. Again, many tax officials dislike dealing with those in the informal sector due to the 
low possibility of job progressions (Aryee, 2007). 
The lack of incentives for tax revenue staff working in the informal sector has been identified 
as one key element accounting for the low tax revenue from the sector. A study of Nigeria’s 
informal sector by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) found that tax 
officers are usually reluctant to be assigned to the informal sector, citing factors such as a gap 
in education, social status and some inherent dangers (CISLAC, 2008, p.7). This low level of 
motivation may impact on their level of engagement with taxpayers which may subsequently 
lead to a reduction in tax revenue. The CISLAC study further suggests that the lack of 
motivation may stem from the nature of the work which sometimes involves patrolling 
remote and poor areas to identify tax evaders, which officers sometimes feel that they do not 
get the required recognition as other revenue officers working in the tax offices. The study 
thus concludes that compared to those working on corporate taxes or customs, tax officers 
working in the informal sector have limited promotion opportunities especially considering 
the fact that the environment offers relatively low status, it’s unrewarding and there are risks 
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associated with patrolling in these poorer areas, especially where officers have to deal with 
serious evasion cases involving taxpayers who are violent. 
Most developing economies, including Ghana, design the informal sector taxes in a similar 
way to those in the formal sector, with limited consideration of the taxpayers in the informal 
sector (Ritchie, 2006). With little known information about operators, direct presumptive 
taxation becomes more promising. In presumptive systems, assessments are based not on 
calculations of actual income, but on broad indicators of the scale of profits likely being 
made (Bird and Wallace, 2003; Sadka and Tanzi, 1993; cited in Bräutigam et al., 2008). 
Presumptive tax is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
Bräutigam et al. (2008) suggest that, depending on the nature of the economic activity, tax 
policy planners could use indicators such as the size and capacity of machinery, commercial 
space in terms of footage occupied, number of employees or the number of customers served, 
as bases for presumptive tax. This approach, complemented with a simplified self-assessment 
method, has been used widely in Ghana since the eighties and in many other developing 
economies (Bird and Wallace, 2003). 
Capacity constraint is also a major issue for the effective taxation of the informal sector as 
observed in chapter two. Budget for the tax administration function of most developing 
countries, including Ghana, is tight in terms of personnel and taxing the informal economy 
requires at times, twice or three times the effort of taxing the formal sector (Bird and 
Wallace, 2003). As noted earlier, Ghana and most countries overcome this by adopting 
presumptive based approaches to taxing informal sector economic activities. 
A further major hurdle for the effective design and implementation of a successful tax system 
in the informal sector is the influence of corrupt political leaders and apparent lack of 
political will to tax the sector for the obvious reason – political expedience (election votes 
from a dominant sector). High illiteracy rates in developing countries make it possible for 
taxpayers to be influenced by promises made by corrupt politicians (for example promise of 
no or a low rate), which, after an election, the taxpayers try to live by, thus making tax 
compliance a real daunting task. This is what Tendler (2002) cited in (Aryee, 2007) describes 




‘‘if you vote for me, … I won't collect taxes from you; I won't make you comply with 
other tax, environmental or labour regulations; and I will keep the police and 
inspectors from harassing you’’ (Tendler, 2002, p.99).   
The resulting impact is that public officials and politicians deliberately refuse to implement 
any tax enforcement program in this sector particularly those that are more likely to be 
disliked by taxpayers, to retain and broaden their support base during election times. 
 
3.6. Informal sector taxation approaches in Ghana 
Ghana has historically employed many strategies to tackle the problem of low compliance 
level within the informal sector including standard assessment, using tax stamps, and 
attempting the use of an association form of presumptive taxation for several years in the late 
1970s to mid-2000s. The next sections assess the various tax administration strategies 
employed by the Ghana revenue authority since the 1970s. 
 
3.6.1. Standard Assessment    1970 – 1986 
During this period, operators in the informal sector were subject to a lump-sum of tax, which 
was levied based ons the nature of activities undertaken by individuals and businesses. Some 
changes were made to the system during its operation. The standard assessment tax approach 
was a complete flat system, which implied that small businesses in the informal and larger 
companies in the formal sector were in effect, paying the same level of taxes. There were 
virtually no considerations for individual business’s financial situation or nature of the 
activity as in the case of current tax stamp regime. The operators of the informal sector 
perceived this approach as unfair and discriminating (Joshi and Ayee, 2002b).  Again, this 
system gave little attention to businesses in the informal sector, which predominantly operate 
on small scales, and therefore paying flat taxes, the same as large businesses in the formal 
sector, was deemed unfair. 
With huge corruption and several loopholes, the system was abolished in 1986 in place of the 
use of (an indirect) associational basis for taxation rather than collecting taxes directly from 
informal sector taxpayers (ATRN, 2014). 
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3.6.2. Associational taxation   1987 - 2004 
Associational taxation is believed to be an ideal way to tax an informal sector if the 
motivation is to move it towards the development of a formal and more compliant tax system 
in contexts like that found in Ghana, (Bräutigam et al., 2008). This strategy has a potentially 
wide reach, compared to the standard assessment method as it can capture more taxpayers 
easily, with informal sector associations acting as agents for income tax collection (i.e an 
indirect tax approach). These associations have detailed knowledge of the activities of 
members and possibly their earnings and the key customer base and could thus collect taxes 
with less effort than other available systems. 
While associational taxation, in theory, provides a political solution to the taxation of the 
informal sector, the informal sector operators’ poor attitudes to paying taxes in Ghana was in 
part the result of the initial aim of the internal revenue service to introduce a more collective 
approach to their taxation. This approach introduced a scheme called the Identifiable 
Grouping Taxation (IGT), where a particular form of association tax was initiated that relied 
on associations in the informal sector to collect taxes from their members (Ofori, 2009)27. 
These are voluntary associations which need not be registered formally, and are created 
mainly to promote members’ welfare. The transportation sector, with its largest union, the 
Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), according to Joshi and Ayee (2006) was at 
the forefront of this movement towards associational taxation, however, they soon outlined 
how the presumptive system posed so many challenges to their members and many flaws and 
unfairness were discovered in the implemented system. For example, as the system, just as 
previously, was based on a standard assessment, which required members to pay quarterly, it 
was not affordable as drivers were to pay a lump sum in advance.  Again, the system failed to 
take account of the loss of income due to the breakdown of vehicles or lost workdays, and 
corruption was prevalent in the filing of taxes and when obtaining tax certificates, for 
example, people were fabricating certificates (Joshi and Ayee, 2002b).   
Following the initial trial with the transportation sector, the association taxation system was 
then extended to all other informal sector associations.  Such ‘associational taxation’ was 
quite successful in raising revenues from an area of the economy which had not been paying 
                                                          
27 See table 3.1 for the list of some of such associations in Ghana. The number of such associations in 
operations could be anything up to thousand and keeps growing daily, and therefore became a difficult task for 
the revenue Authority to identify and fully utilise them for its tax planning and administration. 
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taxes.  Although the amounts collected (especially in the early years) were small in relation 
to the total revenue of the Internal Revenue Service, the success story was that a culture of 
taxpaying was created in a sector that had until then largely avoided taxation (Joshi and 
Ayee, 2006). 
In 2003, the Hoteliers Association of Ghana complained about the irrationally high tax 
imposed by the government (Obosu-Mensah, 2011). In the same year, despite helping to 
bring in some taxes, the IRS abolished the system of associational taxation for the informal 
transportation sector because of the large gap between revenue expected and revenue 
collected.  A further standard assessment system, called the Vehicle Income Tax (VIT), was 
introduced under which transport owners and drivers paid income tax quarterly through a 
sticker system.  The stickers were sold for cash to the associations to make them easily 
available to operators.   In the first two months after its introduction, in 2003, the IRS 
exceeded the amount collected the same period during the previous year by 3.4% (Daily 
Graphic, March 9, 2004, p.20) cited in (Aryee, 2007).   
Although associational taxation did not make up a significant contribution to the Internal 
Revenue Service’s revenue, it’s believed that applying this tax in Ghana was a very useful 
approach. This is because ignoring the tax liabilities of informal sector activities could lower 
morale and increase the risk of lower tax compliance elsewhere (Terkper, 2003).  Therefore, 
taxing the informal sector in Ghana is a positive step forward in the government’s bid to 
improve overall tax compliance in the economy. 
Aryee (2007) summed his views regarding his study on the associational taxation in Ghana, 
stating that if one views associational taxation as one step in the long process of moving 
towards a more formalised conventional system of taxation, then it appears to have been a 
promising step.  Associational taxation has encouraged a culture of taxpaying among 
informal sector operators and has led to a steady increase in state revenues.  Although this 
approach has been replaced by more conventional systems of taxation such as standard 
assessment approaches including the VIT stickers and tax stamps as described in section 
3.6.4, from all accounts, it seems that focusing on the informal sector as a separate taxpayer 





3.6.3. Vehicle Income Tax (VIT)  2003 - present 
As briefly discussed in section 3.6.2 above, the Vehicle Income Tax (VIT) was introduced as 
a tax which is paid by commercial vehicle operators every quarter through the purchase of 
VIT stickers from the local offices of the GRA. This is a presumption based taxation system 
based on a standard assessment approach as the amount paid depends on key indicators such 
as passenger capacity and type of operation. These stickers are displayed in front of the 
windscreen and monitoring is undertaken with the aid of the police force who report, stop 
and cease any vehicle found operating without a VIT sticker. Following the initial success, 
the IRS later introduced the tax stamp to other small businesses and individuals operating in 
the informal sector who pay quarterly and are issued with a sticker which has to be produced 
upon request. 
In summary, Ghana’s informal sector taxation has undergone a number of changes with 
successive governments introducing various types of taxes and /or enforcement strategies. 
Although associational taxation is no longer applied within the Ghanaian tax system, trade 
associations in the country have had a significant influence on the taxation of their members 
and as noted earlier in this chapter, unions such as GPRTU and GUTA have played 
significant roles in vehicle income taxation and flat rate VAT respectively. However, trade 
associations still do take part in negotiations and at times, the designing of taxes affecting 
their members. 
The current presumptive system allows taxpayers to appeal against their tax liabilities 
through various stages as discussed in section 3.7. 
 
3.6.4.  Small Business Tax Stamp   2005 - Present 
Previous attempts to bring more taxpayers in the informal sector into the tax net did not yield 
the desired results.  Although most informal sector operators in Ghana do earn incomes form 
all three major sources – employment, business and investment, majority of these ‘pay 
absolutely nothing in the form of taxes’ (Ofori 2009, p.23). In response to this, the IRS 
introduced a further standard amount based presumptive tax in 2005 called the ‘tax stamp’. 
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The tax stamp is a standard assessment presumptive tax which imposes quarterly lumpsum of 
taxes on taxpayers.  
The tax stamp targets low-income business operatives such as street hawkers, table-top 
shops, hairdressers, mobile-to-mobile operators, etc. The tax stamp aims to ensure that more 
economic activities within the informal sector are brought into the tax net 
Unlike the associational taxation which relied on agents for the tax collection, the tax stamp 
was directly administered by the tax authority.  
Under the tax stamp scheme, to determine the amount of taxes due, businesses are grouped 
by turnover and the type of activity as outlined in section 3.5. These form the main seeding 
through which further classifications are carried out based on sizes/classes to arrive at the 
final tax rates (GRA, 2016).  
Individuals liable for the payment of the tax stamps must purchase them in advance for each 
of the four instalment due dates – i.e. 15th January, 15th April, 15th July, and 15th October.  
The tax stamp must be openly displayed in the business premises, and in the case of itinerant 
operators, they are required to carry the tax stamp always and must produce them upon 
request by a revenue officer. 
Failure to produce a tax stamp amounts to an offense liable to a fine, not less than GH¢20.00 
and not exceeding GH¢50.00 (Ofori, 2009, p.24). 
The tax stamp has seen some successes with respect to the Vehicle Income Tax (VIT) as 
vehicle owners are expected to purchase them quarterly in advance and they must be openly 
displayed on the vehicle windscreen. Failure to display a valid sticker leads to arrest by the 
police and sanctions are applied. By taking away the tax collection function form the 
transport union (GPRTU), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) realised an increase of 176.8% 
in tax revenue in the first few months, compared to the previous annual figure. 
In a press conference on 18th January 2005, the then commissioner general of the Internal 
Revenue Service, Mrs. Janet Opoku-Akyeampong stated ‘in 2002, GPRTU collected 10.875 
billion cedis, but when IRS took over and introduced the Vehicle Income Tax in 2003, the 
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collection increased to 30.103 billion cedis in the third quarter of 200328 and as at November 
2004, 42.154 billion cedis had been collected’ (Modern Ghana, 2005) 
The increased visibility of the police officers on the road has contributed to its success. 
However, the enforcement of the tax stamp has been less effective with itinerant traders, and 
with the majority of operators of Ghana’s informal sector found in this group, there is still a 
large number of taxpayers who are outside the tax net. 
Again, as noted earlier, the low morale on the part of tax officers to patrol some of the remote 
areas also has negative implications on the tax stamp. High corruption rate in the country 
including some cases involving police officers means that the effectiveness of the VIT 
(which the police are to enforce) could be compromised.  
However, Ofori (2009, p.24) noted that the tax stamp has improved compliance rate and has 
overcome some of the challenges with the previous approaches especially the high corruption 
associated with the associational taxation scheme, although there have been reported cases of 
counterfeit tax stamps. 
Despite the challenges, the tax stamp remains the main approach to taxing trading activities 
undertaken by informal sector operators in Ghana. 
 
3.6.5. The VAT Flat Rate Scheme (VFRS). 2007 - Present 
Despite the progress and promise towards compliance in the informal sector using 
association taxation, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to move slowly away from it. 
However, the VAT service introduced it for informal sector businesses, when it reached an 
agreement with the Ghana Union of Traders Association (GUTA) for a new flat-rate VAT for 
businesses in the informal sector. 
To bring small traders into the tax net, the government introduced the VAT Flat Rate Scheme 
(VFRS) in September 2007 at a flat rate of 3% of turnover (Prichard and Bentum, p.14). The 
Flat Rate Scheme aimed to bring into the tax net, those traders in the informal sector on 
whom the standard VAT record-keeping requirements proved more complicated and 
                                                          
28 This is equivalent to GBP 1, 780,083.97 raised in 2003 compared to the GBP 643,072.56 raised in 2002 
under the associational tax approach. Exchange rate (1GBP = 16,911 cedis) is based on Ghana Interbank rate on 
published on January 13th, 2005 (within a week of the press conference). Rate is available here: 
https://bit.ly/2JGNnZU accessed on 18/07/2018. 
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burdensome (Adom et al., 2014). Thus, this scheme aimed to see through the hurdles of the 
informal sector operators particularly those with no or minimal formal education, complying 
with the record-keeping requirements of a standard VAT. 
The VFRS does not allow businesses to claim input VAT. Businesses are required to charge 
a standard 3% on taxable goods supplied and then pass this on to the tax authority. ‘The 
marginal rate of 3% represents the net VAT payable and is the difference between the output 
tax and the input tax of a wholesaler/retailer if the taxpayer were operating the Standard Rate 
Scheme. Thus, the VFRS is an alternative to the invoice-credit (or input-output) method of 
VAT accounting’ (GRA, 2013, P.3). 
The tax authority has an appeals procedure to deal with disputes arising between the GRA 
and taxpayers. The aim is to bring confidence in the system and promote compliance. The 
next sections discuss the various options available to the taxpayer. 
 
3.7. GRA tax Objections and Appeal  
The current GRA has objection and appeal processes which taxpayers must follow if they 
have any concerns about their tax rates, assessment or penalties imposed within the tax 
system. The various stages are outlined below. 
 
3.7.1 GRA Objection process 
There are series of processes which a taxpayer can go through in event of objections with 
their taxes, although this is not clear for informal sector operators, who do not have to go 
through formal assessment. 
The GRA defines an objection as ‘‘the initial written expression of dissatisfaction with an 
assessment, penalty or interest raised on a taxpayer by the Tax Office’’ (GRA, 2010).  
The system allows taxpayers, where they find their rates to be excessive and needing review, 
to raise objections and to appeal against their tax rates or the assessments given by tax 
officer(s) through the following steps: 
- an bjection must be in writing and sent to the GRA; 
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- Grounds for objection must be clearly stated;  
- Taxpayers have nine months from the commencement of basis period within which to 
lodge an objection against a provisional assessment;   
- In the case of final assessment and penalties, taxpayers must appeal within 30 days of the 
issuance of the assessment.  
  
3.7.2. GRA tax appeal  
Where objections are not dealt with by the relevant GRA offices, or where a taxpayer does 
not feel his/her grievances have been fully addressed, they then have the right to take the 
matter to the court and seek redress. 
However, objections will not be accepted by the court unless the taxpayer pays 30% of the 
amount payable as contained in the notice. This reduces any spurious claims of taxpayers 
which are solely to delay any payment of tax (GRA, 2010). This tends to discourage 
taxpayers from taking the tax authority to court. Although there are no data to assess decided 
cases, there is the general perception that it will be highly unlikely for individuals to win 
cases against the tax authority, and even when someone wins, the process to get the 30% 
upfront payment could be another challenge. 
 
 3.7.3. Offenses and penalties - administrative  
The GRA currently applies a number of penalties to deal with tax evasion behaviours. This 
includes minimum daily rate, 5%, 10%, 20% depending on the nature of offence and length 
of time. The fines could also be severe to include doubling the liability, as well as fixed court 






In summary, this chapter has presented an insight into the nature of the informal sector in 
Ghana. The history of taxation of this sector in the country has been outlined, alongside the 
role of the tax administration functions of the revenue authority (GRA). The discussion 
points out that Ghana has undergone a series of phases on informal sector taxation from the 
‘70s to date. In most cases, the informal sector is currently taxed by a presumptive approach 
using available sets of parameters, although these parameters, and how they are applied, have 
changed over the years. Critically, an attempt to turn the presumptive tax system into an 
indirect tax was explored for some years before being abandoned for a direct approach again 






















TAX COMPLIANCE – LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.0. Introduction  
This chapter reviews the literature on tax compliance and first addresses the question – why 
don’t people pay their taxes? The subsequent sections in the chapter then analyse tax 
compliance, here addressing the question ‘why do people pay their taxes?’.  In answering 
these two questions, the analysis will be based on ‘factors influencing people’s decisions on 
tax payments. The section also reviews major international organisations’ policy 
recommendations on tax compliance and key tax compliance theories and models. It 
concludes with the underlying theory for this study. 
 
4.1. What is Tax Compliance? 
At the simplest level, tax compliance refers to a taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes, and this 
compliance can be voluntary or enforced by authorities. Non-compliance refers to the failure 
to pay one’s taxes due (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, p.3).  
Kirchler et al. (2010) argue that where tax authorities are trusted by taxpayers, variables such 
as knowledge, attitude, moral appeals, fairness, and democracy may influence individuals to 
voluntarily comply with tax obligations hence intrusive auditing could corrupt tax morale 
(i.e. the intrinsic drive to comply voluntarily). In the same way, increasing fines and auditing 
probabilities may be effective in situations of distrust as the high power of the authorities is 
required to enforce compliance. 
James and Alley (2002) suggest that tax compliance is a two-fold phenomenon. On the one 
hand, there is a commitment to society and a government’s objectives, and on the other, is 
the role of law enforcement29. 
McBarnet (2001, p.6) identifies four different compliance behaviours; 
• committed compliance which refers to taxpayers who comply willingly without 
complaint;  
• capitulative compliance, which involves taxpayers who give in and pay their taxes. 
They may pay unwillingly, may complain, but pay up nonetheless;  
                                                          
29 This includes auditing and detections and punishments/fines 
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• creative compliance covers the activities of taxpayers who find ways (including the 
use of experts’ knowledge) to reduce their tax liabilities within the brackets of the 
law; and  
• non-compliance group who may choose to flee the tax jurisdiction, invest abroad or 
engage in the ‘cash economy30’. 
Relating McBarnet’s (2001) types of compliance behaviours to James and Alley’s (2002)31 
two-fold concept, there is at one end of the continuum a committed or voluntary compliance, 
and at the other end, the capitulative compliant who gives in due to efficient audit 
probabilities and heavy fines (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010). 
Whether people pay taxes as a result of a government’s coercive tactics - detection and 
punitive measures - or do so voluntarily by their intrinsic motivation (moral judgement or 
other tax morale motivations), policies and strategies to motivate people to honour their tax 
obligations are always a difficult hurdle for every government be it in a developing country 
or in an advanced economy. In a tax compliance experimental study, Torgler (2004, p.243) 
supports this, stating that a ‘total tax compliance is all but impossible under any conditions, 
except when the tax authorities could place a tax administrator under each tax payer’s bed’. 
Murphy (2008, p.113) also stressed that determining the ‘most effective regulatory 
enforcement strategy which will promote and achieve sustained voluntary compliance from 
taxpayers is a very difficult challenge for all tax authorities around the world’.  
In response to these challenges, Kirchler (2007) developed the slippery slope model (see 
chapter four for a detailed discussion) which suggests that tax compliance is directly 
influenced by trust in and the power of the tax authority. 
 
4.2. Why Tax Non-compliance - Why people don’t pay their taxes? 
Tax non-compliance is a major issue for virtually every tax jurisdiction and poses a battle 
that tax authorities will not win in totality, but a battle too, that authorities will never give up 
on. Thus, it’s impossible to find an economy with a 0% tax gap32, and at the same time, 
impossible to find a revenue authority which has given up on reducing the non-compliance 
rate. Some level of tax non-compliance is inevitable in every economy regardless of the level 
                                                          
30 The cash economy here refers to the shadow economy, underground, hidden, and similar related terms as 
used in this thesis as the informal sector 
31 Cited in (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010) 
32 The ‘tax gap’ is the difference between the tax that would have been determined if all taxpayers had reported 
all of their activities and transactions correctly, and the tax determined in practice (Villios, 2011, p.1). 
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of development (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Non-compliance matters as it reduces state 
revenue and subsequently affects government spending on all areas, including welfare 
provisions and other important government functions, and as Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) 
point out, it can be supposed that while no-one likes paying taxes, the fact is that everyone 
knows how essential tax revenue is to the state. 
In 2015/16, the HMRC reported a 9.8% tax gap for VAT (HMRC, 2017, p.24), and in the 
same year, Australia’s Goods and Service Tax (GST)33 gap rose from 6.1% in 2013/14 to 
6.7% in 2014/15 and then to 7.3% in 2015/16 (ATO 2017). 
The tax gap according to Dubin (2012, p.5) is the product of three categories of 
noncompliance:  
• underreporting, which is the amount of lost revenue from filed tax returns that 
underreported the amount of taxes owed;  
• underpayment, which represents the difference between amounts that were reported 
to be owed, and amounts actually paid for correctly filed tax returns, and  
• non-filing, which is the amount of tax revenue lost from not filing returns (i.e. tax 
evasion).  
What exactly then is tax non-compliance and what drives people not to pay their taxes? 
Tax non-compliance refers to failures to meet tax obligations, whether or not those failures 
are intentional. Thus, non-compliance may be legal tax avoidance or the violation of tax law 
(evasion) (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, p.3). 
Early researchers into tax compliance, Allingham and Sandmo, (1972) noted that the decision 
by taxpayers to comply is based on the individual weighing up of the benefits of 
noncompliance against detection and fines. In this sense, the argument is made that the 
decision not to pay taxes is purely based on an individual’s level of risk aversion. Subsequent 
research suggested that taxpayers are rational and these works have models of non-
compliance to reflect such rationality. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS- USA) (1978)34 published a list of factors which 
influences tax (non-)compliance behaviour. Some of these factors include the age of the 
taxpayer, marital status, education, criminal history, employment status, level of tax 
expertise, analysts and others. Most of these factors have been explored in many subsequent 
studies, some of which are analysed below.  
                                                          
33 The GST is Australian version of VAT which is widely used in the EU and other nations. 
34 Cited in Flynn 2003 
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The OECD emphasised that the reason taxpayers may not comply with their tax obligations 
depends on a number of factors, which may include age, education level, moral compass, 
gender, industry, personality, circumstances, the perceived cost of compliance and 
assessment of the risk involved (OECD, 2004, p.71). 
Just as noted by Kirchler and Wahl (2010), the Internal Revenue Service states that not all 
noncompliance behaviours are intentional, and some people fail to comply due to ignorance 
of the tax law and their obligations (IRS, 1994). 
Closely related to the issue of ignorance of the tax system is the issue of the complexity of 
the tax law. If tax laws are complex and cannot easily be understood, the chances are high 
that such taxes may not be paid or paid in full. However, research findings on the impact of 
tax law complexities on tax compliance have been mixed. For example, Clotfelter (1983) 
noticed that understanding the tax law (i.e. complexity) actually contributes greatly to the 
decision not to comply. Interestingly, studies by Witte and Woodury (1985) and Slemrod 
(1989) both find that tax complexity and its influence on tax noncompliance vary across 
different individual taxpayer’s characteristics such as their perception of fairness, and the 
possibility for evasion as a result of such complexities. 
Witte and Woodury (1985) and Slemrod (1989) also find that the perception of fairness of 
the tax system influences tax non-compliance decisions. In other words, if people perceive 
the tax system to be unfair, there is a high possibility of engaging in non-compliance activity 
to either reduce the burden (avoidance) or avoid paying entirely (evasion). 
Tax knowledge and education are also important variables which help explain tax non-
compliant behaviours. As noticed by Andreoni et al. (1998), all tax compliance 
measurements assume all taxpayers to be at the same level of tax knowledge, which is a 
wrong assumption and people’s understanding of the tax law influences their compliance 
behaviour (Torgler, 2003). Further, tax specific education or knowledge should not be 
mistaken for formal education. Research has shown that people with university or college 
degrees may not have sufficient tax knowledge to make them compliant (Loo and Ho, 2005). 
This implies that for an improvement in tax compliance, substantial tax education and ease of 
access to tax information to raise tax knowledge is required. 
Studies also show that non-compliance is the result of interactions with individuals in the 
taxpayer’s inner circle. Taxpayers may not comply with their tax obligations simply because 
of the noncompliant behaviours of their peers, and other taxpayers. James and Alley (2000, p. 
33) argue that ‘‘individuals are not simply independent, selfish and utility maximisers but 
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they also interact with other human beings according to differing attitudes, beliefs, norms, 
and roles”. This interaction is what Lewis (1982) describes as the tax subculture and he? 
concludes that there is a strong likelihood that individuals whose peers do not pay, will not 
comply either. A number of studies (Torgler, 2003; Frey and Torgler, 2007) support this 
view, that compliance behaviour increases when taxpayers know others are paying and vice 
versa. 
Furthermore, a lack of trust in the tax authority/state and the absence of a strong legal system 
have been identified as other factors influencing non-compliance behaviours (Torgler, 2003; 
Frey, 2003). These studies point out that people choose not to pay their taxes in part due to a 
lack of trust in tax revenue usage and a weak legal system to detect and punish tax evaders. 
Therefore, the higher the level of trust in government, and the more likelihood of an audit 
revealing their non-compliance, the higher the rate of tax compliance. 
A high tax rate also increases tax non-compliance as evasion becomes more ‘profitable’. An 
early study (Clotfelter, 1983) found that high tax rates will evoke a high non-compliance rate. 
This view has since been supported by more recent studies (Ivanova et al., 2005; Takats and 
Papp 2008; Kirchler et al., 2010; Matthews, 2011), all suggesting that a low tax rate 
decreases the incentive for evasion hence raising the tax compliance rate. 
Even with these factors, it is without a doubt that different individuals will still respond 
differently to tax compliance decisions. The following section answers the question which 
has attracted the most attention in tax research in recent times – why do people pay taxes? 
 
4.3. Why do people pay taxes? 
In trying to better understand reasons for tax evasion and tax compliance, that research to 
date has been able to answer, many studies on taxation, particularly from the early 1990s, 
have tried to address the question ‘‘Why do people pay taxes?’’ The interest here is, by 
understanding what drives people to pay taxes, one will have a better understanding of why 
tax evasion and avoidance occur, and in so doing, many theories have been proposed, some 
of which will be analysed throughout this chapter. 
A plausible explanation as to why people pay taxes is the deployment of ‘coercive strategies’ 
which involve the use of deterring punitive measures to discourage tax non-compliance. An 
early work which backs up this assertion is the model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
who proposed that the decision to comply with one’s tax obligation is positively correlated 
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with the level of existing punishment and the probability of detections. This view has, 
however, been criticised by many researchers including (Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001) 
suggesting that some people comply regardless of direct punitive measures. Contrary to the 
economic-of-crime model proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which states that 
taxpayers weigh up their benefits of evasion against detection and fines, other studies have 
different views on compliance. For example, Frey (1997) provides an insight into the 
‘crowding-out theory’ stating that not only rewards but intrinsic motivation could be 
negatively influenced by all external interventions, which in the case of taxation policies may 
include issuing commands and imposing rules and regulations and carrying out punitive 
measures.  In truth, the ‘cops and robbers’ approach as in the case of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) or the ‘service and client’ approach, for example Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen 
(2001) as proposed by Kirchler (2007, p.188) do not seem to offer precise explanations to the 
initial question of ‘why people pay taxes’. What both do is offer a partial view of some of the 
factors which move people to comply with the existing tax rules and regulations. The other 
part of this chapter assesses other tax compliance drivers which could help explain what 
motivates people to comply. 
 
4.4. Tax Morale and Tax compliance 
In recent years, attention has shifted to ‘tax morale’ to help further explain and understand 
tax compliance behaviours (Torgler, 2001; Cummings et al., 2005; Frey and Feld, 2002; 
Kirchler, 2007; Pope and McKerchar, 2011; Alm McClellan, 2012). All of these studies 
emphasise explaining the concept of compliance with the understanding of the ‘intrinsic 
motivation’ (i.e. morale) to undertake to pay taxes rather than the extrinsic (external) forces 
or stimuli to respond to tax obligations. For example, Pope and McKerchar (2011) argue that 
the traditional economic deterrence model does not go far to offer a concrete explanation to 
an individual’s compliance with taxes as the fear of facing prosecution and stiff punitive 
measures (Braithwaite, 2009) are considered alone, rather than considering a person’s moral 
judgement to act. Individuals are not ‘remote-controlled’ and people’s approach to risk [in 
this case the economic deterrence model of prosecution and fines] will differ. Thus, 
understanding a person’s intrinsic drive to pay taxes will help explain not only their 
taxpaying behaviour, but also offer ways to improve voluntary compliance. Pope and 
McKerchar (2011) suggest that tax morale can explain the ‘gap’ between expected and actual 
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tax compliance. In a recent survey of Irish taxpayers’ motives and attitudes towards taxation, 
Walsh (2012, p.470) found that deterrence, the conventional tax administration tool is 
important, but not sufficient to explain the level of tax compliance and suggested that the 
influence of personal norms (i.e. morale) are key to understanding a tax payer’s attitude 
towards taxation.  
Interestingly, Frey and Feld (2002) noted that all studies trying to understand tax morale tend 
to treat the intrinsic motivation as external to other elements, and this has made it even more 
difficult, not only to understand where tax morale emanates but how it could be sustained for 
effective tax administration. 
What actually shapes an individual taxpayer’s morale? Modugu et al. (2012, p.71) suggest 
that people’s internal motivations, social norms, personal values, cognitive processes and 
sense of moral obligation collectively shape their tax morale, and subsequently explain the 
motivation for voluntary tax compliance. High morale accordingly signals high voluntary tax 
compliance and the opposite holds (Modugu et al., 2012). 
 
4.5. Administrative and Compliance cost of taxation 
Sandford et al. (1989) describe the cost of taxation as the ‘hidden costs’ which may either be;  
a) start-up costs - cost incurred to effectively deal with the new changes/taxes which 
may include the purchase of new computers, training of one’s self or staff to 
understand and use the new system, or 
b) recurrent/regular costs - incurred in complying with the annual/periodic tax 
obligations. 
Evans and Tran-Nam (2001) broadly defined the total cost of taxation to the tax authorities 
and the taxpayers as the ‘tax operation cost’ which involves the;  
- compliance cost incurred by the taxpayers to honour their tax obligations and, 
- the administrative costs which are incurred by the tax authorities in designing, 
communicating, staff training and overseeing the whole tax system. 
The compliance cost, according to Evans and Tran-Nam (2001, p.3) is the cost associated 
with complying [by tax payers] with their taxation obligations. This may include the costs of 
labour35 and time for completing the activities, the cost of expert knowledge to assist in the 
                                                          
35 This may include time and efforts by owners of the business, managers, unpaid assistance obtained, internal 
bookkeepers and accountants and the physical input of other employees who handle taxes for the business. 
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completion of the tax activities as well as the incidental expenses incurred in the process, and 
these ‘costs are critical in assessing the efficiency of a tax regime’, (World Banks, 2011, p.2). 
Thus, compliance cost may have both monetary and non-monetary expenses which confront 
the taxpayer, for example, the attempt to decipher a potential complex tax law and how to file 
tax returns, therefore representing costs above the payment of the actual tax obligation 
(Mann, 2002). 
Pope (2001) poses a compelling argument that small business tax compliance costs are 
regressive as these costs are not proportional to income and the fact of most being ‘fixed-
cost’ imply that relatively, businesses with small revenues pay higher.  
Furthermore, Lignier and Evans (2012) study conclude that business tax compliance costs are 
‘‘regressive and hit disproportionately the lower end of the small business spectrum’’ 
(p.630). A survey by Lopes (2012) on the compliance costs of Portuguese business taxpayers 
also found that compliance costs are regressive, similarly reporting that, as most parts of 
these costs are fixed costs, there are economies of scale in the process of compliance. As a 
‘business grows or increases, the compliance costs decrease in the percentage of the 
turnover’ (Lopes, 2012, p.79).  
By being regressive, the compliance costs raise fairness and equity concerns within the tax 
system. This could be a catalyst to tax avoidance/evasion especially if a business organisation 
operates in an environment where increased tax burdens cannot be passed on to customers 
due to competition or government regulations on prices or anti-profiteering rules. Kauser et 
al. (2001) study on the taxation of SME’s in the UK found that small businesses’ VAT 
compliance cost is six times as much as for larger businesses.  Analysing these costs for 
businesses, and from a time and a cost perspective, registering, preparing, completing and 
submitting VAT returns, assuming it is filed each quarter of the year, could increase the costs 
of businesses (Smulders and Stiglingh, 2008, p.369).  This supports the earlier argument by 
(Pope, 2001) that compliance costs are regressive. In other words, the smaller the business, 
the heavier the burden, which leaves small firms with two major difficulties – by becoming 
vulnerable to the compliance burden and being in a competitively disadvantaged position 
(Smulders and Stiglingh, 2008). Again, Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) study of New 
Zealand businesses also concluded that compliance costs were significantly higher, making 
2.5% of the country’s GDP, regressive and fall disproportionately higher on small 
businesses. Furthermore, Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) also found business tax compliance 
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cost in the US to be very regressive in nature. The table below compares the business tax 
compliance costs of findings from two studies (Sandford et al., 1989; Kauser et al., 2005). 
 
 
Table 4.1 Corporation Tax compliance costs as a percentage of taxable turnover  
 







Sources: Sandford et al. (1989); Kauser et al. (2005)36 
 
Reviewing the literature on compliance costs, it is difficult to make direct links to the 
situation faced by businesses in the informal sector in developing countries. For example, 
how does compliance cost influence compliance decisions under a presumptive tax regime? 
This question is addressed in chapters 8 and 9 to add to this literature, for informal sector 
businesses. 
In compiling studies relating to the administration and compliance costs of taxation, Evans 
(2003) recognised the interconnection between tax law design and implementation. He stated 
that sensible tax law design must be informed by an understanding of the impact of that 
design on the burden that taxpayers will face and the administrative cost that the revenue 
authority will be required to carry. To Evans (2003), such impact does not only have to be 
the cost borne by the state in the implementation/administration process but also the cost to 
be faced by taxpayers in the compliance process, which may include their physical time, 
appeals processes (Copp, 2001)37, and the psychological cost of the tax burden (Evans and 
Tran-Nam, 2001).  
 
                                                          
36 Cited in Chittenden et al 2010 
37 Cited in (Evans 2003) 
Taxable turnover (£)       Sandford et al. (1989)   Kauser et al. (2005) 
           0 – 100,000  0.97 
0.17 
0.31 
100,001 – 500,000  0.24 
500,001 – 1,000,000 0.07 0.13 
1,000,001 – 10,000,000  0.03 0.11 
10,000,000 and over 0.01 0.04 
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4.6. Tax compliance determinants – evidence from the literature  
In this section, the theoretical framework and the surveys of past studies underpinning tax 
compliance are analysed as the foundation of the rationale of this research - Tax Compliance 
in developing economies.  
 
 
4.6.1. Socio-economic factors 
The starting point in the theoretical framework for this study is to assess the influences other 
taxpayers’ behaviours have on individual taxpayer’s compliance behaviour. An early study 
into these social influences and their impact on tax compliance is by Lewis (1982). In his 
study entitled ‘The Psychology of Taxation’, Lewis (1982) theorised that voluntary tax 
compliance is dependent on the behaviour of the immediate peers’ and fellow citizens’ tax 
compliance behaviour. Lewis (1982, p.144) found that a taxpayer may say ‘‘…I am more 
likely to evade not only because I have friends who, I know, have got away with it (so why 
shouldn’t I?) but also because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends.” 
Similarly, a study by Torgler (2003) also concludes that tax morale decreases if people notice 
that tax evasion is common and they believe that others are dishonest about their taxes, it 
causes their willingness to comply with their tax obligations, to degenerate. 
Adapting Falk and Fehr’s (2002) theory of reciprocity to tax compliance, Frey and Torgler 
(2007, p.138) believe that if many citizens pay their taxes, an individual taxpayer may feel 
obliged to also comply with his/her tax obligations, and vice versa.   
Also, Lavoie (2009) found out that not only is it the deterrence or trust in the government that 
influences tax compliance among the taxpayers, but an important factor is a trust that people 
have in fellow taxpayers that they equally comply honestly to their tax obligations. 
 
4.6.2. Demographic variables 
Certain demographic variables have been identified as influencing people’s tax morale, and 
hence compliance behaviour.  
Previous studies have found that gender influences a taxpayer’s compliance behaviour 
(Hasseldine, 1999; Torgler, 2003). In most cases, women are found to be more compliant 
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with their taxes than men (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Oxley, 1993; Frey and Torgler, 
2004; Torgler and Valev, 2007). 
The age of taxpayers has been suggested by many researchers as an influential variable on 
voluntary tax compliance, with the proposition that young people tend to evade taxes more 
than old people. Torgler (2003, p.358) proved in his study that taxpayers aged under 29 years 
were the highest tax evaders, and those aged 30-65 were slightly better in honouring their tax 
obligations. Again, the older people get, the higher the intrinsic motivation to pay their taxes, 
and Torgler (2003) proved this with the results of people over 65 years achieving 12.5 
percentage points over those under 65years. In addition, studies by Richardson and Sawyer 
(2001) and Devo (2005) all discovered that there is a strong correlation between age and tax 
compliance with younger taxpayers more likely to evade taxes than older people. 
Interestingly, some studies (e.g. Dubin and Wilde, 1988) found that tax compliance varies 
substantially across taxpayer groups. However, Feinstein, (1991) could not find any 
correlation between age and tax compliance. In a subsequent study, Torgler found that single 
people tend to be less compliant with taxation. He claimed, ‘married people or people who 
live together have significantly higher tax morale than singles’’ (Torgler, 2003, p.224).  
 
 
4.6.3. Education and Tax knowledge 
Models for tax compliance have often been based on the premise that all taxpayers are fully 
informed of tax laws and the reporting process (Andreoni et al., 1998), but this is a wrong 
assumption to hold as the level of tax knowledge may differ among individuals (Torgler, 
2003). 
One reason for tax evasion is sometimes the complexity of the tax laws (Torgler, 2003). The 
more educated, in the form of understanding of the tax laws and policies people are, the more 
they understand the benefits of paying taxes, as they understand the fiscal connections and 
taxation due to their ability to analyse the benefits that come out taxation (Lewis, 1982). 
Contrary to this, Torgler et al. (2007) states that the more educated people are, both in terms 
of general education and tax knowledge, the higher the probability of evading taxes, as they 
understand the opportunities for evasion and avoidance and could also be more critical of the 
ways tax revenues are used by the state. In an earlier study, Torgler (2003) argues that the 
complexity of tax laws influences tax knowledge and subsequently tax compliance, as 
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taxpayers tend to use their knowledge of the complex tax laws in a ‘creative’ way to their 
advantage. Krause (2000) has a similar view pointing out that a complex tax law promotes a 
variety of interpretations and that makes it almost impossible to distinguish honest taxpayers 
from tax evaders. 
Loo and Ho (2005) distinguished between formal education and tax knowledge when they 
conducted a tax knowledge study involving taxpayers who have completed tertiary 
education.  Tax knowledge was measured in terms of understanding of chargeable income, 
exemptions, reliefs, rebates and tax credits. The study concluded that, although the 
participants had a strong formal education, their tax knowledge was low making them 
‘incompetent’ to undertake self-assessment.  
In a survey of American taxpayers, Hite (1997), assessed the relationship between gender, 
education and tax compliance and found out those females with college degrees or higher are 
more compliant than females without college degrees. Not all studies have reported the same 
findings of tax compliance and education. For example, Vogel’s (1974) study suggests that 
less educated taxpayers have low exposure to tax information and as a result are less 
informed about relevant tax regulations and may evade taxes due to a lack of access to 
information which otherwise would make them compliant. 
In this this study, compliance is not measured on the assumption that all taxpayers have equal 
knowledge of the tax laws.  Tax knowledge is measured by a series of questions taking into 
account education and other demographic variables. Education in this context is measured in 
two-fold – (i) fiscal knowledge in terms of understanding of tax obligation and reporting 
requirements, and (ii) general education attainment. 
 
 
4.6.4. Economic determinants of tax compliance 
Tax compliance involves an element of cost to the taxpayer, not only the monetary costs but 
the cost involved in computing the tax liability which in some cases involves the use of paid 
expert advice (Krause, 2000). 
As one of the early researches in theoretical analysis of tax evasion, the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) literature pointed out that tax evasion is to a greater extent within the 
discipline of microeconomics as individual taxpayers tend to choose between the option ‘to 
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evade’ or ‘not to evade’ depending on the perceived/expected gains or losses of the other. 
The taxpayer, in this case, is seen as a utility maximiser. 
Taxpayers, according to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) weigh the tax savings obtainable for 
not declaring income; the probability of being caught through auditing which will attract 
costs higher than the compliance cost and their ability to continually cover up income, 
depending on their level of risk aversion. Therefore, fiscal policy components such as the tax 
rate, tax audits, and perceived government spending of tax revenue, potential penalties, and 




4.6.5. Tax Rate and tax complexities 
The tax rate determines how much of a taxpayer’s income, wealth or expenditure is actually 
transferred to the state. So, to what extent does the rate of tax influence compliance 
decisions? What rate of tax will promote voluntary compliance? Will a high rate of tax 
automatically decrease tax compliance? On the one hand, there is the assertion that a high tax 
rate reduces effective income and therefore, makes tax evasion more profitable; and on the 
other hand, is the belief that by reducing effective income, absolute risk aversion increases, 
and therefore evasion should be reduced (Kirchler et al., 2010). 
Takats and Papp (2008) demonstrate that a low tax rate (for example a tax cut) will have an 
immediate Laffer effect as this will raise the effective tax by eroding the incentives for 
evasion and avoidance. Thus, a low tax rate will increase the compliance rate as tax evaders 


















   
 
 
(Source: Blinder, 1981, p.82) 
 
The Laffer Curve (above) states that an increase in tax rate above the optimal tax rate (t*) 
will result in low tax revenue as tax evasion will rise, supporting previous studies (Clotfelter, 
1983; Ivanova et al., 2005; Takats and Papp, 2008; Matthews, 2011) that a low tax rate 
increases the tax compliance rate. 
Analysing the Russian flat tax of 13% which replaced the previous three-tiered 12, 20 and 30 
percent rates, and which gave substantial tax cuts to most taxpayers Ivanova et al. (2005) 
discovered that personal income tax as a percentage of GDP increased from 2.4 to 2.9% the 
following year and 3.3% the year after. This study clearly showed the relationship between 
tax rate and compliance and subsequently, total tax revenue. 
In an empirical study, Clotfelter (1983) analysed a US taxpayer compliance measurement 
program (TCMP) data in 1969 which involved three different taxpayers (business, non-
business and farmers) using Tobit maximum likelihood estimation to determine 
underreported income under different auditing probabilities, and found that tax evasion 
increases with a rise in marginal tax rates. Matthews (2011, p.19) suggests that low tax rates 
reduce the financial benefits38 of evasion behaviour. At a lower rate of tax, the perceived 
gains from evasion reduce faster than the perceived cost, therefore the rate of tax is 
negatively correlated with tax evasion (Clotfelter, 1983, also see Crane and Nourzad, 1992). 
Contrary to the results of (Clotfelter, 1983), Feinstein (1991)39, adopted a similar approach 
using 1982 and 1985 TCMP data and found no significant impact between marginal tax rate 
and tax compliance rates. 
                                                          
38 The aggregate financial gain (i.e. amount of tax saved) for noncompliance 
39 The findings of Feinstein are mixed. He finds a negative relationship between tax rates and compliance when 
Figure 4.1 The Laffer curve 
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The HMRC (2012, p.7) noticed that the impact of the tax rate on evasion is dependent on 
how taxpayers view the tax rate as ‘being permanent or temporary’ and states that ‘a 
temporary rate change may mean that some individuals are less likely to undertake 
behavioural responses that have significant upfront costs’. The impact of the tax rate on tax 
compliance is evident in the amount of tax raised by the HMRC in 2009-10 and 2011. Due to 
the announcement of the 50p tax rate, taxpayers earning over £150,000 forestalled about 
£18bn of their income to the 2009-10 tax year, and the year (i.e. 2010-11) when the tax was 
officially introduced it fell short of £1.5bn of the projected revenue target (HMRC,2012). 
Aside from tax rate structures, other structural factors external to the taxpayer’s control such 
as the tax administration procedures and practices and the complexity of the tax system could 
equally be important in influencing a tax payer’s compliance behaviour, (Alm et al., 1992) 
 
4.6.6. Audit Probabilities and fines 
Audit probabilities have a profound impact on tax compliance and more importantly the 
amount of declared income. ‘…an increase in the probability of detection will always lead to 
a larger income being declared” (Allingham and Sandmo 1972, p.330). The standard 
economic model of tax evasion assumes that the taxpayer tries to maximise the outcome of a 
compliance decision by weighing up the gains of successful evasion against detection and 
punishment (Kirchler et al., 2010, p.10). Previous studies which support audit probabilities 
and compliance include (Lewis 1982; Alm et al., 1995; Trivedi et al., 2003; Palil, 2010; Palil 
and Mustapha, 2011). 
However, Gërxhani and Schram (2006) also Andreoni et al. (1998) could not find any strong 
correlation between audit probabilities and tax compliance rate.  
Fines are closely linked to the impact of auditing probabilities. Alm et al. (1995) found that 
fines on their own will have minimal or no strong effect on compliance, however, when it is 
parallel with high audit rates, the impact will be significant on compliance rate and reported 
income. 
Murphy (2008), in a study involving 652 tax offenders who had been penalised by the 
Australian Tax Authority, suggests40 that by handing out harsh punishment and penalties to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the data for 1982 and 1985 are analysed separately, but the relationship is positive in the pooled data, (Ali et al, 
2001). 
40 Suggestion based on the deterrence model 
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rule-breakers, this will deter them from re-offending in the future. Even though audits and 
their associated threats of prosecution or actual prosecution have time limits on taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviours, however, studies have also shown that those who comply are not 
necessarily bothered about audits, but want to see those who do not comply, punished 
(OECD, 2004).  
 
4.6.7. Trust in the state 
Taxpayers’ compliance behaviour is also influenced by taxpayers’ relationship with the 
government and the perceived level of confidence and trust held by the individual taxpayers 
in the state. In other words, the role of the state has a significant influence on people’s 
decision to evade or comply with taxes (María-Dolores et al., 2010). As discussed in chapter 
six, the incidence of corruption (e.g. tax officers handling cash and embezzling tax revenue) 
do have significant implications for future voluntary compliance decisions. 
As observed by Gracia and Oats (2012), the [tax]regulatory environment is a relational 
process that creates, negotiates and enforces the boundary between acceptable and 
unacceptable practice (p.305). This implies that actions by the tax authority which may 
jeopardise the trust held by taxpayers would have direct implications on future compliance. 
Kirchler and Wahl (2010, p.3) believe voluntary and enforced compliance as well as tax 
avoidance and evasion, are the result of the interaction between taxpayers’ trust in authorities 
and authorities’ power to monitor taxpayers. They further argue that when there is a high 
level of trust in authorities, voluntary tax compliance is high, and vice versa. However, when 
trust is low, but authorities’ have strong powers to effectively carry out audits and to sanction 
wrong behaviours, compliance is enforced, as taxpayers are motivated to reduce their taxes 
within the legal range of the law and engage in tax avoidance, but are deterred from illegal 
reductions or evasion (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, p.3). 
The tax authority has a central role and as Hasseldine and Li (1999)41 point out, the 
government is the main player in tax administration and must be efficient at all times if a 
high tax compliance level is to be achieved. As noted in section earlier, tax compliance also 
depends on the simplicity of the tax system, the probability of detection in the event of 
evasion/avoidance, and the perception of government spending. If the government spend tax 
revenue on basic necessities such as education, healthcare, security, and public transport, 
                                                          
41 Cited in Palil, 2010 
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voluntary tax compliance will be increased (Palil, 2010, p.188) also see (Kirchler and Wahl, 
2010). The state also has the responsibility of developing and implementing an effective and 
fair tax system, as this equally influences compliance behaviour. 
The tax compliance literature discussed so far, is represented in figure 4.2 below, which is 































Figure 4.2. Tax Compliance Paradigm 
Source: (Author’s compilation) 
 
 
The next section analyses some of the theories and models of tax compliance and introduces 
the underlying theory of the study. It also reviews some of the practical applications of some 
existing models in different tax jurisdictions. 
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4.7 The trend in tax compliance research 
This section looks at the key theories and models of tax compliance as they relate to this 
study and offer a further explanation of the compliance determinants discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter. It analyses the trends in tax compliance research from the 
1970s to the present. The section concludes with the theoretical framework for this study that 
seeks to build on this prior foundation. 
 
4.7.1. The trend of tax compliance studies 
The first part of this section discusses tax compliance studies in the 1970s, followed by 
research in the 1980s and then from the 1990s to the present. 
 
4.7.1.1. Studies in the 1970s 
The study of the causes and consequences of crime has a long pedigree in the social sciences; 
however, it was not until the 1960s that the analysis of illegal activities entered the domain of 
economics with Becker (Merlo, 2004, p.677).  Becker’s work was built on the premise that 
economic theory can provide important insights into the analysis of individuals’ criminal 
behaviour. By modeling individuals’ responses to incentives, Becker was able to improve our 
understanding of how the certainty and severity of punishment could affect an individual’s 
decision to engage in illegal activities (Merlo, 2004). 
Following the work of Becker as observed by Merlo (2004) that deterrence, which is the 
product of detection and penalties, was within the control of society to evoke compliance, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) extended the economics of crime model with the use of the 
expected utility theory (EUT) suggesting that the taxpayer is a utility maximiser. Thus, the 
EUT believe that the individual weighs up the benefits of evasion and the probability of 
being audited and the nature of potential fines. The individual complies if the possibility of 




4.7.1.2. Studies in the 1980s 
Studies in the 1980s on tax compliance expanded but mainly with the underlying premise 
that economic sanctions were the most effective way of promoting tax compliance. Thus, the 
studies in this period were mainly based on expanding those designed around the EUT. 
Following the surge in tax evasion in the US in the 1980s, and as a policy response to the 
then-new research paradigm, the United States government extended existing and introduced 
a new range of penalties in a bid to influence compliance but these measures did little to curb 
the issue (Devos, 2014). 
Considering the ineffectiveness of the pure economic deterrence approaches to reduce tax 
non-compliance, tax compliance research shifted to looking outside this model to help 
explain tax noncompliance. Graetz and Wilde (1985) criticise the economic deterrence model 
as being too simplistic suggesting that to improve compliance, the punitive measures of 
auditing and fines should be accompanied by lowering the tax rate. There was also the belief 
that too many fines and severe sanctions could make taxpayers revolt as they may feel 
alienated and could become ‘antagonists’ to the tax laws and will not feel the need to comply 
voluntarily. 
Graetz et al. (1986) moved the tax compliance debate further by analysing the interaction 
between the taxpayers and the tax authority (the IRS in their case). Their finding suggests 
that a positive relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority increases voluntary 
compliance and vice versa.  
Other researchers have attempted to extend the economics of crime model to include labour 
decisions in order to assess the influence of the taxpayer’s income (Franzoni, 1999; Isachsen 
and Strom, 1980; Isachsen, Samuelsen and Strom, 1985; Cowell, 1985).  For example, 
Cowell (1985), found that although the EUT is good in explaining the tax evasion decision 
where the taxpayer decides on how much of their income to conceal in the face of known 
penalties and known possibilities of being caught, the model does not explain all situations of 
tax evasion. For example, in situations of ‘working off the books’. Here, instead of 
concealing an amount of tax from a proportion of income which is undistinguished from its 
source, the taxpayer evades taxes by taking more than one job, which could be in addition to 
or in place of their main job where income is administratively hard to detect or tax. In this 
case, according to Cowell, to fully understand tax non-compliance, other noneconomic 
objectives have to be considered. Cowell (1985) therefore concludes that taxpayer decisions 
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are made in a two-fold way; a decision about how many hours to work; and a decision on 
how many of the total hours is to be allocated to legitimate and illegitimate activities (in 
other words, how much to declare and how much to conceal).  
The economic model was criticised for not including other factors which may equally 
influence tax compliance decisions. For example, Slemrod (1989) found that tax law 
complexities also increase tax evasion due to the associated increased cost of compliance. 
 
4.7.1.3. Studies in the 1990s - present 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the paradigm of tax compliance studies moved to 
address the shortfalls of the economic deterrence models. 
Falkinger and Walther (1991) considered persuasive measures and their associated impacts 
on compliance and found that a tax system which combines punitive and persuasive 
measures tends to be more effective than one which centers mainly on enforced compliance. 
In other words, Falkinger and Walther’s (1991) work is based on the premise that positive 
inducement may serve as a deterrent to noncompliance, at least in part (Devo, 2014, p.19). 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) found that deterrence approaches are not effective and that tax 
compliance should focus on ‘responsive regulations’ which embraces a forward-looking 
approach rather than relying on punitive measures only. This idea is explored later in this 
chapter and forms the basis of this stud. 
Frey (1997) examined external interventions such as fines and intense audits and proposed 
that these forces could negatively affect the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. 
Tax compliance discussion moved further and Andreoni et al. (1998) study found that tax 
knowledge has a direct impact on compliance behaviour.  
During this period, the debate moved further to incorporate social interactions on tax 
compliance decisions. James and Alley (2000) found that compliance is not only a function 
of economic factors but also social factors such as the attitudes of one’s inner circle towards 
compliance. In addition, Onu and Oats (2016) pointed out that a number of studies using 
surveys and experiments have revealed that taxpayers’ compliance attitudes and behaviours 
tend to change by their interaction with others. 
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The compliance debate at this stage moved into the spheres of shared responsibility, 
involving taxpayers on the one side and the tax authority on the other. This new direction of 
research found that tax compliance is positively correlated with trust in the government such 
as law enforcement and tax revenue usage (Torgler, 2003; Frey, 2003). 
The late 2000s saw a surge of research related to the emergence of seeking to explore the 
moral obligation aspects of tax compliance. Many studies during these years sought to 
explain the tax compliance behaviours of people by looking at the inner drive (intrinsic 
motivation) to comply rather than the extrinsic (external forces such as fines and audits). 
These studies (see Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 2009; Pope and 
McKerchar, 2011; Alm McClellan, 2012; Modugu et al., 2012) suggest that economic 
deterrent approaches cannot alone fully explain tax compliance; instead, it is also affected by 
other issues such as the individual’s feelings about their role in contributing to society as a 
responsible citizen. The next section of this chapter reviews some of the key tax compliance 
models and theories for the study. 
 
4.8. Key compliance theories and models 
Analysing the studies in tax compliance since the 1970s, point out that, tax compliance 
research has evolved around three main pillars, with various studies attempting to modify and 
enhance our understanding under each of these areas or approach: 
• Pillar 1 - Economic of crime - Compliance is based purely on punitive measures 
• Pillar 2 -Psychological contract - Compliance is achieved by psychological contract. 
Underlined with trust and power, this theory is concerned with the reciprocal 
arrangements between the taxpayer and the tax authority and the resulting 
compliance. 
•  Pillar 3 - Responsive regulation encompassing tax morale - Tax compliance is 
achieved by mixing persuasive and punitive measures based on different taxpayer 




4.8.a. Pillar 1 Theories 
4.8.1. The Utility / Economics of crime Theory 
As discussed earlier, most studies in recent years have been based on the economics-of-crime 
theory/utility theory as first applied by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). The economics of 
crime theory asserts that the individual’s final decision to comply rests on his or her 
perception of being caught and fined if all income is not declared.  
This theory affirms that an increase in the penalty rate with high auditing probabilities 
will lead to an increase in the percentage of or decision to, declare income. The penalty 
rate is thus seen as a tool to combating tax evasion, (Obid, 2004). 
A study by Mittone (2006) and Kastlunger et al. (2009) also support this theory and both 
suggest that taxpayers are more likely to comply to their tax obligations if they expect an 
audit and vice versa. 
In a study to assess the effectiveness of audit probabilities and fines, Maciejovsky et al. 
(2007, p.679) found that ‘tax compliance decreases immediately after a random audit’, 
suggesting that taxpayers may be prone to misperception of chance. 
In a recent computerised tax-evasion experiment, Mittone and Saredi (2016, p.109) also 
confirm this assertion suggesting that tax ‘evasion increases immediately after an audit’. 
Thus, tax compliance decrease when an immediate audit is perceived unlikely.  
Furthermore, some of the recent tax compliance study embracing this stance has confirmed 
to this and have identified the ‘Bomb Crater Effect’ (BoCE) in tax compliance (Mittone et 
al, 2017, p.225). Originally introduced by Mittone (2006), the Bomb Crater Effect refers to 
the fact that tax compliance drops immediately after a taxpayer is audited. 
Mittone et al. (2017) likened taxpayers’ behaviour to war field, and argue that ‘troops 
under heavy enemy fire hide in the craters of recent explosions, believing that it would be 
highly unlikely for subsequent bombs to fall exactly at the same spot in a short time span’ 
(Mittone et al 2017, p.226). 
Previous studies which support this theoretical stance (i.e. audit probabilities and tax 
compliance) include Lewis (1982), Alm et al. (1995), Trivedi et al. (2003), Palil (2010), 
Palil and Mustapha (2011). 
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The major criticism of this theory is the fact that it sees every taxpayer as a ‘moral profit 
seeker’ who is purely motivated by perceived financial gains for their actions. Also. it is 
believed that taxpayers are willing to, and seeking to, evade taxes unless penalties and 
audit probabilities exceed the expected gain for evasion. This theory fails to recognise 
other factors which may influence individuals’ behaviours as noted in the studies in the 
1980s, 1990s and the late 2000s. There are many recent studies which have found that the 
rate of tax auditing and penalty rates are that small, people should not be paying the 
amount of tax revenue realised by tax authorities. To these group of researchers, (example 
Bajada and Schneider, 2005; Feld and Frey, 2007; Alm and Kirchler, 2012) taxpayers, 
based on economics of crime theory, should evade more than they actually do, implying 
that enforcement and perceived auditing probabilities do not necessarily by themselves 
evoke tax compliance, or even if they do, they do not influence all taxpayers the same way. 
Another key critique of the economics-of-crime theory is that the key explanation of tax 
compliance is the fundamental values (tax morale) which are inherent in taxpayers 
(Torgler, 2003; 2007; Kirchler, 2002; Feld and Frey 2007; Alm and Kirchler, 2012). In the 
same way, the relationship between taxpayers and the state has also been identified as an 
important factor in tax compliance decision making (Feld and Frey, 2005). 
 
4.8.b. Pillar 2 Theories 
4.8.2. Psychological [Tax] Contract Theory (PCT) 
The psychological tax contract considers the factors which shape tax morale, which is 
drawn in part from crowding theory (Frey, 1997). The psychological tax contract assesses 
the interactions between incentives and the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Feld and 
Frey, 2005). Incentives in this model may be positive (rewards) or negative (deterrence) 
and may influence tax morale, which may subsequently affect tax compliance. 
The social-psychological approach gives a better understanding of the behaviour of the 
taxpayer (Pope and Mohdali, 2010), therefore, approaches to improve tax compliance 
should consider the psychological aspect because the taxpayer is influenced by things that 
exist within the taxpayer’s immediate environment (Damayanti et al., 2015). 
92 
 
The psychological tax contract is also based on the premise that taxpayers and the tax 
authority see and treat each other as partners, which involves transparency and honesty 
towards each other. The theory states that if tax authorities treat taxpayers anything 
different from this ‘partnership relationship’, the psychological tax contract will be seen as 
violated and citizens may feel they have a good reason not to stick to their part of the 
contract and may evade taxes42 (Frey and Feld, 2002).  
The theory suggests that visible expenditures of tax revenue may serve as a motivating 
factor for taxpayers to comply, especially when the taxpayers value these goods and 
services they receive (Bello and Danjuma, 2014, p.36). From this theoretical standpoint, 
even in the absence of detection and punitive measures, taxpayers will still comply 
voluntarily when they are satisfied with the provision of goods and services from the 
government (Torgler, 2003), and conversely, compliance will fall with dissatisfaction on 
tax revenue usage (Palil, 2010). 
In the psychological contract, deterrence measurements such as punishment and fines are still 
seen as acceptable to enforce certain behaviours. However, the satisfaction from taxpayers in 
terms of what they get in return, (as contract partners) is the government playing its part 
(Reinganum and Wilde, 1986), which should go over and above the usual provision of goods 
and services and instead include fairness, loyalty and building ties (Feld and Frey, 2005). The 
psychological tax contract asserts that tax compliance is influenced by central government 
policy, tax authorities’ behaviour, and state institutions.  
The theory holds the belief that tax compliance depends on three key elements; 
• The physical exchange of taxpayers getting goods and services for the payment of 
taxes 
• The political process and procedures that create such an exchange and; 
• The personal relationships existing between taxpayers and tax administrators. 
Supporters of the theory (for example, Frey and Feld, 2002) argue that it provides a 
means to bridge economics, law, and policy by ‘genuinely’ rewarding taxpayers in the 
exchange relationship. 
                                                          













4.8.3. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
Previous studies have suggested that human behaviours are determined by both social 
influence and dispositional (attitude) factors ((Banduri, 1991; Deci and Ryan, 2002). This is 
consistent with the literature on tax compliance which has found that social influences 
(interpersonal relationships) and intrinsic (morale) motivations are key determinants of tax 
compliance decisions (Torgler 2001; Cummings et el., 2005; Frey and Feld, 2002; Kirchler 
2007; Pope and McKerchar, 2011; Alm McClellan, 2012).  
Originating from learning theory, the TRA asserts that behaviours towards an object or 
situation are determined by the intention to perform that behaviour. An offshoot from Ajzen 
and Fishbein’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), Ajzen (1991) developed the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to include a measure of perceived behaviour control 
(PBC). PBC, according to Ajzen, influences both intention and behaviour. The reason for 
adding perceived behaviour control was that it would allow prediction of behaviours that 
were not under complete volitional control (Armitage and Conner, 2001, p.472), compared to 
the TRA which predicts behaviours that were relatively under volitional control (ibid, p.472). 
Ajzen states that the transmission of intention into action is to a greater extent determined by 
personal and environmental barriers. 



















Illustrated in figure 4.3 above, intention, the cornerstone of the theory of planned behaviour 
and the performance of a particular behaviour or its transmission into a different behaviour 
depends on the intention that the individual has generated towards the behaviour (Benk et al., 
2011, p.181). The intention in this case is defined as the factor indicating the degree of 
individual efforts to perform a certain behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)43. Thus, the person's 
conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a behaviour (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.168). It 
hypothesises that behaviour is predicted by the intention to engage in a given behaviour. 
Intention in return is predicted by two factors – (a) An individual’s attitude towards the 
outcome of the behaviour, and (b) the opinions held by people in the person’s environment, 
referred to as the subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). This is the opinions of the 
people who are important to the individual and who the individual sees as a reference 
regarding to his/her behaviour (Benk et al., 2011, p.181).  
 
4.8.c. Pillar 3 Theories 
This pillar which comprises of responsive regulation and tax morale assert that tax 
compliance is influenced by a combination of factors which fall under three broad domains – 
intrinsic drive, persuasive and punitive measures. The next section discusses the slippery 
slope model (persuasion and punishment) followed by responsive regulation (the theory 
adopted to help explain and inform the results of this study). 
 
4.8.4. The ‘Slippery Slope’ Model (SSM). 
The slippery slope framework proposed by (Kirchler, 2007), and developed further in 
subsequent studies (for example, Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008) suggests that tax 
compliance is influenced by two main variables.  ‘Trust’ in, and the ‘Power’ of, the 
                                                          
43 Cited in Benk et al, 2011 
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authorities and the associated interactions between the actors44 in the tax compliance process 
(Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010).  Thus, maximum compliance depends on both power (of 
authority) and trust (of citizens) and the ‘absence of either or both reduces the efficiency of 
tax collection' (Oats and Pemberton, 2012, p.53). 
This model rejects a ‘pure economic assumption that individual taxpayers try to avoid taxes 
whenever the evasion pays off and it’s built on the assumption that the majority of 
individuals do pay their taxes willingly without considering the evasion and avoidance 
possibilities (Torgler, 2007; Kirchler, 2007; Frey and Feld 2002; Alm et al., 2012).  
Kirchler et al (2008, p.212) refer to the power of authorities as the taxpayers’ perception of 
the tax authority’s ability to detect and punish tax-related crimes. Thus, power here refers to 
how the taxpayer views the tax authority in terms of detecting illegal tax evasion, for 
example by conducting frequent and thorough tax audits, punishing evasion, for example by 
fining evaders to a deterrent amount. However, as outlined above, the impact of these 
deterrent measures on compliance has produced mixed results among the existing literature. 
For example, Frey (1997) found that voluntary compliance is negatively affected by 
increased audits and heavy fines, Kirchler and Wahl (2010, p.3) on the other hand, found that 
even where trust is low but the authorities have strong power, tax-related crimes are avoided.   
Trust is defined by Kirchler et al (2008, p.212) as “a general opinion of individuals and social 
groups that the tax authorities are benevolent and work beneficially for the common good”. 
Trust in authorities is linked to the general perception and opinions held by taxpayers that the 
tax revenue is used by the tax authority for the common good (María-Dolores et al., 2010; 
Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; Kirchler et al., 2010).  
Tax compliance, according to this model, is therefore directly achieved through a mix of 
power and trust, and the level of one element is directly linked to the weight placed on the 





                                                          
44  The actors in the tax compliance process are the authority and the taxpayer 
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Figure 4.4 the Slippery Slope Model  
        Voluntary  




                                                                                               
 
                                                            
                       
 (Source: Kirchler et al., 2008, p.212) 
The model is based on the following four conditions; 
• Even with low trust in the authorities, tax compliance will increase through high 
auditing and detection probabilities with heavy fines. Increasing power results in 
enforced compliance. 
• Under the condition of low power, compliance increases with a degree of trust. 
Increasing trust increases voluntary compliance. 
• Strong power and high trust lead to high compliance. Strong trust and strong power 
evoke enforced and voluntary compliance. 
• Moderating the effects between power and trust influences taxpayers’ relationships 
and compliance – when power is at its maximum, variations in the trust are irrelevant 
because the authorities can enforce maximum compliance and when trust is at its 
maximum, variations in power do not matter because citizens contribute their share 
regardless 
(Kirchler et al., 2008, p.212) 
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The slippery slope model ignores the individual’s intrinsic drive to act without being 
subject to control. Again, the model assumes that only two variables impact on tax 
compliance and sees the taxpayer as a ‘reactor’ who will only react based on how they 
perceive the tax authority. 
As this study looks at the impact of the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, 
and how this subsequently influences compliance decisions, it adopts Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s responsive regulation theory (as used in some recent tax-related studies, see 
section 4.13), to help explain and inform results. 
 
4.9. Theory of the study 
The study is conducted on an inductive basis and did not test any of the underlying tax 
compliance theories or models discussed earlier in this chapter. The study, following the 
data collections and analysis (see next chapters) uses existing theories to explain tax 
compliance in the informal sector. Based on the aims of this study, to assess compliance 
determinants of informal sector operators (see chapter one), the work of Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) which has been successfully been used in recent tax research (see 
Braithwaite et al., 2007; Gunningham, 2007; Baldwin and Black, 2008; Ventry, 2008; 
Book, 2009; Leviner, 2009, and Holmes, 2011) is adopted to assess the extent to which 
responsive regulation approach in tax administration can influences compliance decisions 
of informal sector operators. 
 
4.9.1. Responsive Regulation Theory (RRT) 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) moved the regulation debate from deterrence and enforced 
compliance paradigm to incorporate principles of responsive regulation which moves away 
from the ‘big stick' approach and embraces a more comprehensive, strategic, and forward-
looking method of enforcement (Leviner, 2008).  
The concept of ‘responsive regulation’ entails administration of determinate law by officials 
who tailor their regulatory behaviour according to the compliance posture adopted by 
individuals subjected to the relevant law’ (Whait, 2012, p.108).  
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The main feature of the concept of responsive regulation is the pursuit of cooperation by the 
regulator with the regulatee. The theory is built around a set of possible compliances 
behaviours and attitudes and suggested regulatory actions to shape compliance decisions. 
These compliance behaviours and associated regulatory responses are presented in the form 
of enforcement pyramid (see figure 4.5). In explaining the responsive regulation pyramid, 
Ayres and Braithwaite (2001) summed up the hallmark of the concept: 
‘Regulatory pyramids offer the advantage of handing regulators a 
set of tools that can be applied without having to have a detailed 
understanding of why non-compliance has occurred. One starts 
with the expectation of co-operation; escalation on the pyramid 
occurs only when one sees the other defaulting and becoming 
non-co-operative’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 2001, p.7) 









         
          Source: Author’s compilation from the literature 
The enforcement pyramid (see figure 4.5 above and the ATOs approach in fig. 4.8 below) is 
a dynamic and gradual application of less to more severe sanctions and regulatory 
interventions. These sanctions and interventions balance the conventional (and often more 
Incompetent or 









antagonistic) authoritarian approaches with strategies which employ persuasion and 
encouragement through three states of communication: cooperation, toughness, and 
forgiveness (Leviner, 2009, p.385). 
Considering the motivations, problems, and conditions of the regulatee, responsive regulation 
emphasises voluntary compliance through persuasion and cooperation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992, p.4). Responsive regulation deemphasizes threats and promotes support 
and regulatees capacity building. In their support for responsive regulation, Job and Honaker 
(2003, p.113) suggest that sanctions should be available and imposable, escalating in ever-
increasing intensity with recalcitrant non-compliance. 
The concept advocates for mutual trust between the regulatees and the regulatory authority 
and a conscious desire for cooperation between the two (Demin, 2018, p.17). Trust in this 
context means a ‘relationship where the other player can be taken at his or her word, where 
there is a commitment to an honest communication, to understand the needs of the other, to 
agreed rules of fair play and a preference for cooperation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, 
p.86). 
A regulatory authority that adopts this approach commits itself to investigation and takes 
into account the problems, motivations, and circumstances of the regulatees (Leviner, 
2008, p.369).  RRT adopts a dynamic approach to regulation, and assumes a total 
commitment to assisting regulatees’ compliance efforts; and strives to enforce compliance 
across the board, even when the regulatees are highly defiant (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 
p.35).  
Responsive regulation theory has been successfully adopted in regulating a number of sectors 
(in different countries), example National Audit Office (Australia); Food and Safety 
(Australia, New Zealand and Netherlands); Health and Safety at work (Canada); Health and 
Safety Commission – enforcement policy statement (UK); Patients safety commission 
(Oregon, US); and Prudential regulation (Australia), just to mention but a few (Ivec and 
Braithwaite, 2015, p.2). 
Subsequent studies (following the initial work by Ayres and Braithwaitte, 1992) has moved 
the responsive regulation theory into two pillars – the regulatory pillars of sanctions and 




4.9.2. The Regulatory Pillars of Sanctions and Support 
As observed earlier in this section, the enforcement pyramid, the bedrock of the responsive 
regulation theory suggests the escalation of sanctions as a means of enforcing compliance.  
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that businesses are more likely to defect from 
cooperation where a regulator has only one deterrence option, even if that option is 
cataclysmic. In addition, for political, moral or sometimes legal reasons, such a strong 
penalty/fine is unlikely to be applied if it is disproportionate to the nature of the crime 
(Davidson, 2016, p.188). For example, criminal prosecutions involving long prison terms are 
unlikely to be initiated for relatively minor business transgressions, such as creating a low 
level of pollution. This further adds up to the previous argument that a graduated response 
(pyramid of sanctions) that considers (at each stage) the actions of the regulatees is the most 
effective way to engage taxpayers and improve voluntary compliance. An example of a 
regulatory pyramid of sanctions is persuasion — warning letter — monetary penalties — 
criminal prosecution — temporary suspension of license — permanent revocation of license 
(Davidson, 2016, p.189). 
A key benefit of the regulatory pyramid is that it allows the regulator to recognize efforts of 
the regulatee and adopts sanctions accordingly.  The regulator thus begins at the ‘bottom, 
assuming cooperation, assuming virtue, but when this assumption is not met or when the 
regulatee exploits this cooperative strategy, the regulator escalates and adopts a stronger 
enforcement posture, first using measures like improvement and prohibition notices, but if 
that doesn't work, escalate into higher enforcement approaches’ (Johnstone, nd., p.25)45. 
Although the pyramid of sanctions recognizes the efforts of regulatees in the compliance 
process and recommends a variation of sanctions to suit nature of the offense, its focus is 
primarily on punishment rather than supporting the regulatee to comply. 
Therefore, as a complementary approach to the enforcement pyramid and to recognize the 
support needs of regulatees who may want to do the right thing but may not [genuinely] have 
the capacity to do so, the pyramid of support (mainly referred to as the strengths-based 
pyramid) has been proposed in recent regulatory literature (see Braithwaitte et al., 2007; 
Braithwaite, 2008; Healy, 2011; Ivec and Braithwaite, 2015; Davidson, 2016). 
                                                          
45 Interview transcription of Prof. Richard Johnstone, Director, National Research Centre for OHSU, ANU. 
Interview is available on Australia’s Safework website (https://bit.ly/2YOG7i8).  
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In other words, the pyramid of support/rewards is recommended where there is compliance. 
As shown in the figure.4.6, at the bottom of the pyramid of rewards, the regulator may 
provide support in the form of education, which can escalate to praise, positive recognition, 
by spreading the word about the approach the regulatee has adopted in its compliance efforts. 
To further boost compliance, the regulator can move to the top of the pyramid and nominate 
the regulatee for a prize. 
 











Pyramid of Sanctions    Pyramid of Support 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Because there are irrational, rational and virtuous taxpayers, the most effective approach is a 
blend of the two approaches to achieve a balance and ensure that the needs of specific 
taxpayer groups are met. For example, whereas structuralists (operators of the informal 
economy) who have tax evasion as a motive may be better served by the pyramid of 
sanctions, adopting the same approach for the legalists may not be appropriate. The legalists 
who mainly operate in the informal sector due to the heavy regulations or excessive cost of 
maintaining formal status may be willing to comply voluntarily with their tax obligations if 
they are offered the needed support. 
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An example of a more blended practical approach of the responsive regulation theory is the 
one used by South Australia’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA as a risk-
based regulator adopts a mix of sanctions and support based approaches (see figure 4.7 
below) to design actions and responses which are tailored to risks, attitudes, and behaviours 
posed by individuals, industries, and sectors (EPA, 2013, p.8). 
 







Source: (EPA, 2013, p.8) 
As shown in figure 4.7 above, the EPA’s regulatory stance is that ‘significant majority of 
entities want to comply. A small percentage do comply willingly with limited support or 
direction from the EPA (deep green zone) – These groups are recognized and rewarded. A 
large proportion of entities need help to comply (faded green and orange zones)—the EPA 
provides support and guidance to assist these groups. A small proportion of entities will 
wilfully flout the law (red zone)—the EPA uses the full force of the law to deal with these 
groups’ (EPA, 2013, p.8). 
 
4.10. Responsive regulation in tax administration 
Within the field of taxation, responsive regulation (in tax administration) has been explicitly 
adopted by wide range of regulators, including the Her Majesty Revenue and Customs 
(MRC, UK) Canada Revenue Agency (CRA, Canada), the Inland Revenue Department (IRD, 
New Zealand), the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (Belastingdienst, Netherlands), 
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, USA), and the pioneer, the Australian Tax Office (ATO, 
Australia) and several countries within the European Union (Rollins, 2016).  
Within tax administration, responsive regulation focuses on the ‘taxpayer - tax authority’ 
relationship, and as noted by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), this relationship plays a vital 
role in tax compliance. It is based on the premise that the regulator has the authority to own 
up to its administrative responsibilities and explore different ways to manage this 
relationship. This is not only to enforce compliance from potential non-compliance but 
also to strengthen ties and to manage compliance more fairly and efficiently with the aim 
to improving voluntary compliance, especially in the face of complex tax laws, which keep 
evolving (Leviner, 2008). 
The Australian Tax Office (ATO) describes responsive regulation as a structured way of 
understanding and improving taxpayer compliance as it helps the tax authority to better 
understand the factors that influence taxpayer behaviour to apply the most appropriate 
compliance strategy’ (ATO, 2009). 
As demonstrated in figure 4.5, at the base of the pyramid are taxpayers who are willing to 
comply voluntarily, and at the end are those who try all options to evade or who will only 
comply based on the threat of audit and severity of potential fines (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010). 
The responsive regulation approach, therefore, assumes that there are taxpayers who want to 
do the right thing or try to comply, but do not always succeed, so the approach is to make 
compliance easy, or to assist them to comply. There are also non-complying taxpayers, who 
need suitable sanctions to comply. In this case, enforcing the law helps maintain overall 
taxpayer confidence in the tax system and encourages ongoing compliance (IRD, 2005).  
Thus, responsive regulation requires regulators to be responsive to the conduct of those they 









Figure 4.8 Actions and responses of the ATO model 
 
A regulatory pyramid, as illustrated in ATOs model in figure 4.,8 above, sets out a series of 
options that a tax authority might use to win compliance, sequenced from the least intrusive 
at the bottom to the most intrusive at the top (Braithwaite, 2007, p.4). Another strong 
assumption held by responsive regulation theory is that procedural justice and fair treatment 
of taxpayers by the tax authority will improve voluntary compliance. 
This theory assumes that most taxpayers are voluntarily compliant with tax laws. Therefore, 
most taxpayers’ compliance behaviour is self-regulated and are at the base of the compliance 
pyramid. The theory asserts that most of these taxpayers will interact with the tax authority 
when they are lodging necessary forms, receiving tax assessments, or making payments 
(Whait, 2012, p.110). They require very limited intervention from the tax authority and the 
regulatory objective of the tax authority towards this group of taxpayers is to make the tax 
equitable and certain and the compliance process convenient (easy) as possible. 
In between the base and the top end of the pyramid are the capitulative compliance group of 
taxpayers. This segment involves taxpayers who are ‘at the edge of non-compliance’. They 
may have different views about the tax law and how it should be applied, may be unsure how 
to comply or may have motivations towards noncompliance. This is the most important phase 
of the responsive regulation compliance pyramid (Whait, 2012, p.110). The strategy for the 
tax authority at this stage is to persuade the taxpayer to comply.  
105 
 
The role of the taxpayer over the years has shifted from a passive (observer) to an active 
participant in the taxation process (Belevich, 2012). Therefore, for improved voluntary 
compliance, a tax authority must critically evaluate this role and provide the necessary 
mechanisms to ensure taxpayers involvement. With its inclusivity, responsive regulation 
responds to this demand well. Responsive regulation makes provisions to accommodate 
situations where taxpayers may be resistant to tax laws. Where taxpayers adopt a 
noncooperative position, the tax authority is less likely to adopt corporative strategies and 
may resort to the conventional deterrence approaches such as audit actions and/or fines to 
enforcement compliance (Braithwaite, 2003). These deterrence strategies may be escalated to 
include court actions, especially in situations where the taxpayer becomes completely 
disengaged from the system. 
Assessing the various phases of the compliance pyramid and the recommended policy 
responses, it’s evident that responsive regulation (in taxation) believes that a tax authority 
that actively engages the democratic will of the people, may not need coercion (at the top of 
the pyramid) to win compliance. Although the taxpayers appreciate the existence of coercive 
force which may be used by the tax authority, they will, however, comply through persuasion 
and education. In a typical tax compliance environment, responsive regulation adopts 
systematic and directed approach that is respectful of regulatees, helpful in filling 
information gaps and attentive to opposing or resisting arguments, yet very firm on 
administering sanctions that escalate in intensity in response to the absence of genuine efforts 
on the part of the regulatees to meet required standards (Braithwaite, 2007, p.5). Thus, 
responsive regulation welcomes the voices of [dissident] regulatees and deliberates on shared 
community goals and understanding. Its preferred approach is through teaching (education), 
persuasion and encouragement for those who fall short, however, responsive regulation 
encourages the use of punishment when necessary to achieve its regulatory objective. As 
observed in the early part of this section, responsive regulation refutes the outright use of the 
command-and-control approach to tax enforcement which presumes that taxpayers are 
programmed to respond identically to certain regulatory demands.  
One major challenge that a tax authority may face in adopting a responsive regulation 
approach is tailoring punishment (Belevich, 2012) to make concessions for self-regulatory 
efforts. Braithwaite distinguished regulatory formalism and responsive regulation, citing that 
although there are some useful attributes of regulatory formalism which can be adopted in 
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typical tax enforcement situations. For example, automated letters from the tax enforcement 
agencies do not have to be couched in a legally dense and unfamiliar language, making them 
incomprehensible to ordinary people, nor do they have to be accusatory and offensive in tone 
(Braithwaite, 2007, p.6). Again, regulatory formalism advocates for fair and respectful 
treatment of the taxpayer (Bentley, 1998), however, ‘humanizing’ regulatory formalism is 
not the fundamental principle of responsive regulation. Responsive regulation is a ‘process’ 
that openly engages the taxpayers to think about their obligations and accept responsibility 
for regulating themselves in line with the provisions of the tax law.  
Most current tax codes are complex and often ambiguous, therefore using command-and-
control approaches will not promote long-term voluntary compliance. At times, tax officers 
need to consult, network and employ a sound judgement in dealing with the grey side of the 
tax laws which, and in most cases, taxpayers may find outcomes as unreasonable or unfair 
which could negatively impact on the legitimacy and the authoritativeness of the tax 
authority but which is a beacon of the regulatory formalism approach.  Thus, regulatory 
formalism may impose order on a dispute in the tax domain, however, it may not promote 
clarification of what the intention of the law is in the community at large and how that law 
connects with notions of justice and reasonableness (Braithwaite, 2007, p.7). Adopting a 
responsive regulation, therefore, ensures an inclusive dialogue to empower the powerless and 
challenge the domination of tax authority in the enforcement process. 
In addition, Fred and Frey (2002) use the ‘crowding theory’ to argue that tax morale is 
nurtured through tax authority honouring their side of the contract and providing an inclusive 
and participatory process for citizens and not through deterrence approaches (command-and-
control). 
Responsive regulation thus assumes that there is a responsible taxpayer with underlying 
moral self that can be unearthed by a good regulator which will enable tax evaders/avoiders 
to change their ways and self-regulate more effectively in the future. 
 
4.11. Responsive regulation and the informal sector 
Assessing the compliance challenges in the informal sector (see chapter two), particularly the 
difficulty of obtaining credible taxpayer information to inform effective tax policy implies 
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that adopting purely command-and-control and other less corporative approaches may be less 
effective in promoting long-term voluntary compliance among these operators. 
As evidenced by the study of Australia’s cash economy (Braithwaite, 2003), designing an 
inclusive system where taxpayers trust that there exist strong mechanisms of support and 
enforcement may be more effective. 
Evidence from literature (in chapter two) indicates that there are different motives which 
drive people to conduct their activities informally – From survival needs, over-regulations to 
profit motives, including tax evasion. This suggests that adopting a responsive regulation 
approach to deal with different operators differently could yield positive results. 
From informal sector compliance perspectives, implementing responsive regulation must 
involve the three key pillars as suggested by Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2001, p.6);  
a) availability of a full range of credible sanctions which are known to the taxpayer, 
b) a clear signal of the tax authority’s willingness to cooperate initially with the 
taxpayer, and  
c) a clear intention (known to the taxpayer) to escalate the intensity of regulatory 
interventions in the absence of effort from the taxpayer to meet required regulatory 
standards.  
Escalating the intensity of regulatory interventions within responsive regulation is to 
inculcate institutional legitimacy and procedural fairness, both of which are influential in 
promoting compliance, as taxpayers will regard tough enforcement action as more 
procedurally fair when persuasion has been tried first (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001, 
p.6). Makai and Braithwaite (1996) described citizen’s perceptions of procedural fairness as 
being more than ‘just a political asset’ for the tax authority, and if properly managed, 
procedural fairness could increase voluntary compliance, especially where regulatory actor 
believes s/he is treated as someone who is trusted, and procedures (systems and structures) 
are fair (Williams, 2016). 
In a typical informal sector tax environment, responsive regulation could increase voluntary 
compliance through the belief (of most taxpayers) that tax officers trust them at a personal 
level, but also want officers to keep distrustful enforcement strategies in place to deal with 
others who cannot always be trusted. Thus, knowing that there are strong and trusted 
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institutional mechanisms in place to deal with those who cheat builds community confidence 
and the legitimacy of the tax system (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001, p.7) 
Trust plays an important role in regulatory relations (Murphy et al., 2009). Central to the 
responsive regulation theory is trust. As discussed earlier, RRT advocates for a dynamic 
regulatory strategy of dialogue and trust as a first choice, followed by escalation to more 
punitive regulation when trust is abused (Braithwaite and Makkai 1994, p.1).  Braithwaite 
(2002, p.36) further showed that lawbreakers are more likely to comply with the law in the 
future if they believe that they are treated as trustworthy by regulators. To assess this 
correlation, Braithwaite and Makkai (1994) conducted an empirical study of compliance 
behaviour of adult nursing homes (caregivers) towards the inspection framework in 
Australia. The study found that the regulatees’ perception of regulator trust in them increased 
their compliance levels in the subsequent inspection, which were usually 18 to 20 months 
later.  
In a study to assess the impact of trust between taxpayers and the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO), Murphy (2004) found that taxpayers trust in the tax office leads to higher voluntary 
compliance.  
The responsive regulation theory asserts that an effective corporative compliance must have 
three key elements; (1) regulators employ a tit-for-tat regulatory strategy; (2) regulators adopt 
a hierarchical range of sanctions (the enforcement pyramid); and (3) the most severe 
sanctions (at the top of the pyramid) are sufficiently high to deter abuses (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992, p.40) – These elements directly address the three key drivers of informal 
sector operations discussed in chapter two. 
The tit-for-tat strategy according to Six (2012) is based on game theory. In this strategy, 
actors start with the cooperation and if the other actor reciprocates, a cooperative exchange 
may develop. If the other actor responds with defection, taking advantage of the initial trust, 
then the first actor retaliates with defection (Six, 2012, p.2). This is more of a passive 
regulation where the regulator reacts with the regulatees actions, which Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) referred to as cooperation trust.  
Over the years, tax researchers have produced a large body of work on the application of 
responsive regulation to tax administration. These studies have shaped and supported 
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responsive tax administration as a viable alternative for organizing the administration of the 
tax system.  
Responsive tax administration approach has influenced compliance scholars around the 
world and related tax compliance research. For example, Ventry (2008), Book (2009), 
Leviner (2009), and Holmes (2011) have advocated explicitly for the adoption of responsive 
tax administration as the best way to improve voluntary compliance, although the literature 
on responsive regulation about informal sector taxation from developing countries 
perspective is still lacking. 
The theory has also been regularly applied, developed, and tweaked (Nielsen and Parker, 
2009) by other scholars (e.g. Haines, 1997; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Parker 
2002; Simpson, 2002; Braithwaite et al., 2007; Gunningham, 2007; Baldwin and Black 
2008). 
Numerous other tax scholars have supported programs aimed at improving tax compliance 
and improving efficiency in the tax system, and have used responsive tax administration as a 
model for policy analysis (Osofsky, 2012). Other similar ideas developed as a result of 
responsive regulation include Tit-for-Tat regulatory enforcement (Scholz, 1991; Harrison, 
1995) Flexible Enforcement (Rees, 1994), and Creative Enforcement (May and Burby, 1998) 
all of which share the key features of the responsive regulation theory. 
 
4.12. Responsive Regulation Theory – The key challenges 
A major drawback of this theory is that it assumes that all taxpayers have the competence and 
positive intentions to do what the law (the tax authority) requires of them. Regulators in RRT 
are assumed to have the skill and will to act responsively towards regulatees, to be tough on 
the bad guys and soft on the good guys (Six, 2012, p.2). This may not be the case always, as 
studies have also shown that sometimes there are capacity constraints within the tax 
administration, particularly those within developing countries (Brautigam et al., 2008). 
In addition, the RRT assumes that trust (persuasion) and control (deterrence) are substitutes 
such that when there is trust, control does not apply and when control is applied it’s an 
indication of lack of trust (Six, 2012). However, this is not always the case and trust and 
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control are not necessarily substitutes but compliments, which may be applied 
simultaneously and may reinforce one another (Weibel, 2007). 
Furthermore, trust, as defined in the responsive regulation theory, is based on deterrence. 
However, deterrence based trust according to Rousseau et al. (1998) is not necessarily trust 
but ‘low distrust’, which is not an opposite of trust. Six (2012) pointed out that using 
sanctions as a deterrence to achieve corporation is not the same as trusting, and that 
corporation is not the same as trust. Thus, trust is not based on corporation -  people can 
corporate without trusting each other, the same way people can trust each other without being 
corporative.  
However, despite these few challenges, the RRT presents an excellent opportunity to assess 
compliance behavior based on the interrelationship (support/trust) between taxpayers and the 
tax authority. Considering the fact that this study is conducted inductively and intends to 
assess compliance behavior of individuals (and effectiveness of current compliance 
approaches), adopting this theory will help explain the study results (current level of 
compliance) from the perspectives of both the regulators (tax authority) and regulatees 
(taxpayers) vis-à-vis existing sanctions and support  
 
4.13. Responsive Regulation Theory in the context of this study 
Having explored other theories, in this chapter, the researcher argues that the responsive 
regulation theory can help analyse the data and be used to inform discussion on tax 
compliance within the informal sector especially considering the shift in taxpayer role in the 
tax system from a passive (observer) to an active participant (Belevich, 2012). Braithwaite 
(2003) observed that responsive regulation was successfully used as the basis by the ATO in 
designing an inclusive framework for Australia’s cash economy in early 2000. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, responsive regulation has been used in several tax 
compliance research (See Osofsky, 2012; Ventry, 2008; Leviner, 2009; Book, 2009; Holmes, 
2011) and has been adopted by many tax authorities (e.g. UK, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada) in designing their tax administration functions. 
Furthermore, central to the responsive regulations theory is trust. The theory advocates for 
trust and dialogue at the initial stages before escalating to sanctions and penalties to enforce 
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compliance. Trust has been used in several tax compliance studies, (for example, work by 
Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 200; Torgler, 2003; Frey, 2003; Murphy, 2004; Torgler and 
Schneider 2005; Pitters et al., 2007; Kirchler, et al., 2008; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; María-
Dolores et al., 2010; Oats and Pemberton ,2012) all assessed tax compliance from a trust 
perspective46 and concluded that trust has a positive correlation with tax compliance 
decision. 
The theories of the informal sector (discussed in chapter two) further indicate that different 
operators in the informal sector may have different intentions for choosing to engage in that 
sector, therefore adopting this theory would help explain how responsive regulation approach 
to tax administration could help analyse informal sector tax compliance behaviour from the 
perspectives of the dualists, structuralists and the legalists ideologies. 
This theory fits within the limits of this study as it helps analyse how the individual’s 
compliance decisions are shaped by the regulatory approach adopted by the regulator 
including the relationship between them (regulator and the regulates). As discussed in 
chapter two, due to lack of reliable data about the operators of the informal economy it is 
difficult to comprehensively understand what produces tax non-compliance, and even less 
what motivates compliance, however, this information is critical to the design of effective 
policy. In response to this challenge, most tax authorities resort to using blunt, non-taxpayer 
responsive and often punitive measures designed to deter evasion rather than promoting long 
term voluntary compliance. Using the RRT, the study assesses how informal sector taxpayers 
are influenced by responsive regulation approaches, which represents a gap in recent 
literature. 
In summary, using the ‘responsive regulatory lenses’, the study explores and analyses 
compliance behaviours of taxpayers in relation to the practices within the tax environment 





                                                          





RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, APPROACH, AND THESIS 
 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter of the study systematically describes the research design and the methodology 
employed to find answers to the research questions posed in chapter one. This chapter is 
further grouped into sections to describe the different stages and processes of the 
methodology used. 
The initial part provides an explanation of the survey methodology used and the justification 
for its selection for this study. 
As the study is a case study of the Ghanaian informal sector, the next part of this section 
concentrates on the survey/data collection methods used in Ghana. These include the survey 
instrument and the procedures involved, sampling frame and size and the questionnaire 
development. The remaining sections of the chapter describe the research framework and 
link to the data analysis chapter (chapter six) to conclude other chapters of the study. 
 
5.1 Study Objectives 
Kirchler, (2007, p.188) theorised two main approaches to understanding the interaction 
between taxpayers and tax authorities - ‘cops and robbers’ and ‘service and client’ 
approaches. 
The ‘service and clients’ approach carries the assertion that taxpayers are cooperative citizens 
who are willing to comply if they understand tax laws and the procedures of paying taxes. 
This study is aiming47 to establish the assertion that operators of the informal economy would 
be compliant if they understood the tax law and deemed it to be fair – i.e. that they would 
respond to similar motivations to pay taxes, as found to be the case in studies of developed 
country taxpayers.  
In addition, the study analyses the procedural fairness effect on tax compliance in terms of 
the tax payment decisions making by informal sector operators. The study also adopts the 
approach48 by Dijke and Verboom on procedural fairness who found that ‘‘low trust in 
                                                          
47 By analysing factors which influence taxpayers compliance decisions in the informal sector away from the 
conventional approach to studying the sector which look at systems rather than taxpayer motivations. 
48 Dijke and Verboom, (2010) used students from the Open University Amsterdam, as research assistants, and 
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authorities makes procedural fairness rules relating to leader behaviour more effective in 
stimulating voluntary compliance with authorities’’ (Dijke and Verboom, 2010, p.90). With 
this in mind, a section of the interview questions is designed to investigate the state - citizen 
– relationships. Here the study draws on the ‘regulatory pillars of support and sanctions’ in 
the Responsive Regulation Theory discussed in chapter four to assess how different 
compliance approaches influence tac compliance behaviour of the informal sector taxpayer. 
In addition, the perceived level of reciprocity and fairness49 (of the state) by informal sector 
are analysed to assess their impact on compliance decisions. Theories in pillar 2 as discussed 
in chapter four help explain this aspect. It is proposed that taxation engages 
citizens/taxpayers to collectively make claims on the state for reciprocity either through 
decision making or the provision of ‘something’ in return for honouring their tax obligations, 
this is one of the key strategies to promoting tax compliance (OECD, 2008; Prichard ,2009).  
Studies show that aside from the understanding of tax laws as well as one’s obligations and 
the relationship between the state and citizenry, there are social and other demographic 
factors which generally influence tax compliance behaviour (as outlined in chapters four). In 
addition, financial constraints and the availability and quality of accounting records kept for 
the business also influences compliance (Singh and Bhupalan, 2001). Therefore, the 
interviews and survey questionnaire for the informal sector operators are designed to cover 
among others, the following areas; 
A. The compliance process – this section of the questions assesses; 
• The stages and difficulty of the compliance process including compliance 
approaches adopted by the tax authority 
• The availability of tax information to aid compliance decisions  
• Taxpayers’ understanding of tax laws and their obligations within these 
laws 
• Tax compliance costs in the form of direct financial costs and other indirect 
costs to businesses and individuals 
B. Social50 issues which could impact on people’s compliance behaviour including 
relationship between actors in the tax field (i.e. taxpayers and tax authority) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
designed scenarios/questions to test taxpayers compliance decision based on procedural fairness 
49 The research will investigate the responsiveness of the state to the needs of the informal sector and how 
involved the sector feels they are to policies that affect them, perceived benefits to paying taxes and the 
resulting impact on tax compliance. 
50 Social issues will incorporate all demographic variables such as gender, religion, age, family status (i.e. 
married/single), taxpayer-authority relationships and influence of reference groups 
114 
 
C. Financial constraints and types of accounting records kept and dominant 
transaction type51  
D. Corruption / perceived fairness in the tax system/trust - in the state as responsible 
government and perception of spending   
More specifically, the objectives of the study as discussed in chapter one are to: 
• Examine the effects of the relationship between taxpayers and the tax authorities on 
the voluntary compliance of taxpayers in the informal sector.  
• Assess how different compliance approaches influence compliance decisions of 
informal sector taxpayers. 
• Identify and analyse the variables that make individuals and small business operators 
in the informal sector ‘‘difficult-to-tax’’. 
• Assess the effectiveness of presumptive based taxation, as the dominant form of 
taxing informal sector economic activities in developing economies. 
• Analyse and compare the key tax compliance determinants of informal sector 
operators with those in the formal sector.  
 
5.2. Research Questions   
In order to accomplish the research objectives, empirical evidence is produced to answer the 
following questions: 
 
5.2.1. Research Question 1. 
Are there more effective ways to tax informal economic activities in developing 
countries than those that are currently employed? 
To address this question, the study first identifies what ways through the survey instrument, 
may be effective in motivating higher voluntary tax compliance in the informal economy.  
Some of the survey questions are therefore designed around different tax administration 
strategies, and aimed to explore whether the informal sectors in developing countries (in this 
                                                          
51  This area will look at whether cash only transactions accepted or cheque and bank transfers are the dominant 
form of payment for their business activities 
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case Ghana) are best served using presumptive taxation approaches such as ‘tax 
disc/sticker/stamps etc. (Bird and Wallace 2003; Loeprick, 2009; Joshi and Ayee, 2002b; 
Bräutigam et al., 2008; Prichard, 2009), as currently being applied or by moving to a formal 
assessment based taxation. 
 
5.2.2. Research Question 2. 
To what extent does the relationship between a taxpayer and the tax authority shape 
voluntary compliance?  
 
The relationship between taxpayers and the tax authority have been identified as having a 
profound impact on compliance decisions in studies involving the formal sector (Richardson 
and Sawyer, 2001; Torgler 2003; Frey and Torgler, 2004; Torgler and Valev, 2007; Loo and 
Ho, 2005; Frey and Torgler, 2007). However, this has not been tested within the informal 
economy, specifically within the developing countries context, and therefore remains a gap in 
research knowledge. This question seeks to contribute to the debate of shaping our 
understanding of the impact of the tax field (taxpayer versus tax authority relationships) on 
compliance decisions. 
This question is answered by drawing on the responsive regulation theory to assess 
compliance decisions, by exploring how the regulatory approach shape compliance decision 
of the informal sector operator.  
 
5.2.3. Research Question 3. 
To what extent does moral obligation contribute to the tax compliance decisions 
of informal sector operators? 
 
Most recent studies within tax compliance have shifted from seeing the taxpayer solely as a 
utility maximiser, to exploring the wider intrinsic drive to comply with tax obligations (see 
chapter four for detailed discussion on tax morale). This question assesses how tax morale 
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influences the compliance decisions of the informal sector operators, drawing on the previous 
formal sector studies, for example (Kirchler, 2007; Frey and Torgler 2007; Pope and 
McKerchar 2011; Alm and McClellan, 2012). 
 
5.2.4. Research Question 4. 
How effective is presumptive based taxation on informal sector operators’ 
compliance decisions? 
 
Presumption taxation is by far the most common form of taxing the informal sector in most 
countries (Stern and Ahmad, 1991, p.276; Makedonskiy, 2005). The reason for its popularity 
is mainly due to the high tax collection costs and the capacity constraints of other solutions 
available (Brautigam et al., 2008). (See chapter two for discussion on the nature and 
principles of presumptive taxation). This question assesses the effectiveness of the use of a 
presumptive strategy in taxing the informal sector from the perspective of the taxpayers. 
 
5.2.5. Research Question 5. 
What social/demographic variables influence tax compliance in the informal 
sector of developing countries?  
 
This question seeks to establish any possible linkage of different demographic variables and 
an individual’s tax compliance behaviours. Individual’s tax compliance responses are 
assessed against variables such as sex, age, and marital status to establish possible 
correlations. This will help assess such relationships in the inform sector and compare results 
with existing evidence within formal sector settings.    
 
 
5.2.6. Research Question 6. 





Research question six is addressing how increased auditing/detection mechanisms and 
punitive measures such as fines may impact on voluntary compliance in the informal sector.  
Previous studies have produced mixed results on the impact of tax audits on compliance 
decisions in informal settings. Some (for example Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Lewis, 
1982; Mogudu and Anyaduba, 2014) believe that such actions influence compliance 
decisions, whilst other studies (for example McKerchar, 2001; Torgler, 2001) found that 
conventional audits and fines do not improve compliance, especially in the long term.   
 
 
5.3. Study Approach 
This study employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches in seeking to address its 
objective and specific research questions. Qualitative data collection is undertaken through 
the use of face-to-face interviews, a field trip observation [with GRA tax officials], and the 
quantitative data collection method is by the use of a questionnaire survey. The research 
design for the study, therefore, involves the use of both exploratory (interviews) and 
descriptive design (questionnaires). Data collected through the qualitative methodology is 
analysed through the use of content analysis with the development of themes from the 
interview data using Nvivo, and the quantitative data (questionnaire) collected is analysed 
with the aid of statistical software, SPSS. 
Using both qualitative and quantitative research approaches ensures that rich search sets of 
data are generated for the study as each approach helps address the various research 
questions from a different angle which adds extra impetus and rigour to the overall study. 
Bryman (2012, p.36), states that ‘quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy 
that emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of data and that; 
- entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which 
the accent is placed on the testing of theories;  
- has incorporated the practices and norms the natural scientific model and of 
positivism in particular; and  
- embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality’.  
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Qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that usually puts an emphasis on 
words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data and that; 
- predominantly emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship between theory 
and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories’;  
- has rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism 
in particular, in preference of an emphasis on how individuals interpret their social 
world; and 
- embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of the 
individuals’ creation.’ 
The qualitative approach, however, dominates the two main methods employed in this study 
since the study is mainly a qualitative inquiry. As one of the most widely used analytical 
strategies, content analysis is used in coding the data. Most recent studies within the social 
sciences employ qualitative content analysis, which addresses some of the weaknesses of the 
quantitative approach in generating needed data for analysis (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009).  
 Using qualitative content analysis helps serve a number of vital purposes such as: 
• an approach of empirical, methodological and controlled analysis of texts within their 
context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, 
without rash quantification” (Mayring, 2000, p.2)  
• a method of qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of 
qualitative material and establish consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p.453), 
and 
• a method for the subjective interpretation of the content of data through a systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns to ease analysis 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p.1278). 
The vital functions illustrated above, according to Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), demonstrate 
that qualitative content analysis emphasises an integrated view of speech/texts and their 
specific contexts in establishing one’s stance on an issue of inquiry. 
Apart from the obvious benefit of adopting content analysis and a general qualitative 
research approach in a social science enquiry, another reason for adopting a qualitative 
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approach for this study is the pioneering stage of this field of inquiry. There is currently no 
suitable tested and universally agreed-upon theoretical framework for the research of 
informal sector taxation undertaken in the developing economy context, which this study 
could adopt as the foundation or the theoretical framework for testing in this particular case 
or to seek to develop further in the course of this study. Therefore, using a qualitative inquiry 
approach enables the researcher to assume an inductive stance and to explore areas of key 
interest.  As argued by Fu (2012), there is a clear and significant distinction between western 
societies and those of the developing world, it is, therefore, unwise to test a western 
theoretical framework (in this case of tax compliance in an advanced economy) in a 
developing country (and more specifically in an informal economy) context. As a result of 
this, this study does not seek to test theories via a deductive approach. Instead, it takes an 
inductive stance in analysing, presenting and seeking to gain an understanding of developing 
country informal sector tax compliance issues. This approach may, however, then help serve 
as the theoretical framework for future studies in the field of informal sector taxation in 
developing countries. 
The nature of the research questions implies that using a mixed methodology, it was possible 
to create the interaction required to establish the views of the informal sector operators 
through face-to-face interviews, hand-delivered questionnaires and field observations, which 
other methods such as experiments would be less able to fulfil.  
 
5.4. Research Methods 
This study uses three approaches – interviews, questionnaires and field observation as the 
main methods to collect the required data from the informal sector operators and tax officials 
from the national and local authorities – namely the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA), 
the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) and the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). 
This study, thus, uses mix methods for data collection. Mixed methods involving an 
interview and field surveys have been adopted in a number of recent tax research studies (see 
Saad, 2014; Mohdali and Pope, 2014; Sikayu, 2016; Rosid et al., 2016), and the use of 
observation in tax taxation studies is equally gaining prominence. 
Adding field observation to the survey and the face-to-face interview methods offers extra 
advantage and rigour to the data collection. Yesegat (2009, p.104) observed that this helps 
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researchers to gain perspectives from different types of data or different levels within the 
study’. Observation has been used in a number of recent tax studies, for example, Caro et al. 
(2014) adopted it to assess household beverage purchases in Chile following the 
implementation of the new sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax (from 13% to 18%); Chetty 
et al. (2009) assessed the effect of alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption in the United States 
using experiment and observational techniques. Within the field of tax compliance, Yesegat, 
(2009) uses surveys, experiment, and interviews to assess how compliance cost of VAT 
shapes compliance decisions in Ethiopia; Hayes and Baker (2014) use a participant’s 
observation to assess the resolution of audit engagement challenges in government tax 
compliance audits; and Boll (2014) adopts observation and interview to assessed how the 
daily interaction between bookkeepers and business owners influence tax compliance. 
Although in most studies, interviews are used as a follow-up with individual respondents 
after questionnaires to further investigate their responses (McNamara, 1999), this study takes 
the opposite view. Surveys are designed to provide a ‘snapshot of how things are at a specific 
time (Denscombe, 1998). In this study, using the interview first allow the researcher to 
explore the compliance variables broadly and used content analysis to establish themes. The 
survey technique is then followed to collect data on key aspects of the established themes 
which the researcher wanted to further investigate. The order one adopts does not matter as 
noted by Kelly et al. (2003) who stated that the approach which suits individual project 
should be the deciding factor.  In this study adopting an exploratory (interview) approach at 
the initial stage to establish trends to inform the survey questionnaire design was considered 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, the choice of research method and approach was influenced by a lack of 
secondary data and the unreliable nature of the available data within the sector generally, 
which implies that the only reliable method, at present, to collect data for such sensitive 
research is the use of the three approaches. 
Whilst Hanousek and Palda (2003) suggest that in such countries, survey methods are the 
main source of information for tax compliance studies since the data needed for other 
research methods is unreliable due to inadequate national statistics, Charmes (2002) observed 
that mixed methods are the best approach for collecting information for the informal sector 
studies, because the weakness in one method will be compensated by the strength in the 
other. Thus, using mixed-methods help deal with some of the challenges of using only one 
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method such as a survey.  Again, a mixed method design is recognised as a superior approach 
and capable of providing more comprehensive answers than a single method design (Loo et 
al, 2005, p.185). 
 
5.4.1 Face-to-face interviews 
As the starting point of the study, a semi-structured interview was conducted with individuals 
and businesses in the informal sector, as an exploratory investigation to generate an 
understanding of the operation of the sector in relation to taxation. As the study aims to 
explore the relationship between taxpayers and tax officials and how this influences 
compliance, it was envisaged that (as the starting point) interviews would be the most 
effective data collection method, due to their ability to explore wider areas in the course of 
the process, for example using probes. Conducting the interview at the first stage of the data 
collection helped to gather more in-depth insights on participant attitudes, thoughts, and 
actions (Kendall, 2008). This led to the emergence of new themes that did not form part of 
the initial questions designed from using existing literature, but found to be relevant to the 
study objectives and as a result were developed further and became an integral part of the 
survey data collection. 
The interview questions were designed to establish linkages and to seek clarification of 
possible linkages to the results of existing studies in the area of tax compliance, both in 
developing and in advanced economies contexts (as outlined in chapter four).  
To be able to get a good insight into the issues in the informal sector by getting open 
responses from interview participants, this study, rather than using a direct approach to 
measure tax evasion and avoidance practices in the informal sector, employed an indirect 
approach. ‘Indirect methods look for traces of evasion behaviour that are left in various 
indicators that can be identified, so that evasion is not measured directly but rather indirectly 
via these measurable traces’, (Alm, 2012, p.58). Using this strategy as a guide, questions 
were designed to explore respondents’ tax compliance behaviour and key variables/ 
indicators which could increase or decrease compliance rates.  
The interviews were conducted among small businesses and informal sector operators and 
involved a face-to-face session with the minimum interview duration lasting 51 minutes, and 
the longest session one hour thirty-five minutes. The interviews were made up of 17 
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participants from various businesses with different income levels and demographic 
differences selected52 from two regions of Ghana. The interview responses were organised 
around three major themes. These themes were identified during the literature review. The 
themes were further grouped under sub-themes for further analysis – The sub-themes include 
themes from existing literature and those which emerged (new trends) during the interviews 
(see chapter six for interview themes). 
The interview was followed by a questionnaire survey (section 5.8) and field observation 
(section 5.9).  
Tax compliance studies in developing countries, ‘‘involves additional complicating factors 
that make it even harder to get reliable answers”, (Gerxhani, 2006, p.561) regardless of the 
methodology adopted. These complicating factors come as a result of the fact that people are 
not used to paying taxes. Also, people’s attitudes towards the government may be hostile and 
as such, any issues involving taxes may be seen as exposing their private lives to the state, 
and they may resist giving complete and truthful answers in interviews or when filling in a 
questionnaire. This issue could be reduced by assuring respondents of their anonymity, 
(Gerxhani, 2006; Torgler et al., 2010; Molero and Pujol, 2012) an approach which was 
successfully applied for the interview and the questionnaire administration in this research.  
Again, this issue is addressed in this study by adopting a modified approach53 of the three 
principles used by Govender (2008) in the informal sector study of South Africa; 
• Firstly, to overcome a possible language barrier, a research assistant accompanied the 
researcher, and where necessary offered translations. For anonymity, the research 
assistant is not selected from the same community to ensure that they are not known 
to the interviewees. The criterion for selecting the research assistant is based on their 
understanding of research and their fluency of the local language.  
• Secondly, a snowballing approach was adopted so that the interviewees could direct 
the researcher to other people whom they felt would be comfortable and willing to 
answer the questions, and who are known to them either as customers or business 
associates. 
                                                          
52 The justification for sample selection is detailed in the methodology section.  
53 These three approaches are further explained in later stage under ‘strategy to increasing participation and 




• Finally, a strong confidential agreement and parameters are then outlined to 
participants to further guarantee confidentiality.  
 
In choosing a research method to investigate tax compliance, consideration needs to be given 
to the sensitivity of the nature of the issues being asked about so that an appropriate 
technique is chosen which it is hoped makes people feel comfortable enough to provide 
unbiased answers to generate more accurate data for which the research is seeking. 
The sensitivity nature of tax research is also raised by (Gerxhani, 2006) who cautioned that 
before any research method is chosen to investigate peoples’ tax compliance decisions, it is 
important to recognise that it is a very sensitive area where people may not provide the right 
answers if the wrong approach or method is applied. In suggesting two54 approaches to 
dealing with the sensitive issues in tax research, Gerxhani first stated that ‘‘people do not like 
being confronted with questions such as ‘‘Do you pay your taxes?’’, as such questions may 
intimidate respondents who may be dishonest (Gerxhani, 2006, p.558). In addressing this 
issue, both the interview and the questionnaire use less direct questions and instead make use 
of more gradual approaches through indirect questions to assess the attitudes of the sample 
population’s approach to taxation. During the interview stage, questions are normally 
followed by probes for further clarifications. 
This research also adopts some of the key variables used by Frey and Torgler (2007) in their 
comparative study of tax compliance behaviour among Central Eastern European (CEE) and 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. The controlled variables in their experiment are 
included and explored in this study to assess how an informal sector operator’s tax 
compliance behaviour is influenced by age, peers’ compliance behaviour, educational levels, 
marital status, and religion. Although corruption and perceived fairness in the tax system is 
investigated, the study, however, did not adopt fully the institutional quality (i.e. the six 
governance variables)55 used by Frey and Torgler (2007), as the study is more interested in 
tax field relationships, morale, demographic, and other factors which directly affect informal 
sector operators’ tax compliance behaviour. This does not mean the study completely ignored 
institutional factors. To understand tax administration and the impact of the relationship 
                                                          
54 Gerxhani proposes use of a direct and a gradual approach. The direct approach asks respondents directly 
about their (non)compliance with taxes, whereas the gradual approach formulates such sensitive questions 
concerning social and fiscal fraud to deduce individuals compliance behaviour 
55 The variables include; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
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between taxpayers and the tax authority in tax compliance, a series of questions are designed 
to test such a relationship or correlation. 
Frey and Torgler (2007) also used indirect questions in their survey. Some sample questions 
for their study are; 
a. “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, it can never be justified, or it falls somewhere in between: . . . Cheating 
on tax payments if you get the chance.” (p141). 
 
b. “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Cheat on taxes if 
they get the chance?” (p142). 
 
The questions56 for the survey data take a similar pattern to these questions above.  
Another study which uses the indirect approach to asking survey questions also suggests that 
‘‘these types of questions should increase the reliability of the measure of tax morale: since 
they do not directly ask whether a person has evaded taxes, hence the degree of honesty can 
be higher’’ (Barone and Mocetti 2011, p.728).  
In summary, considering the nature of the population within which this study is conducted, a 
mixture of both direct and indirect questions are considered as ideal to help generate the right 
responses for the study 
 
5.4.1.a. Study parameters and population 
This study investigates the main challenges hindering the achievement of efficient and 
effective tax systems in the informal sectors of developing countries. It also analyses the tax 
compliance behaviours of those working in the formal sector but who have the chance to 
under-report their incomes. The study is thus not limited to purely the informal sector 
operators, but also those in the formal sector but who have some degree of informality in 
their operations. Activities and individuals who are mainly formal and undertake a formal tax 
assessment are excluded from the study. This approach enables the study to speak to the 
structuralist perspective on the motivations for the existence of informal sectors, as well as 
the dualist and legalist perspectives (as outlined in chapter two). 
                                                          
56 See appendix 6 for full lists of questions for this study. 
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The research involves studying the tax compliance behaviour of individuals’ small 
businesses in the informal sector in the two largest [by population] regions of the Country – 
the Ashanti region and Greater Accra.  
The decision to select these two regions stems from the fact that they are the two largest in 
terms of business operations, and they have a wide variety of types of business activities, 
involving various sectors of the country’s informal economy (Aryee, 2007). Although Ghana 
has ten regions, the decision to restrict the study to only two is that a preliminary analysis of 
the other eight regions did not report any major differences in terms of economic activities. 
With large informal economic activities in these two regions, they will give true 
representations of taxable economic activities within the country’s informal economy, which 
makes it possible to draw generalisations. 
In summary, studying these two regions with their large informal sectors and their 
similarities to the other regions means that the outcomes from the study are representative of 
various forms of businesses and the results indicate an accurate picture of informal sector tax 
compliance within the country. 
 
5.4.2. Sampling frame and interview/survey procedure 
A series of structured and semi-structured interviews and ‘drop-off and pick up’ 
questionnaire approaches were used to gather information from personal and small business 
owners operating within the informal economy from the selected regions of the country and 
tax officials. 
The researcher was assisted in each region by a Research Assistant during the interviews and 
also for the questionnaire distribution and pick-ups. As the researcher speaks fluent Twi 
which is the main language in one of the regions, Ashanti, the research assistant for the 
Ashanti region only assisted in the questionnaire administration.  
However, as the researcher does not speak the Ga language, the main language spoken in the 
Greater Accra region, the research assistant for this region helped in translation where 
respondents could not speak English. Using a research assistant who speaks the same 
language as the participants was deemed useful in generating reliable data, and as stated by 
Grewal and Ritchie (2006) common language and ethnicity are very important for data 
collection through qualitative interviews. Also, the idea of using the two research assistants is 
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to establish trust of the community in order to gain access to them as suggested by Ryan et al 
(2011), who in analysing the insider/outsider status of research argued that such an approach 
reduces suspicion surrounding certain communities in potentially sensitive research. Using 
locals with their ‘insider status’ has a significant benefit in community-based research 
because of their ethnic, religious, linguistic backgrounds or networks within a specific 
neighbourhood (Ryan et al., 2011).  
 
5.4.3. Research Assistants: selection and justification 
The research assistants were recruited based on personal recommendations during the 
researcher’s initial data collection stage. In total, there were five candidates, from whom the 
researcher selected two based on them having had experience in supporting research before. 
Both research assistants are graduates from two tertiary institutions in Ghana and have both 
written dissertations as part of their qualifications. These key qualities made it somewhat 
easier to work with them. The selection was further based on their understanding of the local 
area and language capability especially in the case of the research assistant for the Greater 
Accra Region.  
To strengthen the confidentiality arrangements put in place for respondents from the onset, 
research assistants were not selected from places where the actual interviews were 
conducted, but by virtue of their ability to speak the local language or general knowledge of 
the local area. The reason for this decision was that it was envisaged that in situations where 
people are not complying with tax obligations, for whatever reason, they may feel 
uncomfortable to reveal certain practices if they are known personally to the research 
assistants. Furthermore, using someone who speaks the language but who is not a resident in 
the community also eradicates the issue of the research assistant nominating his family and 
friends for convenience. With this in mind, the area of residence within the city of the 
research assistants was the first issue tackled before they made fully aware of the task and 
their role in the study. 
127 
 
After selection, the research assistants were given briefing/ training on ethical considerations, 
timing, appearance and general presentation, which was then followed by a formal university 
ethical approval57. 
These training and briefing sessions are of paramount importance as it gave the research 
assistants the techniques and skills required to effectively interpret and help conduct fair 
interviews without interrupting the interviewee during the sessions or without them 
presenting personal opinions or assumptions rather than those presented by the interviewees. 
 
5.4.4. Validity testing - Personal face-to-face interview questions 
Before undertaking the interviews with the operators in the informal sector, a pilot study was 
conducted to test the validity of the proposed questions. The pilot study was conducted 
among randomly selected members of the public in the Ashanti Region capital, Kumasi. This 
helped to refine the questions and helped improve the reliability of the interview process. The 
pilot survey includes four respondents whose responses form no part in the actual study. 
The face-to-face personal interviews for the study were semi-structured to generate more 
information from the sector operators’ taxpaying behaviour. Oral consent was sought from 
each participant before interviewed and they were given the chance to opt-out at any stage of 
the process. As the interviews form a very critical part in the study, the researcher and the 
research assistant were very patient, giving all the necessary assurance to encourage people 
to freely and openly talk about their tax issues without fear of having their details passed on 
to the authorities. In doing so, each interviewee was given a strong assurance during the 
interview scheduling phase, and also at the time of the interview, this was further emphasised 
to reinforce the assurances made. The confidentiality was assured with the fact that no 
personal or business data was collected. For instance, no data was collected relating to a 
business address, telephone, or individual names. These excluded parameters were very 
useful as they assisted respondents to feel assured of confidentiality. 
                                                          
57 All research carried out at the University of Birmingham involving human subjects, or which raises other 





The interviews were carried out over 4 weeks within the two selected cities of the country. 
However, the overall interview process lasted for nine weeks starting from the 28th February 
2013 to 22nd April 2013. 
See table 5.1 below on the pairing of the selected regions of the country, and a week by week 
schedule for interviewing the sample population. 
 
Table 5.1 interview schedule 
 
Week Number  City Region(s) 
One – Two (28th February 2013 – 12th April 
2013) 
Kumasi Ashanti 
Three – Four (13th April 2013 – 22nd April 
2013) 
Accra Greater Accra 
 
On average, four interviews were conducted in each week with the other time being taken up 
with search and identify or referral system on informal sector activities/operators as 
explained in section 5.5.2.   
 
5.5. Sampling  
This part of the data collection involves identifying and interviewing different 
sectors/business activities within the informal sector (for example, transport, service, 
woodwork/carpentry, electronics, food vending, and similar sectors) as defined in section 
5.5.1 below. The idea of interviewing people in different sectors is to establish if there is any 
trend in tax compliance for particular business activity within the informal sector. Also, as 
the informal sector is dominated by many different business activities, interviewing different 
business operators helps to assess if there are any differences in compliance decisions 
between operators of different sectors.  
In identifying the population from which to draw the sample, the researcher adopted the most 
recent work on Ghana’s informal sector activities by Aryee (2007), for the World Bank. 
Represented in table 2.1, this study summarised the various forms of informal sector 
businesses and associations existing in Ghana.  This classification is used as a guide of the 
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nature/category of activities for this research. This list covers almost all kinds of activities 
that are legal and most likely to be found in the informal sector, (Mirus and Smith, 1997).  
However, this list by Aryee (2007) is used as a guide and is not the final list. It is envisaged 
that in the course of the field work other activities could be of interest to the researcher in the 
form of potential taxable activities, which are then studied. Also, such flexibility further 
promotes the reliability of results as the researcher is not under pressure to find the initially 
defined sets of activities ‘at all cost’. 
 These lists of informal sector Associations in Ghana as identified by Aryee (2007) (table 
2.1) could be challenged in a sense that as businesses and individuals form associations, they 
are in principle well organised and could be classified as more formal businesses even if not 
as such for tax purposes. However, it is vital to also note the distinction between such 
associations from the notion of ‘economics’ as members of these informal sector associations 
which are usually organised informally do so for their individual welfares such as 
accompanying and supporting a member to family events such as weddings, engagements 
and funerals, rather than formal unions. On this basis, the list of Ghana’s informal sector 
operators as identified by Aryee (2007) serves as a useful starting point in defining activities 
in the informal sector, and more importantly in selecting the sample for the study. 
In collecting the data for this study, both the survey and face-to-face interview used the same 
sample technique and approach (i.e. searching, identifying and interviewing or giving survey 
questionnaire). Therefore, the following sections describe the sampling technique adopted for 
both the survey and the interview process. 
 
 
5.5.1. Sampling technique 
The main challenge for the study is defining the sampling frame that will be deemed 
sufficient and appropriate for the analysis of the informal sector of Ghana. This is because 
there is no adequate record or proper account of the sector in terms of the shape and its size, 
therefore defining the general population from which a sample is to be drawn is a difficult 
task. To get reliable data, which will be a clear representation of the informal sector, the 
researcher stratifies the sample by location of business; the scale of operation, and more 
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importantly for this study, the type of business activity. However, the stratification of the 
sample poses a significant challenge because there are no clear general population 
parameters. The lack of reliable data on the national, municipal and district levels of the 
country means an alternative plan had to be devised to determine what business activities 
form the population from which the sample is drawn for the study. 
The research, therefore, made use of the business activities in the most recent study in the 
Ghanaian informal Economy for the World Bank58 in 2007 as the basis for the sampling. 
The sample of people and businesses for the study are drawn from small businesses in each 
of the two cities, and this is further stratified by four major groups59; 
• Legal Entity  
• Form of Operation  
• Registration 
• Nature/Type of Business activity  
 
A. Legal Entity 
a) Sole Proprietor 
b) Partnership  
c) Family Business 
B. Form of Operation 
a) Mobile 
b) Permanent Location –Office/Shop 
c) Home Business 
  
C. Registration 
a) Fully Registered Business 
b) Part Registered Business60 
c) Unregistered Business 
 
 
                                                          
58 The World Bank study was conducted in Ghana by Aryee (2007), see table 3.1 for full list of informal sector 
activities identified in the country. 
59 Each main group will be further classified with relevant variables during the questioning/data analysis to 
incorporate variables such as education, turnover, years of operation, religious and other demographic variables. 
60 This is when a part of a business is registered rather than the complete chain of activities for which an 
individual is engaged in 
131 
 
D. Nature of Business 
a) Finance 
i. Financial services/Susu Collection/Loans 
ii. Real Estate 
iii. Business Services. 
 
b) Travel and Tourism 
i. Hotels/Guest Houses 
ii. Taxis and commercial Vans and Buses 
iii. Restaurant 
iv. Travel and tour operators 
v. Visa and immigration 








1. Local soap and drink manufacturers 
 
e) Communication and Personal Services 
i. Barbers/Hairdressers 
ii. Communication/ internet cafes 




i. Retail shops 





g) Entertainment Sports and Leisure 
i. Pubs 
ii. Night clubs 
iii. Sports centres 
iv. Gym/fitness 
h) Fashion and Clothing 
i. Tailors and Seamstresses 
ii. Clothing Boutiques 
iii. Second-hand clothes/shoes sellers 
i) Health and Spiritual Care 
i. Personal/traditional Doctors/local Surgeries 
ii. Fetish Priests/Occultism 
iii. Traditional healers/Herbalists 
iv. Drug Peddlers 
j) Electrical and Electronics 
i. Electricians 
ii. Spare Parts and Garages 
iii. Electronic Sales – computers, sound systems, fridges 
iv. Electrical repairers 
k) Other (all other activities not listed above). 
 
 
5.5.2. Strategy for increasing participation and obtaining reliable data 
Having established the sample frame, which guided the nature of business activities and 
individuals to be included in the study, the sampling strategy was then formulated. 
The researcher initially anticipated that securing participation would be a very difficult 
hurdle to tackle, as the operators of the informal sector often carry the belief that such 
participation could lead to them having greater exposure to the tax authorities. Consequently, 
this might result in them being targeted by such officials. This is however true, as to some 
extent as by definition; the informal sector is dominated by operators who conduct their 
activities outside the formal regulated economy to escape direct state control and/or tax 
authorities (World Bank, 2012). 
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To overcome this problem, a modified approach of the Govender, (2008) study on the 
informal economy of South Africa (as discussed in section 5.4) is adopted for this research. 
To improve participation, and data reliability, the study also uses snowballing to identify 
potential respondents, aside from the usual ‘search, identify and give’ questionnaire (during 
the survey stage) and ‘Search, Identify, and Interview (SII)61 approaches that the researcher 
and the research assistants used. After identifying and handing over questionnaires or 
interviewing participants, referral techniques are used to gain access to other respondents. 
This approach was found very useful, as respondents who felt comfortable about the study 
provided referrals of other informal sector operators who in most cases were business 
partners, suppliers or by virtue of their social relationships or proximal locations, and such 
personal referrals assisted further in lowering the discomfort levels especially in relation to 
the sensitive information sought. 
 
 
5.5.3. Sampling Strategy 
As data and information about the informal sector and its operators are lacking, the 
researcher resorts to the use of snowball sampling technique as an easy but efficient approach 
compared to other options. Hoppitt et al (2011) defined snowball sampling as a strategy that 
involves tapping into existing participants’ networks to identify links with other potential 
participants’. Hoppitt et al.(2011) stressed that it is the most useful approach to studying a 
population which is ‘hidden’ or ‘hard-to-reach’. This approach has been used successfully in 
recent years in studies involving “most-at-risk populations” (MARPs) such as drug users, 
prostitutes, HIV, and AIDS patients, and other social stigmatised and sensitive issues. 
Examples of recent studies which involved respondent-driven sampling include Malekinejad 
et al. (2008); Kendall et al. (2006); Browne, (2005) and Ekstrand et al. (1999).   
Recruiting participants for this study, just as with any other sensitive social research study 
was problematic as it focuses on specific individuals or groups whose behaviours, in this case 
of tax non-compliance, are not validated by society (Browne, 2005). 
                                                          
61 Research Assistants were given the list of ‘Business activities which form the sample and searched within the 
designated locality and hand over survey questionnaire or lead the researcher to interview individuals and 
business owners whose activities fall within the sample. 
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The fear of stigmatisation and prosecution makes getting participants for sensitive research 
very difficult. Faugier and Sargeant (1997, p.791) also conclude that the ‘more sensitive or 
threatening the phenomenon under study, the more difficult sampling will be’. However, 
using the snowballing approach has clear practical advantages in obtaining information on 
difficult-to-observe phenomena, in particular in areas that involve sensitive, illegal or deviant 
issues, (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997, p.792). Sarantakos (1998) further mentions that social 
networks and the personal acquaintances of participants are used in making the process 
easier.  
Since this study involves a hard-to-reach population, with no reliable data about the 
population and subsequently without a readily available sampling frame, snowball sampling 
is the only feasible method available as suggested by Faugier and Sargeant, (1997).  
A modified approach of the snowball sampling strategy adopted by Browne (2005) is 
employed in the research. The sampling strategy begins by first initiating recruitment chains 
within the target population, and using this ‘seed’ to form the quota (Faugier and Sargeant 
1997) among different economic activities in the informal economy. The ‘seeds’ are selected 
from the list or similar informal sector associations or businesses in table 2.1.  
Apart from the proposed ‘search and identify approach’ and informal associations, the 
researcher recruited participants through attending religious and social events. The 
researcher, in total, attended two social gathering and four church events from 28th February 
2013 to 10th March 2013 with the view to recruiting participants for the study.  The two 
social gatherings yielded minimal results, as people did not seem to be in the ‘mood’ to 
discuss business during their ‘party times’. The researcher also found that the unwillingness 
on the part of people to partake in the study from this group could also be that they may not 
have wanted to draw the researcher into their ‘space’ or boundaries and alliances (Edwards et 
al., 1999). The fact that people were attending church or a party did not matter to this study, 
but these approaches were adopted to see if people would feel comfortable to talk to the 
researcher as being ‘part of them’. 
However, throughout the church events, two individuals were recruited, who in return 
recommended colleagues.  The rationale for using these social and religious events for the 
snowball sampling was that recruiting participants by using this approach builds up the trust 
as the researcher is considered part of the ‘community’ (Hopitts et al., 2011). Also by using 
recruits (i.e. seeds) personal contacts and networks, it means that participants do not have to 
attend a certain social event or be part of an association to be part of the study. 
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5.6. Nature of activities and area of coverage of interview Questions. 
For this study, the informal sector is limited to only ‘Legal Activities’ as identified by Mirus 
and Smith (1997), in table 1.1, chapter one.  
As discussed in chapter one, this research is interested in taxable economic activities which 
are underreported or concealed entirely and therefore no tax is paid or the correct amount of 
tax has not been paid. These include personal and businesses under-reported and concealed 
incomes within the informal sector. 
 
5.6.1. Interview questions, coding, and themes. 
Face-to-face interviews were initially projected to last for approximately 30 minutes, but, 
following the piloting stage, the research plan anticipated an hour would be needed. 
However, on average, the interviews lasted about one hour 20 minutes. 
The interviews were semi-structured, with closed and open-ended questions (see appendix 7). 
Each interviewee was given a total of 54 sets of questions, and written notes of responses 
were taken. There were no electronic recordings as initially planned due to the reluctance on 
the part of people to be recorded. Therefore, all interview responses were handwritten and 
were subsequently transcribed verbatim onto a Microsoft Word document where they were 
sorted and exported to Nvivo 10 for the coding (see chapter six for codes/themes).  
The emerging themes from the interview responses and transcriptions also shaped the next 
stages of the data collection, as detailed in this chapter – the questionnaires which were sent 
to some informal sector operators, as well as the tax officials’ interviews and the researcher’s 
field observation trip with the tax collection officers.  
The study adopted two stages of categorising the themes – a ‘focused’ and an ‘open coding’ 
approach (Charmaz, 2006) were used and the responses coded into Nvivo nodes, with the 
three major themes forming the parent nodes. In the first stage, the transcripts were read line 
by line and extracts of meaningful text coded into the emerging themes (per process as 
outlined in Braun and Clarke, 2006), followed by a process of reassembling the highlighted 
data to ensure that there were connections to it and the research objective. The next step 
assessed each code carefully, analysing the meaning of the codes in the context of the study, 
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and codes with similar meanings were merged (Razzaq, 2012). This stage is also important to 
prevent a situation of having an unnecessarily large number of codes 
Overall, there were 450 key references coded into three main themes and 32 sub-themes. 
Sub-themes are essentially themes-within-a-theme, which help to structure large and 
complex themes and also for demonstrating the hierarchy of meaning within the data (Braun 
and Clarke 2006, p22). 
 
5.7. Questions for tax officials and policy advisors from international organisations 
A further part of the primary data collection for this study was conducted through one – on – 
one interview with tax officials. The reason for including the tax officials in the study is to 
seek an expert opinion on the questions set for this study and to better understand informal 
sector tax compliance from the tax administration perspective of the country. Also, 
comparing these expert views with the informal sector operators’ view is considered useful in 
drawing meaningful conclusions from the major stakeholders of the sector. The researcher 
interviewed senior tax officials at the Ghana Revenue Authority in Accra and Kumasi, as well 
as the revenue sections of the municipal authorities62 which administer different types of 
local taxes from the national one which is under the GRA. By interviewing these officials, 
the study can assess the impact of this relationship (taxpayer-tax authority), and the 
compliance strategy used and how this interplay influences compliance decisions. 
To gain access to key tax officials to ask them to take part in the study, an introductory letter 
was given by the University through the project supervisor. This letter stated the purpose and 
nature of data to be collected. This letter was handed to the tax offices, and a suitable person 
and date were agreed with the researcher. 
Initially, the study planned on interviewing IMF and World Bank country representatives as 
main donors, funding sources and policy advisors for many developing countries, to seek 
their views on current approaches about taxing the informal sector. However, difficulties in 
obtaining access mean that the country representatives of these international organisations 
were excluded from the study. In place of these organisations, personnel from Adam Smith 
International (ASI)63 were interviewed. ASI is a UK based non-profit organisation – 
                                                          
62 The Municipal Authorities which the interview took place are the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) 
and the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). 
63 Details of this interview is in chapters’ eight, nine and ten. Link to Adam Smith International: 
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providing policy advice to countries and major international organisation on local governance 
and tax-related issues.  
 
 5.8. Drop-off and Pick-up Self-Administered Questionnaire Survey  
At the second stage of the data collection, hand-delivered questionnaire surveys were 
distributed to 500 small businesses and entrepreneurs through random selection using the 
search and identify strategy adopted for the interview. A survey methodology has been used 
in many tax research studies both form and informal sector contexts (Torgler et al., 2010) and 
informal economies (Gerxhani, 2006).  
The target for usable returned questionnaires for this study was 350 (to achieve a statistically 
relevant sample), based on previous tax research studies (example, Junainah, 2002; Loo and 
Ho 2005; Manaf et al., 2006). Therefore, 500 questionnaires (using drop-off and pick-up 
approach) were considered reasonable to achieve the target. The questionnaires are delivered 
in person by the two Research Assistants. At this stage, it was important to maintain the same 
research assistants as they had developed good experience and had a strong understanding of 
the project and its ethical considerations. A possible high non-response rate associated with 
other methods such as telephone and postal surveys meant that the best option, considering 
the sensitive nature of the study, was hand delivery, hand retrieval and a self-administered 
questionnaire (i.e. drop off-pick up approach).  
The nature of Ghana’s address system coupled with the target population meant that the only 
reliable methods of reaching participants are through drop-off and pick-up questionnaire 
surveys and the snowballing method. Ghana still uses the Post Office letter collection method 
(i.e. the P. O. Box system) for mail. This implies that there is no guarantee as to how often 
people visit their inbox as post offices are usually situated in major town centres which could 
be miles away from the residents or may not be used at all by the informal sector operators. 
As the study involves the informal sector, information about their addresses and nature of 
business is not available within the country, and the researcher believes by going through the 
formal address system, the focus of the study will be shifting to a more ‘formal sector’ 
taxation inquiry. Therefore, using the ‘drop-off and pick-up’ approach for targeted 
individuals and activities was deemed the ideal method for the study. 




Furthermore, due to the high illiteracy rates within the country (Ofori, 2009, p.28), this 
approach made it possible for the Research Assistants to offer extra support to the 
respondents including in some instances, helping to complete the questionnaire for those who 
could not read and write.  
Steele et al. (2001), describe the ‘drop-off, pick-up’ (DOPU) method of data collection as an 
effective approach to collecting data on sensitive issues. This data collection technique has 
been successfully applied in many previous studies where response rates have been excellent 
and in most cases over 80% response rate has been achieved. For example Di Pofi (2002) 
used the hand-delivered approach successfully64 to understand change management; Bourke 
(1994) obtained a 94% response rate in his study about hazardous waste in rural Utah; 
Meidan and Edris (1990) had a response rate of over 60% from households in the UK 
regarding the impact of nutritional labelling on food choices; Olsen et al. (1998) achieved a 
93% response rate in a community interest-based study; and Brennan and Luloff (2007), had 
a 65% response rate for studies of the residents of two villages in exploring the ‘role of 
community agency in the rural community and economic development processes’. Most of 
the aforementioned studies involved the use of research assistants for the field study (i.e. 
research assistants dropped-off and picked-up the completed questionnaire). 
By using the DOPU approach, and knowing that the majority of the informal sector operators 
are uneducated, the research assistants can further explain the questions to them or help them 
to complete the questionnaire based on their responses. 
The researcher in many instances, except the times when on the field trip or when conducting 
the tax officials’ interview, accompanied the research assistants for the drop-off and the pick-
up process. In a few instances, respondents asked for the support of the research team to 
complete the questionnaire on the spot without them having to go back. 
The Government of Ghana’s fiscal year runs from 1st January to 31st December, and tax 
declaration is within four months of the end of the tax year (Deloitte, 2011), as a result, the 
interview data collection exercise was carried out between February and April, when most 
people have to pay their taxes.  
Within this period, it was envisaged that people would be aware of taxes being collected in 
the formal settings so taxpayers (including those in the informal sector) would be more aware 
                                                          
64 Di Pofi (2002) did  not involve the use of Research Assistants, however, the questionnaires were attached to 
employee payslips and were given days when Admin managers collected the completed questionnaire on behalf 
of the researcher, and response rate was just under 40%. 
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of the ‘tax period’ process than may be the case at other times of the year. The timing was 
also in relation to the studies by Song and Yarbrough (1978) who conducted tax ethics of 
taxpayers with similar timing and argued that such timing reduces respondents’ biases. 
 
5.9 Field Observation 
To gain further insight into the relationship between the taxpayers and the revenue authority 
on a typical tax collection day, the researcher went for a field trip with the ground staff for 
the revenue collection exercise. 
Observation techniques have been used in a number of tax compliance studies, for example, 
Chetty et al (2009), Yesegat (2009), Caro et al. (2014), Hayes and Baker (2014), Boll (2014), 
see section 5.4 for a discussion on the inclusion of this methodology. 
The researcher followed two male enforcement officers for a full day’s trip for tax collection. 
According to the GRA, there is no basis for the gender of the tax officer sent out, and it 
depends on knowledge of the area and staff availability. The day for the field trip was 
randomly chosen by the researcher, following the acceptance of the introductory letter, by the 
tax authority. 
The purpose of this approach was to assess the physical interaction between the tax 
authorities and the taxpayers. This was the third phase of the data gathering and emphasis 
was placed on observing behaviour-responses between the two parties.  The behaviour-
response interactions are represented in table 6.2 with colour coding (red, green, amber and 
grey), to indicate the nature of the relationship. Red indicates severe compliance issues as a 
result of the observed relationships; Green shows a compliance situation, where the taxpayer 
has complied and has evidence of tax payment. It also shows a cordial relationship or a 
situation where each party, particularly the revenue officers, performed their duty diligently. 
The Amber depicts a situation with some degree of low compliance and/or tax officials 
exhibiting a behaviour that it is believed could impact on voluntary compliance in the future. 
Finally, Grey indicates a situation where the tax officials’ approach was seen to encourage 
future voluntary compliance and/or taxpayers are deemed to have appropriate tax knowledge, 
have a clear understanding of tax obligations and compliance processes, but are not currently 
compliant or have no evidence of compliance but have agreed to be compliant and the 
interaction is deemed cordial. The age and other demographic data were unknown due to lack 
of one-to-one contact with the taxpayers.  
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The observation was not so much to dwell on the actions of the tax officials, due to the 
impact that the researcher’s presence could have on their attitudes, so although observed, the 
emphasis was on the reaction of the taxpayers and how they reacted to the activities of the 
tax officers.  
The respondents were given numeric codes and a letter at the end of each number. The letters 
at the end of the numbers indicate the sex of the observed individual (F =Female; M=Male).  
They were further grouped into M, O, and Y - Y= young, perceived to be under 30; 
M=Middle aged, perceived to be between 30-45; and O = mature taxpayers, assume to be 
over 45. 
There was no pre-planned number to observe, and although many interactions occurred, it 
was ten that were of interest to the researcher, mainly due to language barriers – Sometimes 
the language used between the taxpayers and the tax officers was not understood by the 
researcher. (See chapter six for details of the observation data). 
 
5.10 Summary 
Chapter five presented the research methods and approaches adopted for this study. As a 
relational study, this thesis first used face-to-face interviews to assess the nature of the 
relationship between taxpayers in the informal sector and the Ghana revenue authority. 
Taxpayers and tax officials from the national and municipal authorities were interviewed. 
This was followed by a set of self-administered questionnaires to the taxpayers using a drop-
off and pick-up approach. In addition, the researcher also embarked on a field trip with tax 
collection officers to assess the interaction (during tax collection) between taxpayers and the 










DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
6.0. Introduction     
This chapter systematically describes the results of the study. The section includes a 
description of the survey sample, response rate, participants’ profiles and results of the 
interviews, questionnaire and the observation data.  
The initial part of this section analyses the data gathered through the face-to-face interviews 
with the three main participant groups described in chapter five (i.e. informal sector 
operators, tax officials from the GRA and officers from the two local/municipal authorities). 
Extracts of interviews with tax experts from Adam Smith International (ASI) is also 
presented in this section. 
The final part of this chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the questionnaire data and 
field observations. A detailed discussion of the three methodologies employed in this section 
is presented in section 5.4. 
 
6.1. Face-to-face Interviews of sector operators 
The data collected from the face to face interview is analysed using themes. The themes are 
grouped into three with sub-themes – the first two (A and B) are mainly informed by and 
developed from existing literature whilst factors exclusive to the final theme, which looks at 
future tax compliance is derived from the interview responses. Table 6.0 below shows the 














A. Reasons for 
complying 
with current 
tax obligations   
Moral obligation / 
Tax knowledge 
Torgler, 2001; 2002; Cummings et al., 2005; 
Frey and Feld 2002; Kirchler, 2007; Palil, 
2010; Pope and McKerchar, 2011; Alm 
McClellan, 2012 
Trust in government 
and reciprocity 
Frey and Torgler 2007; Lavoie, 2009; María-
Dolores et al, 2010; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010. 
Tax rate and the cost 
of compliance, 
High audit 
probabilities and fines 
Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Krause, 2000; 
Ivanova et al., 2005; Kirchler et el., 2010; 






Low audit rate/fines, 
High tax rate,  
Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Maciejovsky et 
al (2007, p679) Mittone and Saredi (2016) 
Poor education /low 
tax knowledge 
/unfairness 
Torgler, 2003; Loo and Ho, 2005; Palil, 2010 
Corruption / Poor 
reciprocity 
Terkper, 2003; OECD, 2009; Shukla et al, 
2011 
Poor previous 
taxpayer vs tax 
authority interactions 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Frey and Loo 
and Ho, 2005; Torgler and Valev, 2007; 








Responses gathered from interview 
responses65 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p10) describe a theme as ‘capturing’ something important about the 
data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set’’. They further state that the ‘keyness’ of a theme is not 
necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures but the ability to capture something 
important in relation to the research question, and this was the main determinant to the 
themes selected during the interview design (see chapter five) and the coding stages of this 
study.    
                                                          
65 This is only the factors exclusive to Theme C. Factors such as corruption, tax education which also appears in 
this theme is already captured in the literature under Themes A and B. 
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As seen in table 6.1, the code selected for study are: 
A. Reasons for complying with current tax obligations  
B. Current non-compliance determinants 
C. The future – what taxpayers expect 









Source: Author’s compilation 
These themes (figure 6.1) are further elaborated with sub themes in figure 6.2. below: 
 











It is important to note that the compliant and the non-compliant taxpayers are split from the 
panel by the responses given per theme. The table below shows key attributes of the 
interview respondents 
Source: Author’s compilation 
The results from the themes are now discussed in relation to the themes and the research 
questions. 
Excerpts from the interviews are provided for further illustration. For confidentiality, the 
interview respondents are given alphabetical codes.  
6.2. Theme A. Why do people pay taxes? 
As the study focuses on tax compliance behaviours, the starting point of both the interview 
and the analysis is addressing the question ‘why do these people pay their taxes after all?’ 
                                                          
66 MA (Municipal Authority) 
67 RGOC (Registered General of Companies) 
68 GRA (Ghana Revenue Authority) 
69 One is full-time teacher and operates grocery as part time business 
70 One is employed full-time in a health clinic and operates in the informal sector as a part-time food 
supplement seller where income is commission based. Other owns a local health centre (formally registered) 
and operates a gym where members pay subscription (unregistered/informal)  
71 One is a seasonal foodstuffs seller and employed in the formal sector on full time basis (as administrator) and 
the other is food vendor. 






Education  Nature of activity 
Up to 1  4 41- retired      MA66 Only 3 O'levels/A'levels/SSCE 8 Saloon/Hairdressing 4 
2 - 5  6 26 – 40 9 RGOC67 only 2 HND/Professional 3 Mobile technician 1  
6 -10  4 Up to 25 4 Unregistered 7 Degree 3 Plumber / Handyman 1  
Over 10  3 
    
GRA68, MA 
and RGOC 
5 Masters’ and Above 3  Electrical shop 1 
        Grocery shop 269 
  
  












     











     
Healthcare / Gym 
 
270 
          
        Food seller/vendor 271 
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This theme analyses what respondents believe are the key determinants for their tax 
compliance decisions. There are ten sub-themes making the ‘reasons for paying taxes’ main 
theme, although only four of the ten are exclusive as the remaining sub-themes interlink with 
other themes which are represented in figure 6.2 and each is further explored from the 
interview responses. Education, fairness, tax authority support, and a low tax rate are the 
lowest among the reasons behind current compliance levels as they are the ones people made 
the least reference to. The moral obligation (tax morale) sub-theme represents the factor 
respondents gave as the key determinant for their current compliance decisions. The themes 
are divided into existing themes (themes from existing literature) and the themes that 
emerged from the interviews: 
a) Themes from prior literature: 
i. Moral obligation 
ii. Auditing probabilities 
iii. Nature of potential penalty fines  
iv. Compliance process 
v. Tax education 
vi. Fairness 
vii. Religion 
viii. Benefits and Social Amenities 
ix. Low tax rate 
b) Emerged Theme 
i. Tax Authority support 
 
 
6.2a. Themes from prior literature: 
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6.2a. (i) Moral Obligation 
Moral obligation emerged as the greatest determinant to current tax compliance levels among 
the respondents. A majority of the interviewees (12) comply mainly due to their instincts 
(moral) to pay taxes rather than other external stimuli, such as auditing or fines.  This 
supports previous studies (Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 2002; Kirchler, 2007; Pope and 
McKerchar, 2011) that there are taxpayers who comply willingly due to their intrinsic drive 
rather than extrinsic (external) forces. 
Paying taxes as a moral obligation was raised many times by the respondents. 12 of the 17 
respondents stated that the main or at least a factor which moves them to pay their taxes is 
the duty they morally believed is bestowed upon them to perform as citizens of the state.  
The results from the face-to-face interviews (in this section) is consistent with findings from 
the survey data presented in section 6.7.c(i) which also indicates the majority of informal 
sector operators pay their taxes due to the intrinsic drive to do so. 
Analysing the responses of these group of taxpayers, punitive measures and other direct 
enforcement tactics used by the GRA, although they could have an impact, may be 
ineffective on their own to evoke voluntary compliance.   
‘..I think I should pay my taxes to get the government money to run the country.  I see it as 
my duty to pay what they want me to pay, to help contribute to developing the country (MF) 
‘…. as a citizen, I know when you work you should pay something to the state in the form of 
taxes (KM) 
‘I see tax payment as a basic responsibility’ (JF) 
‘I see it as an obligation as a citizen who enjoys state services’ (EM) 
‘The need to contribute as a working citizen who enjoys state benefits (e.g. Security, roads, 
water, etc...)’ (BM) 
 
Although moral obligation has been identified as having a strong influence among 
respondents’ compliance decisions, there are instances when people who are influenced by 
their moral obligation, need further assurance of revenue usage to comply voluntarily; 
 ‘I pay taxes for my kid’s future…. If I’m educated, and they (GRA) can also convince us that 




This implies that although morale is key to tax compliance among the respondents, the 
intrinsic motivation to pay on its own may not be enough to encourage voluntary compliance 
as in the case of ‘CF’. 
 
6.2a. (ii) Auditing probabilities 
Respondents acknowledged that they were influenced to paying their taxes due to the high 
auditing (constant tax officers’ visits) probabilities. The interview respondents reported that 
the more they perceive a high possibility of their business activity being audited/visited by 
tax officials, the higher the chances that they will comply and pay on time. 
These taxpayers can be likened to the ‘capitulative’ group of taxpayers as identified by 
McBarnet (2001) who tend to give in unwillingly due to audits and detection mechanisms. 
Also see (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010), although the impact of such actions (according to Alm et 
al., 1995) is minimal and mostly short-lived. 
 This theme emerged as the second-highest determinant of the current compliance level after 
‘moral obligation’ and 10 out of the 17 said they pay up as a result of this. 
‘‘….the GRA visiting me to check if I have paid my taxes is very likely and they come every 
two or three months. It influences me greatly since you can't operate without paying and 
displaying your tax receipt’’ (IF). 
 
‘‘They (GRA officers) do come around most often, so if there's a slight delay in payment, they 
will come to inspect unexpectedly’’ (JF) 
 
The average GRA audit visits were reported as being approximately every 2 months (based 
on all participants’ accounts). However, tax officers from both the municipal authority 
(KMA) and the GRA gave different periods for visiting. In an interview with KMA officials, 
it was confirmed ‘We do send out for collections/compliance checks on daily basis’ (KMA 
3). The GRA stated ‘we send officers out once or at times twice a week’ (GRA A1). Because 
tax officers visit taxpayers in turn, the two months average revisiting/auditing interval stated 
by the interview participants could conform to the officers’ timings. Regarding frequency, 
the tax officials’ interviews further revealed that due to the nature of the informal sector, 
especially as some people do not have fixed locations, it is impossible to have accurate 
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compliance data, hence the decision to send enforcement officers regularly for compliance 
checks. 
 
6.2a. (iii) Nature of potential penalty fines 
The fines imposed for non-compliance also play a crucial part in the compliance decisions 
with four respondents stating it influenced them directly.  
‘I think people will always pay because the tax officers are not so easy to get away with when 
they visit’ (CF).  
Respondents explained some of the consequences of non-compliance, which include the 
possibility of significant penalties being enacted on the spot, examples of having business 
premises closed with new padlocks put on by the tax authorities. They also explained the 
impact of the stigmatisation (by customers and business partners) and the stress they go 
through to deal with the fines and how they also play a key role in their compliance 
decisions. Thus, the penalties that influenced them were not just the effect of the monetary 
value, but also the non-monetary issues of loss of reputation with others. 
‘I pay just to avoid confrontation from the GRA or the KMA tax collectors, and importantly 
avoid the fines to pay to  open my office /shop by officers, following closures’ (GF). 
 
I do not want to face such fines and humiliations so I always ensure my taxes are paid on 
time (IF) 
 
Avoiding penalties and just to stay open and conduct business (i.e. an extra monetary cost for 
non-payment) is a key compliance determinant. There are those (10) who ‘pay taxes only or 
partly to be seen compliant, to continue operating’. 
‘…..paying means I can continue to operate, ‘…without thinking of the arrival of the tax 
offices or possible closures’ (CF). 
 
Respondents were also asked if they have any fears or concerns which influence their 
compliance decisions, and again the respondents indicated that the possibility of having their 




‘Not a fear per se, but I am just concerned about the tax officers and their approach to 
businesses which have not paid their taxes when they come for the inspection’ (GF) 
 
‘The only fear is how ruthless (regarding physical intimidation) the tax authority's tax 
officers can be’ (IF).  
Even respondents who have issues about tax revenue usage [EM, IF, GF] and may otherwise 
not pay taxes, as a result, accepted the need to comply if their business is to continue without 
facing fines which include closures by the revenue authorities. 
‘It's worrying when you think about the tax revenue usage, but if you want to operate your 
business successfully, you have to play by the game [....by paying the least you can to stay in 
business]’ (EM). 
 
6.2a. (iv) Compliance process 
Cost and ease of payment which make up the tax compliance processes appear to be 
important determinants of the tax payment decisions, as many studies had identified them as 
likely key impacts on the process of compliance of an individual’s compliance decisions 
(Copp, 2001; Evans and Tran-Nam, 2001). During the interview and data analysis stages, the 
compliance process was defined to include the financial and other non-financial costs and a 
three-stage definition of the theme as involving; 
• the financial cost involved in the compliance process such as the real cost of the tax 
and the cost of paying for advisory/support services to aid compliance (Evans, 2003); 
• the physical time needed for filling forms, attending appeals and tribunals (Copp, 
2009); and 
• the psychological cost of the tax burden (Evans and Tran-Nam, 2001). 
Some (8) respondents believe the decision to pay their taxes are purely or partly due to the 
compliance process, including the financial cost of compliance; 
‘I do not have to do anything. They come around to give the bill and I make payment in my 
shop. I prefer how it is now’ (CF). 




‘In terms of the process, it’s simple as I do not have to go anywhere. They [tax officers] come 
to my business directly with receipt booklets (tax stamp) to collect payment’ (FF). 
Although these respondents believe their compliance decisions are partly influenced by the 
process, some showed concerns about paying taxes through visiting tax officers through 
negotiations and other means, as it may give special treatment to certain taxpayers. 
‘previously, I was paying through my trade association (which was ok) but the 
current system of paying through visiting tax officers, is open to 
corruption/unfairness’ (BM).  
Officers are believed (according to BM) to favour people they like by giving low rates and 
there is a doubt that the amounts collected are reported properly to the GRA. Although the 
compliance process is seen as simple, there were concerns raised as all 17 respondents 
believed that it is possible to negotiate with the tax collectors for a lower rate.  Results from 
the survey data presented in section 6.7.b iv also suggest that the compliance process (with 
field officers) do have a negative impact on future compliance decisions. 
 
6.2a. (v) Tax education 
Tax education relates to taxpayers who pay as a result of their awareness of tax education 
campaigns by the revenue authority in audio (e.g. radio), video (television), printed media 
(newspapers, magazines, billboards, etc.) or in person through interactions with field tax 
collectors.  Tax education as represented by this theme, includes tax knowledge which 
measures taxpayers understanding of their tax obligations about to when, how and where to 
pay their taxes. 
‘Tax education’ is one of only two sub-themes to have appeared in all three major themes 
(i.e. Themes A, B, and C). Thus, in Theme A, as shown below, few taxpayers attribute their 
compliance decisions to tax education, under theme B, some don’t pay because of lack of 
appropriate tax education and in theme C, taxpayers expect more targeted tax education to be 
compliant. This indicates the significance of tax education to tax compliance, interestingly 
though, only four respondents [HM, IF, JK and KM] confirmed that they have heard of tax 
information/education from the GRA in the last 12 months.  
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Two of the respondents emphasised the importance of tax education, and information 
availability to their tax compliance decisions (HM and IF); 
‘I do hear of radio, newspaper and TV adverts on taxes quite a lot’ (HM). 
‘I have a clear understanding of the tax system particularly areas relating to my business 
sector; ‘….GRA officers who come for the taxes do educate us (taxpayers)’ (IF). 
 
Not only does the revenue authority’s tax education and information availability help some 
taxpayers to comply now, but such information influences their voluntary compliance 
decisions in the future. Three respondents (IF, JF and HM) pay their taxes voluntarily due to 
the influence of past GRA tax education campaigns. 
Interestingly, not all taxpayers who are exposed to tax education run by the GRA, find it 
useful in making compliance decisions. The fourth and the last respondent to make positive 
reference to the GRA’s tax education [KM] although they confirmed hearing of tax 
education/information of some sort in the last 12 months, they felt that, such information 
does not in any way play any part in the compliance decision making due to the nature of the 
message stressing that;   
‘‘….I usually hear of adverts /information on radio, and even on the TV but the nature of the 
information points to people with shops/offices, but not mobile workers as I am’’ (KM) 
The other three (3) respondents share the views of KM that although tax 
education/information is provided by the GRA, they are however not always relevant to their 
situation. The message content is usually directed towards big businesses, or where they do 
target them, there is little or no understanding of how the rates are determined, when, how or 
even where to pay taxes. Although ‘KM’ has a Bachelor’s Degree qualification and has been 
operating in the same business for at least 6 years, the business is still unregistered, and he 
appears to have no understanding of the key tax issues relating to his business. Thus, the level 
of tax education campaign may be high in the country, and people may be exposed to the 
messages as in the case of KM, however, the tax knowledge which will directly influence 
compliance may be limited.  
Findings from the survey data are consistent with findings from the interview data that there 
is a lack of ‘appropriate’ tax education/information to aid compliance. Although there were 
mixed results from the survey data as people who have registered their businesses indicated 
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there is adequate tax information. Overall though, most taxpayers expressed a lack of 
adequate information (from the survey data) to aid compliance (section 6.7.b vii and 6.7.b ix). 
Again, the on-field observation also indicated weak tax knowledge among the observed 
taxpayers (see section 6.6.7) as tax officers’ presence rather created scenes violence. 
 
6.2a. (vi) Fairness of the tax system 
Respondents were also asked if their compliance decision is influenced by their perception of 
their tax rate compared to what they believe that others are paying and also if the current rate 
is reasonable for their business activity. Surprisingly, a majority of the respondents (15) were 
not concerned about unfairness as being a factor to their compliance or non-compliance 
decisions. A few (5) believed that the amounts they pay are very small, and this small tax bill 
is the main factor to their overall decisions to comply. 
‘I pay simply because the tax rate is reasonable’ (MF). 
 
Although people still have concerns about how their tax bill is calculated. 
‘‘It's reasonable - however, I do not know how they come by the rates (i.e. GHs 300 / £55 a 
year in my case)’ (AM). 
 
6.2a. (vii) Religion and compliance decision 
Religious influence on tax compliance was also explored during the interviews. 
Here, the researcher focused on how people relate their religion to tax compliance in the 
informal economy, and 3 respondents stated their decision to comply is influenced in part by 
their religion. 
‘My religion as a Christian plays a part [in my tax compliance decisions], although I know 
the tax revenue is not used effectively’ (AM) 
 
Some respondents linked tax compliance to the payment in their church as stated in the Bible 




‘I know from Tithe payment you can't cheat on God, so the same way I won’t cheat on the 
Government’ (BM) 
 
Despite these strong religious beliefs demonstrated during the interviews, out of the three 
who stated that they are influenced in part by their religion, one (BM) is reluctant to pay 
justifying the decision not to comply as due to corruption among tax officials and misuse of 
the tax revenue. 
‘I pay my Church tithe without [pastors] humiliation or embarrassments as I see the 
obligation towards God as a Christian. In the same way, if the system is ok and GRA do the 
right thing, I will pay without hesitation’ (BM). 
 
6.2a. (viii) Benefits and Social Amenities 
Perception of revenue usage especially in the form of social amenities was identified to be an 
influence on why people pay their taxes in the informal sector in a few cases. 3 of the 17 
interviewed are influenced by the visible signs of tax use through the provision of social 
amenities. 
‘I see it as an obligation as a citizen who enjoys state services such as roads, water, 
electricity, hospitals and schools’ (EM). 
‘….think it’s advisable to at least pay something as the government relies on these monies to 
finance its projects and basic amenities’ (FF). 
This is different from moral obligation as here taxpayers will only pay taxes because there is 
evidence of social benefits to them, reinforcing the social contract (i.e. reciprocal 
arrangements with the government) 
This sub-theme appears strongly in part B, and some taxpayers stated that visible signs of tax 
revenue usage, to a greater extent. influence their decisions. 
 
6.2a. (ix) Low tax rate 
As observed in section 1.1, evidence shows that a low tax rate decreases the incentives for 
evasion (Ivanova et al., 2005; Kirchler et al., 2010; Matthews, 2011). This section uses the 
interview responses to assess this view from the informal sector perspective. 
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Here, respondents were asked if the rate of tax (actual tax rate, excluding any compliance 
costs) in any way influences their decision to comply with their tax obligations. Some (5) 
interviewees confirmed that the low level of taxes they pay influences their decision to 
comply.  
‘The rate I was charged (by the tax officer) was too small so I did not challenge it. However, 
if I am charged a higher rate in the future I will challenge it’. (AM). 
 
‘Knowing I have to pay only GHc30/£6 means no point challenging as this covers me for a 
whole year’ (HM). 
 
6.2b. Emerged Theme 
6.2b. (i) Tax authority support 
During the interviews, the theme of tax authority support emerged as respondents stressed 
the impact of receiving support from the tax authority when paying taxes and the effects this 
would make on their overall compliance behaviour. 
Tax authority support in this context is distinguished from education to specifically include 
the authority providing advice and support services including taxpayers’ advice lines which 
people could contact for general tax advice, as opposed to running adverts and 
information/reminder campaigns. 
 
‘ …officers from the GRA have come to physically work with me to show me practically how 
to do the tax (VAT) returns, which was complicated earlier, but now I’m confident in myself’ 
(JF). 
 
Considering the high level of illiteracy in Ghana, informal sector operators are not exempt, 
respondents (HM, IF, JF) therefore raised the importance of receiving support from the GRA  
 
‘It makes life easier when you could speak to someone when they visit than information on 
say newspapers. I cannot read so it’s better for me this way (IF). 
 
JF who has to do quite complex compliance exercises such as VAT returns believes that if 
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there is support readily available, and what taxpayers are required to do is well explained 
with direct one-to-one support from the revenue authority, people will comply voluntarily. 
 
6.2.10. Theme A summary 
 The results from this section indicate that informal sector taxpayers are influenced by high 
tax morale like those in the formal sector who were identified by existing formal sector 
literature discussed in chapter four. In the same way, it is evident from this section, that 
auditing probabilities and the severity of the penalties imposed by the tax authorities also 
have a significant influence in tax compliance decision of the informal sector operators. 
However, as the evidence shows, those who refer to auditing as the main reason for 
complying or as partially influencing their compliance decisions, are mainly those who 
believe there is inadequate tax education, high corruption, and a poor relationship with the 
tax authority or they faced a high tax rate as discussed in theme B. 
 
6.3. Theme B - Drivers for tax non-compliance in the informal sector 
Following on from the initial stage of assessing why people pay taxes, this section (theme B) 
analyses the interview responses of the key determinants for non-compliance to tax 
obligations. The non-compliance issues in literature which are potentially relevant to this 
study and themes which emerged in this section include: 
6.3.a. Existing themes 
i. Inadequate tax education 
ii. Perceived tax revenue usage 
iii. Corruption 
iv. Bureaucracy and system complexities 
v. No visible benefit of tax payment  
vi. Low auditing probabilities 
vii. Financial constraints 
 
6.3.b. Emerged themes 
i. Past Tax Authority Interaction (PTAI) 
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ii. Intuitive taxation and perceived double taxing 
 
6.3.a. Existing themes 
6.3.a. (i) Inadequate Tax Education 
Tax education helps taxpayers to understand the overall tax system, including their tax 
obligations to the state, the rate of tax to pay, when to pay and how to pay. The level of tax 
education within the tax jurisdiction has been found in previous tax compliance studies of 
formal tax to influence people’s compliance decisions (Torgler, 2003), and education in this 
context is not necessarily a formal (non-tax) education (Loo and Ho, 2005). Having a higher 
level of formal education may not automatically improve tax knowledge which is instead the 
function of the availability, quality, and level of tax education. 
Most respondents (12) believe that there is a lack of appropriate tax education which 
specifically addresses their situation or business activity. Some qualifying72 taxpayers do not 
pay at all or try to pay the least they can. Although some appear to have the desire to pay, 
lack of appropriate tax education to inform them of their basic tax obligation means they are 
not fully compliant as a result. When asked about tax education and its impact on their 
compliance decisions, some stressed:  
‘Tax education does play a role in my decision not to pay taxes. I do not know how or what 
to pay therefore I don’t pay voluntarily (CF). 
‘… I don’t know how and when to pay taxes’ (LM). 
 
‘the tax authority does not give any information about tax rates, I understand there is a tax 
but I have no idea how much or when and how to pay (AM). 
 
‘‘..they only come and tell you to pay an amount you have no idea how it is calculated’’ (IF).  
 
Again, among these taxpayers, some believe that they are tax-exempt by the nature of their 
employment: 
                                                          
72 Qualifying taxpayer in this context is measured by the fact that they (respondents) are in employment, and the 
informal sector taxation in Ghana takes not into account a ‘threshold’ which one must earn before paying taxes. 
Therefore, ‘iced water sellers’, bread sellers, Hawkers, load carriers (popularly known in Ghana as ‘Kaya yoo’) 




I do not pay any taxes - My decision not to pay is based on the nature of my employment and 
no clear information from the GRA about operators like me regarding the compliance 
process. They go to those with shops to collect, so people without fixed location should be 
educated about what to do if we are also to pay’’ (KM). 
 
The issue of the complete lack of, insufficient or irrelevant tax information has been 
identified throughout the interview response from those who comply as well as those who do 
not. Some (7) respondents believe that the available tax information is too general, and as 
they (informal sector operators) pay taxes which are different from the formal (standard 
assessment) taxes, information about their taxes should be specific to their sectors or type of 
activity. These taxpayers believe their non-compliance is justifiable because there is not 
adequate information about who, when, where and most importantly how much to pay.  
 
I do not pay any taxes voluntarily there is no clear information from the GRA about 
operators like me about the compliance process. They go to those with shops to collect, so 
people without fixed location should be educated about what to do if one chooses to comply 
(KM) 
 
‘‘…..It's very confusing now. I used to pay my taxes through 'Garage Operators Association' 
which was straightforward but now you pay through visiting officers. I will say I do not know 
much about the tax system now’’ (BM) 
 
‘‘…it’s difficult to determine how much and when to pay. This means that I have to bargain 
for cheaper rate anytime a tax officer comes around (FF) 
 
‘‘I do not know how the tax system works. The tax authority does not give any information 
about tax rates’’ (GF) 
 
Tax education is an issue raised in almost every interview conducted, even those who are 
currently tax compliant still believe that much could be done to make things clearer 
especially the way tax rates are determined.  
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‘‘…I do not know how the tax system works. The tax authority does not give any information 
about tax rates’’ (AM).  
6.3.a. (ii). Perceived tax revenue usage 
Many respondents raised the perception of tax revenue usage as having a strong influence on 
compliance decisions. However, this influence varies, and so do their reactions to this. 
Most (11) who do not comply voluntarily associate the decision not to do so to their 
perception of tax revenue misuse by tax authorities; 
‘‘I do not want to pay money which I know will not be used for any good cause’’ (AM) 
‘‘Government misuse of tax revenue discourages me from paying’’ (CF) 
 
‘‘My perception is like everyone in this country. The tax revenue does not go anywhere useful 
than politicians and tax officers’ pockets’’ (HM) 
 
‘‘I know am obliged to pay tax but I feel our tax [revenue] are not put into good usage so am 
not encouraged to pay’’ (LM) 
 
The way the taxes are collected and the nature of records kept by the revenue authorities also 
influence certain types of taxpayers’ perception of the destination of the collected revenue 
and its use. 
‘I know for the fact that just a fraction of the revenue from taxes goes to a good cause. They 
don't even know from their system if you have paid, so how are accounts made’ (GF). 
 
6.3.a. (iii). Corruption 
Corruption here refers to the practices of individual tax officers rather than the government as 
a whole (which is discussed under revenue usage). In response to how payment receipts 
work, a taxpayer admitted having seen someone nearby use the payment receipt of a friend as 
evidence of payment when inspectors visited, without them being caught, and has seen 




‘‘With the current loopholes and corrupt system, its easy people will pay less or may even 
use someone's payment receipt (and show to visiting officers as evidence of payment). I have 
witnessed this before’’ (AM). 
 
6.3.a. (iv). Bureaucracy and system complexities 
The system complexities and bureaucracy, include the compliance processes (for example, a 
taxpayer having to travel by car or bus to the center of the city to pay a tax bill of say 
GHC15/£3, which could have been paid locally if such options existed.) In addition, there are 
times where there are complexities in the tax system which are not well communicated to the 
taxpayer. Small taxpayers may, therefore, be discouraged to pay due to their inability to 
contract an advisor to interpret such complex laws. 
 
‘‘The system is so complex; the authorities do not have the right measures/mechanisms in 
place for people who want to comply to easily do so’’ (EM). 
 
Those with engagement in the formal sector also opt to have informal sector engagement due 
to the complex regulations in the formal sector (i.e. complexities in the formalisation 
process) 
In an attempt to register and formalise the informal sector activity one taxpayer stated; 
 
‘…I was asked to register for a TIN from the GRA, but the GRA officer I met in the office 
said I should pay GHC5073 per shareholder (GHC 200 in total). Meanwhile, according to 
what I read from the GRA the TIN is free, so I decided not to register’ (DF). 
This supports the legalists stance on informality, who asserts that the cost of registration and 
maintaining legal status including system bureaucracies breeds informality. 
 
6.3.a. (v). No visible benefit of tax payment  
The direct benefit of taxation is defined in this study as a benefit which taxpayers see as 
reciprocal, immediate and directly related to the taxes paid. Taxpayers who stress reciprocal 
arrangements, demand direct benefit for paying taxes. Not having a direct benefit to business 
                                                          
73 Exchange rate: £1 = GH¢ 5.6 (FxExcchange, 2017), so GHC50 = £8.92 
160 
 
owners and individuals for paying taxes is a factor for non-compliant decisions among these 
respondents.  
 
‘‘If I know the benefits I will get, I will surely pay (voluntarily), but for now, I am not 
convinced about the need’’ (AM). 
‘‘I know I have to pay taxes, but I need benefit for doing so’’ (BM) 
 
The taxpayers expect a direct and visible return for the tax payment. However, their reason 
for not paying is that there is nothing directly linked to the previous tax payments. Their 
arguments seem to suggest that ‘after all, they will enjoy the state services whether they pay 
taxes or not, just as anyone else’. This belief is directly explained by the psychological 
contract theory which asserts that compliance is enhanced through trust and reciprocal 
arrangements between the taxpayer and the tax authority (see detail discussion of pillar 2 
theories in section 4.8) 
Findings from this section are consistent with the survey data analysis (in section 6.7.c. iii) 
‘trust in authority’, which suggests that the low tax compliance rate is mainly due to lack of 
visible benefits of tax payments 
 
6.3.a. (vi). Low auditing probabilities 
Despite the high auditing probabilities reported by the majority of respondents referred to 
earlier, some respondents (AM, EM, KM), are not paying their taxes because they believe 
there are no ways the GRA or the Municipal authorities could find out their taxable activities, 
mainly due to the nature of their business (e.g. mobile operators).  
‘I know they (GRA tax inspectors) won’t come, so no point paying or worrying about paying’ 
(AM). 
‘I know I wouldn't be inspected so I do not think I should pay any taxes. Possibility for 
detection does not influence me’ (KM). 
These types of taxpayers accept the risks and pay as and when they are caught. They will 
therefore not pay voluntarily or for fear of being audited, instead, they will pay in the 
unfortunate scenario of being caught. This suggests that, as discussed earlier, auditing 
probabilities, by themselves, do not evoke long term voluntary compliance in the case of 
mobile traders at least. This also supports the bomb crater effects (See Mittone et al., 2017) 
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discussed in section 4.8.1, which states that tax compliance is likely to decrease if taxpayers 
expect no immediate audits.   
 
6.3.a. (vii). Financial constraints and double taxation   
A few (3) taxpayers made interesting remarks about the tax system. They are unable to 
honour their tax obligations because the fixed tax rate regardless of income (presumptive 
system) makes tax payment unsustainable. These taxpayers believe that the profit/income 
they make cannot even pay the tax liabilities demanded of them, so financially it is not 
possible to comply, even if a desire to be compliant is there. These taxpayers would prefer a 
formal assessment based system where taxes are paid on profit or income or a variable 
presumptive method which is not based on fixed (for example self-assessed presumptive 
taxes). 
 
‘‘My sales fluctuate so it becomes difficult to accept a fixed rate of taxes. These fluctuations 
can be very high and not just a small difference. 
I know people who close their shops when tax officers are coming because their incomes are 
low’’ CF. 
 
 A major challenge for these taxpayer groups is that their incomes are reported as below the 
GRA’s £16,000 threshold to be able to opt for formal self-assessment (see chapter three for 
discussion on taxpayer groups and assessment methods). 
In this case using the standard assessment of levying a lump sum based on taxpayer’s income 
as described by Jacobs (2013) may be effective as compared to the estimated approach. 
 
6.3.b. Emerged themes 
6.3.b.(i) Past Tax Authority Interaction 
Another influential factor to tax non-compliance described in the literature on formal sector 
compliance is what is described in this thesis as the ‘Past Tax Interaction Influence’ (PTII). 
The past tax interaction influence is the outcome of the previous interaction between officers 
from the tax authority and the taxpayer. Thus, it is the product of the tax officer’s support, 
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cooperation, knowledge, fairness, and attitude towards the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s 
perception of the officer in discharging of his/her duties. 
Some (10) taxpayers report that they view the interaction between them and the officials as a 
key factor in future compliance decisions. One taxpayer has decided not to pay any taxes at 
all and finds all means to avoid paying due to his past interaction with a revenue official;  
‘‘I once had a serious argument with an official who decided to charge me about 20 times my 
tax liabilities (compared to the previous year). I was paying GHs15 a year before when sales 
were much higher, but he gave me a tax bill of GHs300…. when I challenged them, they were 
so harsh and rude….I have decided not to pay any taxes again, and I have not been inspected 
for over three years now’’ (BM) 
 
‘…..I am just concerned about the tax officers and their approach to businesses which have 
not paid their taxes when they come for the inspection. They have no time to try to 
understand the reasons for delay/non-payment of taxes’ (GF). 
 
 ‘‘The experience I had with the GRA officers when they visited, was very bad. Having paid 
my taxes for the period, I wasn’t expecting a non-compliance check which demanded my 
payment receipts – I guess I should have been on their system as paid. They were rude too, 
and seem not to care’’ (GF) 
 
‘‘…..I could have been forced to pay some taxes plus a penalty for late payment, even though 
there was no prior notice to tell me I owe any amount (FF). 
 
Even though the full tax for the year, according to FF had already been paid, the taxpayer 
could have been forced to pay another one due to poor data/record keeping about the 
informal sector by the tax authority. As noted in chapter two, tax authorities in developing 
countries major reason for having an ineffective tax system for the informal sector is lack of 
data from the operators to design an effective system, however, information from the 
interviews suggest that the tax authorities (at least in the case of Ghana) are equally bad 
regarding record-keeping. This does not create confidence within the system among the 




6.3.b. (ii). Intuitive taxation and perceived double taxing 
The informal sector operators in Ghana are taxed under a presumption tax system in 
principle, which has clearly defined rules for determining the tax rates for different 
businesses (GRA, 2013) as shown in tables 3.5 and 3.6. About a third (6) of all interviewees 
reporting to be non-compliances (voluntarily) suggest that the presumptive system is not well 
explained and the process in deciding the coefficients and indices upon which the 
presumption rates are determined, are not communicated properly or are non-existent. These 
taxpayers believe that there’s just ‘an intuitive form of taxation’ rather than a proper 
presumption system which has clear factors that are used to determine liability. These 
taxpayers have very interesting descriptions of the meaning and administration of the 
‘Ghanaian Presumptive Taxation’. Asked about how they would describe the tax system in 
Ghana, responses were generally negative: 
 
‘‘No published data about the rates. Officers just give you a tax rate they deem fit during 
their on-site visit’’. (AM) 
 
‘‘GRA would not even tell you in advance how much to pay. ..... how much you pay is at the 
discretion of the visiting officer’’.  (BM). 
 
‘‘..the rate you pay depends on the officer who comes around and your negotiation skills’’ 
(GF) 
 
‘Very unfair, poorly planned’ (IF) 
 
Findings from the survey data (see section 6.7.b.iii) directly mirrors this finding as the results 
indicate that taxpayers do not have a clear understanding of how their tax rates are calculated. 
The observations from the field trip also seem to suggest a lack of understanding of how tax 
rates are determined as taxpayers constantly questioned ‘why’ they were being given the 
liabilities.  
Some taxpayers have an interesting understanding of what constitutes double taxation. Some 
(i.e. those with formal employment) believe that their informal employment income is tax-
exempt because they are already paying through PAYE and that any additional tax payment 
outside their PAYE will constitute double taxation;  
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‘I pay PAYE taxes on my main job but do not pay any taxes on my second (informal sector) 
activity’  (HA). 
 
‘..I don't understand the tax system at all. One thing I know is that your employer pays your 
taxes. That's the reason I am not bothered about my tax obligations on the self-employed 
work done alongside (EM). 
 
The tax authority, therefore, needs to ensure that people are educated to understand that 




6.3.11. Theme B Summary 
Theme B provides several factors which influence tax non-compliance decisions among the 
operators of the informal sector. An inadequate or generalised tax education can be equated 
to no tax education as taxpayers in this sector largely believe that messages not directed to 
them have no impact on compliance decisions. The main source of tax education to most 
taxpayers in the informal sector is through the visiting tax officers, who are mostly there for 
the collection of taxes rather than to educate taxpayers and may thus not apply the correct 
rules due to corruption. Furthermore, non-compliance decisions in the sector are also the 
result of a perception of poor tax revenue usage.  
Crucially, the relationship between the taxpayers and the officers (tax authority) has a direct 
relationship with tax compliance decisions. A positive interaction evokes future voluntary 
compliance whilst hostilities produce negative attitudes towards future voluntary compliance 
decisions. 
It is also noted that presumptive tax approaches can breed potential corrupt practices where 
there are no fixed, well-understood indices for determining tax liabilities, as officers tend to 





6.4. Theme C – Future Expectations of informal sector operators  
This section presents issues raised by interview participants as factors which could influence 
their future decisions to comply voluntarily with their tax obligations. These stem from the 
two main opposing themes - Compliance vs non-compliance decisions. The presence of these 
factors (expectations of taxpayers) most participants believe, will make them compliant, 
however, some are already complying. These taxpayers’ expectations are represented in 
figure 6.2 (Circle C in the Venn diagram). 
Six of the factors which the taxpayers believe could influence their decisions to comply 
voluntarily in the future are discussed in themes A and B (see figure 6.2). These include 
fairness in the tax system, support from the tax authority, curbing corruption, financial 
constraints, tax education, and awareness creation, and tax revenue usage. Two factors were 
exclusive to future compliance decisions – flexible payment options and incentives/breaks. 
As evident from section 6.3.a.(vii), taxpayers who wish to comply, are faced with the 
challenge that their income cannot even cover the tax liabilities. In this case, evasion 
becomes profitable (Takats and Papp, 2008; Kirchler et al., 2010). 
Incentives and tax breaks just as the ones given to large companies, especially multinationals 
could also influence voluntary compliance, as people see the direct benefit of their 
compliance. Also, these incentives serve to establish a cordial relationship with the tax 
authority, in the form of ‘recognition and rewarding good /compliance behaviours’  
The future expectations are further described under the six pillars of voluntary tax 
compliance in section 6.4.1 below: 
 
6.4.1. The six pillars of informal sector voluntary tax compliance 
Based on the evidence from themes A and B, the study identifies six key variables, which 
could shape the future of taxpayers’ decisions, and which are regarded as the most influential 
factors to informal sector taxpayers’ voluntary compliance decisions. These are: 
• Tax liabilities directly sent from the GRA / formal assessment 
• Tax education and awareness campaigns 
• Visible sign of tax revenue usage, and  
• Tax Morale (the feel to contribute to state building) 
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• Tightened tax collection process and curbing corruption 
• Positive tax authority interaction /support 
Tightening the tax collection process will increase taxpayer confidence in the tax system. The 
current Ghanaian informal sector taxation, which involves predominantly tax collection 
officers going around to collect taxes from sector operators, is seen as a weak system, which 
is susceptible to favouritism and corruption due to the increased power of tax officials. 
Taxpayers have some perception that tax collection officers do not report the actual taxes 
collected due to the way the taxes are currently administered. Some suggest that to comply 
voluntarily, the tax authority must tighten tax collection procedures and monitor/audit 
officers, by implementing systems which tackle such loopholes to prevent potential revenue 
leakages.  
When asked what will be an ideal tightening method that they would recommend, some 
interesting approaches were suggested; 
 ‘‘No officers to collect taxes. officers should only come around to give reminders but the 
actual tax payment must take place at GRA designated offices’’ (EM) 
 
‘‘I will like to see a system that automatically sends the payment collected by the tax officer 
directly and instantly to the tax authority electronically’’ (FF). 
 
Participants challenged the current system of tax officers issuing paper receipts as evidence 
of payment stating that the officers could design and issue their own receipts and not that 
from the GRA and the money may not be collected for the tax authority. 
Some (6) taxpayers also feel distanced from the tax authority as a result of the current tax 
collection process, and they believe that they have no access to the tax authority at the head 
offices, and rather deal solely with field officers whose words are final. These (2) 
respondents suggested what they want changed; 
 
‘I will give every taxpayer tax code and offer the chance to deal with GRA directly’ (BM). 
 
‘Effective collection approaches; a system to allow us (taxpayers) to raise concerns and have 




Even though the majority of taxpayers see the regular visits of tax officers in the collection 
process as unnecessary intrusion into their business, interestingly almost half of the 
respondents believe that no matter the collection approach adopted; regular checks from tax 
officers will help raise the overall compliance rate. 
In addition, the results indicate that taxpayers want direct visible benefits for paying the 
taxes, for example, the provision of basic amenities such as good quality water, street 
lighting, roads, sanitation, etc. 
Asked if a transparent tax revenue use (as they suggested earlier) will make them comply 
voluntarily, (5) respondents believe this will directly influence their decision positively and 
will make them comply without the need for the tax authority having to chase them: 
‘‘I will comply fully and voluntarily when I know every tax will come back to benefit us’’ 
(IF). 
 
‘‘Most important thing is that tax revenue use will play a big role. If people are to comply 
voluntarily they must not see the state misusing the revenue’’. (EM). 
 
‘Use of tax revenue should be transparent; Projects which are built by taxes should be 
indicated. For example, notice on a building that it was built by tax revenue, etc.’’ (JF) 
‘‘When people have the perception of tax revenue poorly used, they will just pay as little as 
possible just to remain in business’’ (GF). 
 
In summary, all participants would comply voluntarily and the GRA will spend less on 
monitoring when the revenue usage is transparent and people who embezzle tax revenues are 
punished publicly. 
Taxpayers were asked to recommend approaches they would wish to see adopted regarding 
tax education in order to improve voluntary compliance among the informal sector operators:  
‘‘Clearly published tax rates and education to create awareness’’ (EM) 
 




‘‘Complete overhaul of the system, which includes effective administration, removal of the 
"middle man" [tax officers] and publishing tax rates (education) so it’s clear how much to 
pay, how, where and when to pay. As the system is, I am sure most people are paying less 
and few might be paying more’’ (FF) 
 
Also in most cases, tax liability changes are not communicated to taxpayers and most believe 
the figures are made up by the tax officers on the field. 
 
‘I have made up my mind not to pay until I get a letter from GRA telling me why my tax 
liability went up over 20 times, within 12 months and how they reached that figure’ (BM). 
 
All these are the result of not having the factors used in determining the tax rates published 
or if there exists, such a publication is not properly communicated to taxpayers. Again, it 
could also be attributed to low literacy rates among the sector operators. This as per 
participants’ accounts, has a greater influence on their compliance decisions.  
Also, although published by the GRA from time to time, the rates for presumptive tax are not 
on their website.  
Furthermore, not understanding how the rates are determined makes the system unfair, and 
offers loopholes for officers to explore and exploit. 
Other factors such as flexible payment options and a dedicated tax support team with direct 
contact numbers for informal sector operators to contact in times of need for assistance are 
things which people want to see to comply voluntarily.  
Besides, the interview results suggest that, generally, respondents oppose the current 
presumptive tax system, and would rather see a self-assessment based taxation where the tax 




In summary, the taxpayers’ interviews reported that there are several factors which may 
influence voluntary tax compliance decisions (as listed under the six pillars above) among 
the informal sector operators. 
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In addition, the indices used to determine the tax rates must be clearly explained and the 
actual tax rates must be available to taxpayers, for example, in the form of leaflets to them or 
on the GRA’s website, and via other media outlets taking into account the illiteracy rate in 
the country. This will reduce the discretionary powers of tax officers and corruption. 
 
6.5. Tax Officials Face-to-Face Interviews 
This section analyses the interview responses of tax officials from the Ghana Revenue 
Authority (GRA) and the Metropolitan Assemblies74  as discussed in chapter seven.  
 
6.5.1. Understating of the taxpayers  
In this section, questions were designed to find answers to ‘how well does the tax authority 
know the taxpayers? 
The questions to assess tax officers’ understanding of what the ‘informal economy’ is, 
produced some interesting responses; 
The degree of informality is; 
 ‘‘determined by turnover’’ (GRA A1)75. 
The informal sector is defined by;  
‘‘the threshold of a business as defined by the GRA, and includes those taxpayers who are 
liable to pay their taxes through the tax stamp such as tailors, hairdressers, and carpenters’’ 
(GRA K1)76. 
The two definitions of informal sector businesses by the two GRA officers is quite different 
from the one offered by the local authority, which suggests different approaches by the two 
bodies to their informal sector tax administration. 
The Metropolitan Assembly classifies businesses in the informal sector ‘by their sizes, 
location and nature’ (KMA 1).  
                                                          
74 The main municipal authorities which were interviewed are the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) and the 
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA). 
75 Ghana Revenue Authority Officer in Accra number 1 (GRA A1). 
76 Ghana Revenue Authority Officer, Kumasi 1 (GRA K1). 
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The uncertainty of what constitutes the informal sector is even evident on the GRA’s official 
website where there is no clear definition of informality and businesses are grouped by 
class/size to arrive at the rate to be paid based on the class or size. This presupposes that even 
if a business formerly registers which is ideally a formalisation process, to be able to file its 
tax returns, the system as it stands now, will still classify such business as informal and 
subject to presumptive taxation. The informality, in this case, is by the size of income rather 
than registration status. 
The main problems faced by authorities in taxing the informal sector, according to officials 
in the three authorities (i.e. GRA, KMA, and AMA) were identified with three key variables 
– illiteracy, information availability, and a lack of proper address system in the country. 
On what is considered as the biggest problem officers have similar views; 
‘‘The main problem is the lack of information – difficulty extracting information about 
people. Also, most taxpayers do not understand the purpose of paying the taxes’’ (GRA K1) 
‘Lack of effective address system in the country to be able to identify peoples’ businesses and 
locations and also lack of information flow from the tax authority to the taxpayers’ (GRA 
A1). 
‘High illiteracy rate in the country means people do not see the relevance of paying taxes; 
(KMA 1). 
Similar to the issues raised by the taxpayers during the interview, the tax officers equally 
appreciate that lack of education which is blamed on capacity constraints, and understanding 
of tax revenue usage are the biggest problems in taxing the informal economy of the country, 
although lack of a proper address system (e.g. post coding) is equally a challenge. 
 
6.5.2. Justification of the current tax rates  
The study explored the success of the current approaches and tactics employed by the tax 




Most taxpayers found it ‘criminalising’ when the tax collection officers are accompanied by 
police officers and believe these practices draw unnecessary attention to their businesses, but 
the revenue officers justify these acts; 
‘People could be very violent towards the officers, therefore the police are used purely for 
protection’ (GRA K1); 
 ‘there have been instances when some of our officers have been beaten by the people’ (KMA 
1). 
On the issue of intuitive taxation (discretionary presumptive system) being applied, officers 
gave had various responses. 
‘The rate they pay is based on their business size, type of business etc. and officers who 
determine the rates are trained in these areas to properly work out the tax liabilities’ 
(KMA2)  
‘‘There is a minimum charge which officers could not go below that, although they use their 
discretion in most cases during the assessment’’ (GRA A1).  
Officers also stated there will always be discretion in presumptive taxes, and that the GRA 
has a complaints procedure to deal with unfair treatment:  
‘‘The amount of tax they (taxpayers) pay is based on a fixed rate from the 
industry/business/activity or profession which they fall under, and if a taxpayer is not happy 
with his taxes, he could bring it to the attention of the GRA’’ (GRA A1),  
 ‘‘The rate we charge is very low to ensure affordability’’ (KMA1). 
As observed from the interviews, some taxpayers object to the use of the current presumptive 
taxation system, however, responses from the tax officers indicate that it is the approach the 
GRA and the municipal authorities consider appropriate.  
 
6.5.3. Views on the success of current strategies 
The success of current tax strategies will undoubtedly affect future approaches and strategies. 
The study also attempted to assess how successful or otherwise have the current taxing 
strategies, for the informal sector been. Responses from the tax officials did not provide 
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much insight into this issue, neither did the responses indicate any degree of certainty of how 
the current strategies are working. 
‘People tend to comply due to fear of prosecution’ (GRA A1), and ‘the detection mechanisms 
have also been very successful’ (GRA K1). 
There is no information provided about which business or activity type is least compliant, 
and this perhaps suggests why there is no precise information about the impact of current tax 
strategies.  
In trying to understand which business/activity is least compliant, the officers stressed that 
the informal sector collections are not computerised and therefore no accurate data exists on 
compliance statistics. 
‘It’s difficult to specify because we do not have such classifications’ (KMA 3); 
‘‘the payments from the informal sector is not computerised’’ (GRA A1) 
Although the authorities blame lack of information (see section 6.5.1) from the sector for 
improving policy design, the authorities are doing little to help the situation.  
 
6.5.4. Dealing with corrupt practices/favouritism  
Earlier in this chapter, taxpayers raised the issue of the corruption and abuse of discretionary 
powers by tax officers as factors influencing their compliance behaviour. There was, 
therefore, the need to find out from the tax officials what measures are currently in place for 
combatting corrupt practices and promoting fairness in the system. 
To reduce the incidence of corruption and favouritism due to the possibility of a tax officer 
getting used to certain locations which may lead to the establishment of informal contacts, 
the GRA undertakes an annual rotation of tax officials: 
‘We do rotate our officers every year; however, since the merger (in 2009), I don’t think it 
has happened’ (GRA K1). 
Another issue raised by the officers is the right of the taxpayer during an assessment. 
‘‘The taxpayers have to sign and accept the assessment/tax rate given by the tax officer’ 
(GRA AK1),  
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However, officers could not tell what the consequences were but pointed to the GRA’s 
distress action process in section 6.5.7. Taxpayers did state that if one refuses to 
sign/disagree, their businesses could be temporarily closed down; indicating that signing to 
agree the tax rate is a mere formality in reality. 
Regarding the question of how do they know which business to visit on their visits, both 
confirmed that collections are not computerised so officers do not usually (though not in all 
cases) know which informal sector operator has paid, so businesses may be visited over-and-
over again, and they are required to produce a payment receipt as evidence of payment. 
During compliance visits, a business is required to buy or show (on demand) a valid tax 
stamp.  
 
6.5.5. Approaches to encouraging voluntary compliance 
To find answers to one of the research aims of establishing ‘the most effective ways to 
cultivate voluntary tax compliance culture among informal sector operators in developing 
countries’, the researcher asked revenue officers about the current approaches they employ to 
encourage voluntary compliance, particularly in the long term. 
‘‘We try to establish a cordial relationship with the taxpayers and we do this by sending them 
reminder letters before visits. We also run TV and radio campaigns to remind people and we 
have a van going around the city to provide information about taxes’’ (GRA A1). 
‘‘Few do comply voluntarily, and to make life easier for them, people can come for free tax 
advise at the taxpayers’ service section of the GRA’’ (GRA K1). 
Interestingly revenue officers from the metropolitan assembly do not believe voluntary 
compliance is a possibility, considering the current economic situation. 
‘‘Voluntary tax compliance will be difficult due to the hardship in the country. The economy 
is not doing well so people are tight and therefore reluctant to pay’’ (KMA 3).  
The KMA strategy is not about achieving voluntary compliance, but rather to rely on 
enforced compliance, which gives people no choice. The officers at the KMA also confirmed 
that there would soon be a taxpayers’ court to deal with tax-related issues, and this they 
believe, will help achieve voluntary compliance. 
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On the possibility of an informal sector operator being allowed to file tax returns, there exist 
restrictions of who can file tax returns in the country.  
‘‘Ability to file for tax returns is dependent on a threshold, and people/businesses are moved 
over when they reach that turnover’’ (GRA A1). 
 
6.5.6. Taxpayers engagement 
To establish the relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority in the country, and 
to assess how the taxpayers are involved in the tax planning, officers were asked how the 
current strategies engage taxpayers. 
The KMA do involve the taxpayers from the planning phase of the taxes through 
representatives who decide on rates through a democratic system, balloting.  
‘‘The tax rate is decided by the assembly-men77 of the local communities; they also decide on 
categorising of the businesses and the associated rates. Afterwards, a vote is cast by them 
using a simple majority before such taxes come into force’’ (KMA 3).  
This does not directly involve the informal sector taxpayers. Although there are stakeholder 
meetings, these are usually for businesses with representatives, and not the informal sector 
operators who do not have the possibility of being represented as indicated by the KMA3 
officer: 
‘We organise stakeholder meetings to get the views of various stakeholder groups, but not 
with the informal sector operators. The informal sector is excluded from such meetings 
(KMA 3), however, no justification was offered to the exclusion. 
These valuations and classifications, according to the KMA are usually done every 5 years. 
The GRA taxpayer engagement programme includes running campaigns in the local 
languages through the use of a van with a Public-Address System (PAS) and via the local 
radio stations (GRA K1).  
Interestingly, the results from the interview data and the survey proves the opposite. The 
results indicate that taxpayers have no idea how their tax rates are determined. This is further 
                                                          
77 Local representatives of the council 
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confirmed during the on-field observation where it was observed that most taxpayers 
observed questioned the basis of their tax liabilities  
 
 
6.5.7. The distress action process of the GRA 
This part asks officers the strategies they use in the event of tax non-compliance. The officers 
(GRA K1 and GRA K2) outlined the following steps: 
▪ Stage 1 - Assessment: an assessment is done and a tax rate/liability given. This gives 
the taxpayer 21 days to pay the taxes due. After the 21st day, the money starts 
attracting interest, however, the GRA is flexible in situations where people are unable 
to pay and may enter into negotiation. 
▪ Stage 2 – Immediate demand notice: After the initial period given during an 
assessment elapse, then an immediate demand notice is issued which gives the 
taxpayer 14 days to pay. 
▪ Stage 3 – Final demand notice:  Failure to comply up to this stage means the 
taxpayer enters into the third stage where the GRA issues a ‘final demand notice 
which requires that the taxpayer pays within 7 days of issue of the letter. 
▪ Stage 4 - The warrant: After the taxpayer fails to pay, the local office builds a dossier 
(distress action) and the Head Office issues the warrant. 
▪ Step 5 – Garnishment: The GRA at this stage arranges with the debtors of the 
taxpayer to pay to the GRA directly an amount equal to the taxes owed. At this stage, 
the revenue officers in charge take inventory of all items. This normally happens after 
the business has been closed by the GRA. Where a business is to be closed for non-
payment of taxes, the local press is involved to report to raise awareness of the 
consequences of non-compliance. 
However, these approaches point more to formal sector operators, although officers did say 
they use it for the informal sector too. The operators’ interviews did not confirm these 
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practices, instead by their account, tax officers could close a taxpayer’s shop or confiscate 
his/her goods on the same day of being found non-compliant. 
 
6.5.8 What should be changed to increase compliance level? 
The officers raised several points they believe could help raise tax compliance levels, 
particularly those in the informal sector: 
‘‘People don’t know the purpose of paying taxes. The politicians need to educate the 
taxpayers from the top. They do listen to them than we at the local level’’ (GRA K2) 
‘‘Flexible payment terms, although I know it’s an obligation, but the tax should be designed 
in a way that taxpayer feels it is right to pay. I will also suggest constant 
campaigns/reminders and promotions. Example, first 200 to pay will get a present/discount’’ 
(GRA A1). 
‘‘More education and threats of court action will encourage people to comply’’ (KMA 3). 
 
6.5.9. Summary 
The results from the tax officials’ interviews indicate that the tax authority does not have a 
complete understanding of the operators of the informal sector, and therefore try to apply the 
‘best’ approach to get as much tax revenue as possible. For example, the tax payment records 
of the informal sector are not computerised and therefore at any point in time, the tax 
authority is unable to determine how many of the taxpayers are yet to comply. 
With regards to inclusiveness, the tax authority stressed that various taxpayer groups are 
consulted before the introduction of new approach, or the amendment of any existing 
approach (section 6.5.6.), although this is a practice carried out by the municipal authorities, 
and not the GRA. 
One interesting thing which emerged from the officials’ interviews is the fact that, the tax 




Finally, the main issues affecting the design of an effective tax system for the sector (based 
on the reports from the GRA and municipal authorities), are illiteracy, information 
availability, and lack of a proper address system in the country. 
 
6.6. Field observation studies  
6.6.1. Introduction  
This section presents data collected through a critical field observation study, which involved 
the assessment of the interaction between the tax authorities and the taxpayers. This form the 
third phase of the data gathering and emphasis was placed on observing behaviour-responses 
between the two parties. The behaviour-response interactions have been represented in the 
table below with colour-coding, indicating the level of severity. Red - indicates severe 
compliance issues as a result of the observed relationships; Green - shows a compliance 
situation where the taxpayer has complied and has evidence of tax payment. It also shows a 
cordial relationship or situation where each party, particularly the revenue officers, perform 
their duty diligently. Amber - depicts a situation of concern; low compliance from taxpayers 
and officers could do more with their responses by not being aggressive, instead adopt a 
consistent and fair approach. Grey - shows a situation where the taxpayer is deemed to have 
appropriate tax knowledge, has a clear understanding of tax obligations and compliance 
processes, but is not currently compliant or there is no evidence of compliance but they have 
agreed to be compliant and the interaction is deemed cordial. 
In total, the researcher was present at 23 potential observable taxpayers/incidences during the 
trip. However, in only 10 were people observed and interactions recorded, it was these (10) 
that were of interest to the researcher, this was due to language barriers – sometimes the 
language used between the taxpayers and the tax officers was not understood by the 
researcher, and also situations where both officers were attending to taxpayers, the researcher 






6.6.2. Types of businesses and individuals observed 
 Age and other demographic data are unknown due to a lack of one-to-one contact with the 
taxpayers. The researcher followed two male enforcement officers. There is no basis for the 
gender of the tax officer sent out on any compliance visit day, and it depends on knowledge 
of the area and staff availability, as confirmed by the officers. 
Also, concerning the taxpayers, officers had no formal pattern and no parameters (apart from 
being a trader/hawker) were agreed in advance by the team of who exactly they were visiting. 
The approach was purely random ‘stop and check’ which had no predetermined basis. 
The observed participants in this field observation were given numeric codes and a letter at 
the end of each number. The letters at the end of the numbers indicate the sex of the observed 
individual [F =Female; M=Male]. 
They are further grouped into M, O and Y [Y= young, perceived to be under 30; M=Middle 
aged= perceived to be between 30-45 and O = mature taxpayers, assumed to be over 45 
years]. The ages assigned to respondents are based purely on the researcher’s judgement as 
there was no direct communication with respondents to ask about age or other factors of the 
interaction. As the researcher was with the revenue officers, the reactions and attitudes of the 






















Taxpayers response/reaction Issue 
code 




No receipt, argued heatedly that he is 
selling for his boss who is out of town. 
Angrily left goods with officers. 
 




No receipt/ selling for mum who has 
receipt 
 




Seller finally paid  
4M M O Books Verbal 
warning 
No sales for the day, so unable to pay. 
Will pay when makes sales or next 
time 
 
5M M M Herbalist  Demanded 
tax receipt 
No tax receipt. Paid for one peacefully  
6F F M Bread  Checked 
receipts 
Produced valid tax ticket  
7F F Y Jewellery Verbal 
Warning. 
No receipt/ selling for mum who has 
receipt 
 
8 F F Y Fruits  Verbal 
warning 
Challenged officers of no sales. 
Promised to pay next time 
 
9F F M Snacks Seize 
goods 
Insulted officers as bringing bad luck 
and driving customers away when they 









Tax paid but left receipt at home. 




6.6.3. Field tax officers, questions 
The field tax collection officers are asked a series of questions after the observation exercise. 
The questions are denoted with FROQ (to signify field revenue officers’ questions). Table 
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6.2 above shows that the officers take several enforcement strategies during the field trip, and 
the purpose of further questioning is to help explain these practices. 
 
6.6.3.i FROQ1 
What do you do with the seized goods?  
The senior revenue officer said: 
 ‘‘The goods are taken to the office and we keep it until when they pay then they can come for 
it by showing receipt of payment’’. (AMA Senior revenue officer 1).  
The issue of selling the goods to defray the tax liability is not common, but it’s done as the 
last resort according to the officer. 
 
6.6.3.ii FROQ2 
What do you do with perishable items?  
The officer stated that they leave them in the office until they come to pay, and if a taxpayer 
does not return for the goods, they are binned, although this is a rare case as taxes demanded 
are usually a fraction of the cost of the goods.  
‘The amount of tax we ask them to pay is very small in comparison to the goods, so they will 
always come for the goods’ (AMA senior revenue officer1) 
 
6.6.3.iii FROQ3 
How do you know whom you have issued verbal warnings to when people do not have 
fixed locations and you do not keep any records of whom you have warned? 
‘‘It’s impossible to do anything, especially hawkers, as you rightly said, they do not have 
fixed locations so I just try as much as I can to give strong warning with the view that it will 




This approach indicates that an itinerant trader could escape detection for these taxes for a 
longer period without being detected. 
 
6.6.3.iv FROQ4 
Why do you let some people off and give others a strong warning when they are all 
committing the same offense (Non-complying)? 
‘‘When someone shows the desire to pay and for genuine reasons do not have the receipts, I 
use my judgment based on what they say, and I am sure most will pay. However, there are 
others who will not pay, and you could see from their responses, so in these cases, I make 
sure the action is deterrent enough, which include seizing of goods.  
However, some of the sellers will not pay following seizure of their goods, because they know 
someone senior within the office (AMA) who will plead on their behalf to collect their goods. 
These kinds of behaviours make our work difficult’’ (AMA senior revenue officer 2) 
Such practices confirm the initial findings from the informal sector operators’ interviews, 
that there is no fairness within the system due to favouritism and corruption. 
For clarification (regarding FROQ4), the officer is asked: 
 
Has there been any instance as you explained above, and what did you do? 
‘‘I could do nothing, these are my superiors. These send wrong signals to the people and 
usually, it discourages going to the field or seizing goods, but I do it for the good of the 
country’’ (AMA Field Revenue Officer 2) 
The response suggests that the tax officials equally face challenges from other officers within 







6.6.4. Officers’ attitude 
The overall attitudes of the field officers were keenly observed too. 
The attitude of the field revenue officers can be described as ‘not good’ – even though they 
could be biased towards better behaviour than usual because of the researcher’s presence. 
Although the researcher’s presence could have influenced their behaviour, the overall attitude 
and their relationships with the taxpayers is not good enough to encourage voluntary 
compliance even at a future date. Officers shouted at taxpayers who had not paid their taxes. 
In some situations, things got very confrontational and quite personal, therefore, the integrity 
of the tax authority, not the officers could be brought into disrepute. Overall, the 
interpersonal relationship exhibited by the officers is an issue, and seems very likely to have 
a negative influence on voluntary compliance in the future, if this is typical of other officers’ 
behaviour. 
 
6.6.5. Tax knowledge of people observed 
Overall, the levels of tax knowledge exhibited by those engaged by field officers were good. 
It was only in one instance that a taxpayer indicated he had no knowledge of paying for a 
license to sell. The taxpayer, in this case, was a youngster who confirmed he was selling for 
his boss who had travelled, and was unsure if he had the receipt. 
 
6.6.6. Level of fairness 
The researcher’s field observation suggests that there are examples of favouritism and 
inconsistent practices among tax officers. In most instances, people were let off when they do 
not argue with the tax officers. However, most of those who argued were people the 
researcher believed needed education, and the people the revenue officers should have taken 
the opportunity to educate. On the contrary, they received harsh responses. For example, 
taxpayers 1M, 2M, 4M, 7F, 8F, 9F, and 10M all committed the same offense – non-
compliance. However, 1M, 9F who questioned the officers about the reasons for payment, 
etc. had their goods seized. The researcher believes that because the officers have no records 
of who they have warned before, people who adopt a ‘nice way’ to communicate with the 
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officers and come up with good excuses could go long periods without complying if they 
play the system suitably. 
 
6.6.7. On-field tax education 
On-field tax education appeared very poor and not an obvious feature of the role of 
compliance officers. Tax officers were more interested in the tax collection than educating 
the taxpayers. In one instance a revenue officer shouted to a taxpayer; 
 ‘….but you should know that [payment of sellers license] is compulsory before you came to 
the market….You either pay or I take your goods to the office’.  
Such approaches do not build a good relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority 
for the future, especially operators who are new to the market. 
In most part, of the situations observed, tax officers offered very little time to educate 
taxpayers who were not familiar with these taxes (selling license). It appeared to the 
researcher that the officers assumed that all the taxpayers were of the same level of 
understanding as suggested by Andreoni et al (1998), which could be a wrong assumption, 
according to Torgler, (2003). 
 
6.6.8. Summary. 
Overall, there were mixed incidences during the visits and officers used different strategies 
/approaches in handling them. There was no consistency in officers’ actions, and there were 
few situations where favouritism was shown towards some taxpayers. Although using 
discretion is part of the process, however, there were instances where officers seized goods 
belonging to taxpayers but other similar situations attracted only a verbal warning. This does 
not send the right message to other taxpayers, especially because the majority of taxpayers in 
the informal sector operate in an open market where officers’ actions are open to view by 
others. 
In terms of tax education, there is clear evidence that most of the taxpayers observed are well 
informed of their tax obligations and fully understand when and how to pay. 
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The excuse of ‘I have left my payment receipt home’ and ‘I’m selling for someone, I don’t 
know I have to pay’ were common excuses given by taxpayers. Officers used mixed 
approaches in dealing with such situations, which raises fairness concerns relating to this 
system. 
 
6.6.9 Tax experts’ interviews - Adam Smith International 
This section presents extracts of the interview responses from experts on informal sector 
taxation from Adam Smith International. Detailed interview questions and responses are 
presented in appendix 9. The interview was participated by  and  
. The experts’ interview questions are denoted by (EIQ). For example, 
‘EIQ1’ represents experts interview question one. 
The issue of tax officials abusing their power, engaging in negotiation and favouring people 
was evident throughout the study (as seen in this chapter) so the question of how to tackle 
this issue was put forward: 
 
6.6.9.a. EIQ1  
Question: How do we deal with corrupt tax officials for an effective presumptive tax system 
to be achieved? 
This produced some interesting responses from the participants; 
 ‘What we recommend is something transparent, and kind of guideline on how tax officers 
assess, and how the judgment is made, and give the shop owner the basis to agree or 
disagree. Also, a place to take complaints to if a taxpayer disagrees’ . 
 
‘If I look at the Kosovo context, two important things are in Kosovo 
▪ One:  The presumptive tax was self-assessed, so it’s self-assess by the taxpayer, not 
the revenue officer. The tax officer provides the forms, but the people complete the 




▪ Two: The taxpayers take the money to the bank and pay themselves 
So, the Kosovo system which I understand is different from Ghana is: Self-assessed, and 
payment into the tax authority’s bank account by the taxpayers’ themselves’ . 
Even though they believe in helping the taxpayers, but both  and  agree that the tax 
officers must not take away the responsibility of the taxpayers away from them and 
suggested they are allowed to go and make direct payments. On the issue of small and 
regular payments, it is suggested; 
‘…Point of Sales (POS) technology, – where people are issued with receipts on the spot by 
the revenue officers but the receipts must reconcile with the recorded transactions on the 
machine which the officer takes to the bank later on which will help deal with leakage 
problems’ . 
In the absence of these, they suggested mobile money payment which is now very common 
across most developing countries. 
Proper assessment or auditing of taxpayers in the informal sector has always been difficult a 
task hence officers tend to use an intuitive approach to issue tax bills. The experts’ views 
were sort on this issue. 
 
6.6.9.b. EIQ2 
Question: What will you recommend as the best auditing mechanism for these field tax 
officers? 
 
Response: ‘Monitoring could be done using other sources to check taxes collected are 
reasonable. For instance, by checking import data records, assess what government 
contracts they have, size of the business utility bills, etc.’  
Evidence from the data in this study presented in this chapter suggests that there are often no 
clear guidelines on when businesses are moved from presumption to other forms of taxes 




Question: What should be the key determinants/triggers to moving businesses from 
presumptive assessment to formal/standard tax assessment – any cut-off point?  
Response:  As a general we want as many people to keep more books/records as possible so 
expect people to move from presumption. One example is if you are a new business, and you 
are running at a loss, under presumptive tax you still have to pay taxes and under standard 
assessment you pay nothing. 
In Kosovo78, we allowed people below the threshold to move over as long as they have good 
records, but also once they decide to do so, they must stay three years before going back, to 
prevent people going backward-and-forwards. Also, particular taxpayer groups were moved 
out of presumptive taxes where they were deemed to be able to keep records, for example, 
professionals.  
Also, the IMF recommended that they (countries) do encourage using high rates of taxes for 
the presumption to encourage people to move over to formal assessment’ . 
Taxing petty traders and hawkers who could barely meet their tax obligations came up as an 
issue during the interactions with the informal sector operators, and the GRA do not seem to 
have any reason to remove certain businesses from taxation. Expert opinions were sought on 
this in EIQ4 below. 
 
6.6.9.d. EIQ4 
Question: As you are aware, countries like Ghana do not have any social benefits system, 
and people have to hawk (sell in the streets) to survive. I spoke to people making as little as 
£2 a day during my fieldwork, but may pay 30p 40p in tax [tickets] a day, considering your 
experience in developing country taxation, do you think it’s advisable to tax all these people 
as well? 
Response: ‘As a general rule, anyone making an income, we recommend taxing them for the 
sole reason of participating in running the country and for democracy. But we also 
                                                          
78  and  indicated the were involved in designing the recent tax reform. 
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recommend charging a small amount. Small is better than nothing. Low thresholds to 
promote an all taxpayer led system and also as a way to engage citizens . 
‘…when people are already paying, they are already on the system, for future taxation  
The next question seeks a response on dealing with complaints issues in the informal sector. 
 
6.6.9.e. EIQ5 
Question: What I have noticed in most tax regimes, is that when it comes to tax complaints, 
taxpayers are asked to put in writing, which I think could be difficult to countries like Ghana 
and other developing economies, either due to illiteracy or nature of the system. What will 
you recommend as the best way to dealing with taxpayer complaints in the informal economy 
or under presumption regimes in developing countries context? 
Response: It shouldn’t be in writing only, and this can apply to both federal and state levels. 
For example, a dedicated complaints support officer sitting in the local office on a desk, it 
could be telephone complaints or a small call center may also be used or even in this modern 
era, an online complaints procedure may be adopted.  
Being able to walk in and talk to someone is a standard recommendation  
 
6.6.9.f. Summary 
The data presented in this section shows that although the informal sector presents some 
challenges making it difficult to be taxed effectively, there are ways to dealing with these. A 
tailored approach to suit individual countries or situations as suggested above could be 
effective. 
Tax officials’ powers which are abused under the presumptive system could be overcome 
with taxpayers taking their responsibility for physically making the tax payments, although 
this could discourage some taxpayers who may be busy to go to banks or who do not have 
mobile money.  
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Finally, to ensure fair and consistent billing, using third party information such as electricity 
consumed, water used, or customs data, etc. may be helpful. 
 
6.7.0. The Survey data for the study 
This section of the chapter presents the questionnaire results of the study and it’s presented in 
three sections. In part A, the key demographic information of respondents is presented. This 
is presented in the form of descriptive statistics which provides summaries of the 
demographic data in tables and diagrams. This is then followed by part B which analyses the 
data in relation to existing literature. The final part (part C), presents evidence from the 
survey and assesses how new evidence is linked to the core theory of the study – the 
responsive regulation theory 
 
6.7.a. PART A - Descriptive statistics 
6.7.a. (i). Questionnaire distribution and response rate 
Using a drop-off and pick-up technique, 500 survey questionnaires were distributed across 
the two selected regions of the country (refer to chapter seven for a detailed discussion of the 
process). 77 of the returned questionnaires were unusable, due to incomplete questionnaires 
or a selection of multiple responses by a respondent. Out of these, 43 were from the Greater 
Accra Region, and 34 from the Ashanti Region. Overall, 334 of the 500 distributed surveys 
were usable responses representing 66.8%. The actual response rate was 82.2% and the non-







                                                          
79 This figure excludes returned but non-usable responses. 
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Ashanti / Kumasi 300 46 254 34 220 73.3 
Greater Accra/Accra 200 43 157 43 114 57.0 
Total / Valid Res. (%) 500 89 411 77      334 66.8 
 
 
6.7.a. (ii). Background of respondents 
This section describes the key demographic characteristics of respondents and presents 
descriptive statistics of these respondents including age, gender, level of education, and 
income. In doing so, a mixture of data presentation techniques such as tables, and graphs are 
used to present the data. The graphical representation reduces the complexity of the data (for 
the reader), shows trends and distribution whilst the tables promotes simplicity and reduces 
large data sets to a meaningful summarised form. 
95.8% of the survey participant’ declared their nationality as Ghanaian. People from other 
African countries made up 3%, whilst 0.3% were from Asia, the same as Europe (0.3%).  
This reflects the nature of the country’s recent population census described in chapter three, 
which is predominantly Ghanaians (97.6%).  
The respondents comprised of 188 (56.3%) males, 140 (41.9%) females and 6 (1.8%) non-
disclosures.  265 (79.3%) of the participants operate as sole traders with 52 (15.6%) being in 








Table 6.4. Type of business ownership 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Sole Owner 265 79.3 79.3 79.3 
Partnership 52 15.6 15.6 94.9 
Family business 17 5.1 5.1 100.0 




Table 6.5. Age distribution of respondents 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Under 25 Years 21 6.3 6.4 6.4 
25-40 Years 171 51.2 52.3 58.7 
41-50 Years 86 25.7 26.3 85.0 
Over 50 Years 49 14.7 15.0 100.0 
Total 327 97.9 100.0  
Missing (No response/blank) 7 2.1   
Total 334 100.0   
 
The age of the participants is represented in table 6.5 above. Four age groups are used for the 
study [under 25years; 25-40 years; 41-50 years; and over 50 years]. The dominant age group 
is the 25-45 year olds who make up 171 (51.2%), followed by the 41-50 year olds, 86 
(25.7%). People in the over 50 age group amounted to 49 (14.7%). There are 21(6.3%) 
respondents from those aged under 25, and 7 (2.1%) participants did not declare their age.  
The majority of the participants are married 191 (57.2%) and the remaining are single 102 
(30.5%), cohabiting 29 (8.7%), and in ‘other relationship’ 9 (2.7%). 0.9% of the participants 
did not disclose their marital status. This demographic data shares similar trends with the 
recent (2010) national census, which reported that 51.8% of the population were married, 
29.6% single, and consensual union (cohabiting) 6%, (GSS, 2012, p.33). The age distribution 
of the census data is different from the study and as such cannot be compared to assess 





Table 6.6. Marital status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Married 191 57.2 57.7 57.7 
Single 102 30.5 30.8 88.5 
Cohabiting 29 8.7 8.8 97.3 
Other 9 2.7 2.7 100.0 
Total 331 99.1 100.0  
Missing No response/blank 3 .9   
Total 334 100.0   
 
 
Table 6.7. Highest educational qualification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
O Level/A Level/SSCE 150 44.9 45.2 45.2 
HND/Professional 52 15.6 15.7 60.8 
Degree 32 9.6 9.6 70.5 
Masters degree & Above 1 .3 .3 70.8 
No formal education 97 29.0 29.2 100.0 
Total 332 99.4 100.0  
Missing No response/blank 2 .6   
Total 334 100.0   
 
The educational level of participants is grouped into five classifications – (a) No formal 
education, (b) basic education - O’Level/A/Level/SSCE, (c) HND/Professional, (d) Degree, 
and (e) Master’s degree and above.  
As shown in table 6.7 only one (0.3%) participant declared a Masters’ degree or above as the 
highest held qualification. The largest education bracket is those with the basic education 
(O’level/A’levels/ SSCE) representing 150 (44.9%) of the sample. People who have ‘No 
Formal Education’ are the second highest in the sample making up 97 (29.0%). Those with 
HND/Professional level qualifications are at 52 (15.6%), and Degree holders 32 (9.6%). 
This trend is similar to the national trends as recorded by the recent population census- No 
formal education 28.5%, JSH, SSCE (O-levels / A-levels) 49.8%, 
Vocational/HND/Professional 7.5% Degree 2.5%, and Masters degrees and above 0.5% 















Figure 6.3 represents the religious denomination of the participants. Christianity dominates 
the sample and represents 274 (82.0%). Muslims are second 43 (12.9%), Traditional and 
Occultism represent 11 (3.3%), and other religious groups make up 1 (0.3%). Five people 
(1.5%) did not disclose their religion. At the national level, Christians are 71.2%, Islam 
17.6%, Traditional believers 5.2% and all others including non-believers are 5.3% of the 
population (GSS, 2012, p.6) 
The income of the participants is shown in figure 6.4. Grouped into three, the highest income 
group is those earning between GH¢133 - GH¢50080 per month who are 152 (45.5%). The 
income bracket GH¢501 - GH¢2600 is made up of 110 (32.9%). Those earning up to 
GH¢132, which equals the tax-free Personal Allowance limit for those in a formal 
employment (GRA, 2013), are 37 (11.1%) of the sample. Participants in the highest income 
category of over GH¢2600 constitute 25 (7.5%). No reliable data for income distribution 
nationally was obtained and the recent census did not capture such data, therefore there is no 




                                                          
80 Exchange rate GH¢5.1 to GBP 1 (Barclays Corporate, 29th May, 2014). 
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The years in business as shown in figure 6.5 is almost evenly distributed. People operating 
between 6 – 10 years are 132 (39.5%), over 10 years 94 (28.1%), 2-5 years 83 (24.9%) and 
up to 1 year 24 (7.2%). 
 













6.7.a. (iii). Reliability and internal validity 
Assessing the reliability and validity are key steps before any further data analysis is 
undertaken and they go a long way to determining the internal consistency and reliability of 
the test scores. The intercorrelation between the test scores are maximised when all items 
measure the same construct, as a result, Cronbach’s alpha becomes useful in determining 
internal validity. Quality tests are important to evaluate the reliability of data, and 
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Cronbach’s alpha is a commonly used index for determining such consistencies (Tavakol and 
Dennick, 2011). 
In order to determine the reliability and internal validity of the data for this study, to measure 
the degree at which the analysis yields a consistent result, and as the first step before the 
formal analysis of the responses, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is applied to test the data 
(Tavakol and Dennick, 2011) of the completed questionnaire (n = 334). 
Again, measuring the internal consistency helps to estimate correlation and enables the 
researcher to understand how good the scales are in terms of producing reliable outcomes. 
Using Cronbach’s alpha helps to determine if the questionnaire gives the same result, under 
the same conditions (Field, 2009 p.673).  
The acceptable level of Cronbach’s alpha considered good is derived from the indicators set 
forth by Hair et al. (2010) who put 0.9 as excellent (high stake testing) and 0.70 as 
acceptable. However, Hair et al. (2010) conceived that for certain studies, especially 
exploratory research, a 0.60 is considered appropriate to provide the required internal validity 
and reliability.  Cronbach’s alpha-coefficients for the key factors upon which the data for the 
questionnaire survey is analysed, indicate good internal consistency - tax education and tax 
knowledge has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.881, tax morale 0.635; compliance process and cost 
0.764; perception of fairness and equity 0.688; taxpayers’ and tax officials’ relationship 
0.652. The strong test results from Cronbach’s alpha suggests that the research instrument 
employed has a high degree of validity. 
The test also demonstrates internal strength in scale choice, with each validity test depicting a 
strong inter-item correlation of above 0.3, the threshold level suggested by Hair et al. (2010, 
p118). Again, a selected corrected item-total correlation shown in appendix 10, which 
indicates how much each item correlates with the overall questionnaire score, shows strong 
correlations as just one of the variables is under 0.5, the benchmark for determining the 
strength of an item’s correlation with the rest of group (Hair et al., 2010). 
From appendix 10, the highest is ‘understand own tax’ with a corrected item-total correlation 





6.7.b. PART B - Data and existing literature 
This section of the chapter conducts a detailed analysis of the data to explore and explain 
trends and patterns in relation to existing studies. The analysis begins with the results of a 
Chi-Square test to establish associations between the key variables of the study. 
 
6.7.b. (i). Chi-Square test 
The initial part of this section (questionnaire data) is analysed using a chi-square test. As the 
variables are in Likert scales measures, individual dummy variables are introduced. The 
newly created variables are dichotomised which condense the five-point into (a two-point) 
scale. As suggested by Robbins, there are several ways of coding positive and negative 
responses for Likert scale questions, but choosing one depends on how the researcher codes 
undecided answers (Robbins, 2008, p.177). In this case, besides the undecided or neutral 
responses, the highest-numbered code denotes the highest level of agreement and the lowest 
numbered code is assigned to the lowest level of agreement (Robbins, 2008, p.175). 
The ‘strongly disagree and disagree’ are coded as negative responses and the ‘strongly agree 
and agree’ are positively coded into the new variables. In doing so, neutral responses are 
discarded. The rationale for this approach is to establish and analyse only the positive versus 
the negative responses [with other variables] either as dependent or independent variables.  
Clark and Watson (1995), argued that respondents erroneously chose the neutral response 
when they don’t have a response. Thus, labels like “neither agree nor disagree” and 
“neutral,” denote attitude response options labels such as “undecided,” or “indifferent,” 
which can be interpreted as nonresponse. Again, Alwin and Krosnick (1991) found that 
allowing neutral responses has no effect on the reliability of attitude survey questions.  
Introducing the neutral responses helps to create bound in the responses (i.e. negative on one 
end and positive on the other). For example, in tax education variables (see Q.38 in the 
survey), the key is to determine whether taxpayers in the informal sector believe there is 
adequate tax education to aid their tax compliance decisions. After creating the new 
variables, initial descriptive statistics are undertaken to determine the frequencies used for 




6.7.b. (ii). Tax information and Gender 
A chi-square test for association is conducted between gender and the ‘adequacy’ of tax 
information from the tax authority. All the expected cell frequencies, except one, were less 
than 5, however, a Chi-square test is still possible in this case as this is only 16.7% of the 
cells (Lunsford and Fink, 2010, p.12). The test proved that there exists a statistically 
significant association between gender and availability of tax information, X² (2) = 6.177, p= 
.046. The results of this association test also indicate that there is a moderately strong 
association (see table 6.8) between gender and tax information availability, φ = 0.144, p 
=.046.  
 









The cross-tabulation frequency results also indicate overall that 87.9% of respondents believe 
that there is not adequate tax information from the GRA to help educate them and make 
people compliant (see figure 6.6). Breaking it down, this represents a male population of 
50.0% in relation to the total sample and 37.9% females who believe that there is a lack of 
adequate tax information to aid their tax compliance decisions. This distribution is 
represented in figure 6.6 below. Figure 6.6 also shows that only 9% of males and 3.1% of 







 Value df Asyp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.177 2 .046 
Likelihood Ratio 5.859 2 .053 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.211 1 .137 
N of Valid Cases 296   
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value                           Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by 
Nominal 
Phi .144                                  .046 
Cramer's V .144                                  .046 













6.7.b. (iii). Relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority 
The underlying theory of the study, responsive regulation, focuses on the taxpayer-tax 
authority relationship (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) as the main variable which shapes long 
term voluntary compliance. Results from this section also help in answering research 
question two (i.e. to what extent does the relationship between a taxpayer and the tax 
authority shape voluntary compliance decision of the informal sector taxpayer?) 
Thus, this part, therefore, tries to explore the relationship between the tax officials and the 
taxpayers - which results from both the face-to-face interviews and the field observation 
indicate it’s not cordial. 
To test this relationship, the study adopts an ordinal logistic regression. Specifically, a 
cumulative odds ordinal logistic regression with proportional odds is used. The choice of a 
test to assess this relationship is because the dependent variables are ordinal and the 
independent variables are categorical/nominal/dichotomous.  
The relationship between the taxpayers and the tax officials (Model A); the helpfulness of the 
tax officers/GRA (Model B); and the availability of tax advice (Model C) are measured by 
variables81  contained within the survey instrument. 
Model A is measured with equation 6.1. Equations 6.2 and 6.3 measure models B and C 
respectively. The choice of variables for each model is derived from the literature and 
interview data (refer to interview themes analysed in section 6.1). The models used by Stock, 
                                                          
81 The questions used in equation are abbreviated. See appendix 6 for detailed question and possible responses. 
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(2012, p.167) and Palil (2010, p.259) in their tax morale and tax compliance studies also 
provided a useful guide in constructing these models for the study. 
 
Model A 
PPTOEi = α + β1BPHISi + β2 GENDER i + β3RWTB i + β4AGE i + β5EDUC i + β6YRBUS i + 
β7UNHTP i + ε i                                                                 
           (Equation 6.1) 
Where: 
PPTOEi -  Perception of Past tax officers/office encounter 
BPHISi - Bribe Payment History 
GENDER - Gender of taxpayer 
RWTB i - Received written tax bill directly from the tax office in the past 
AGE i  - Age of taxpayer 
EDUC i - Highest educational qualification held by taxpayer 
YRBUSi -  Number of years in business 
UNHTP - Understands how to pay own taxes 
 
Model B 
POTAHi = α + β1BPHISi + β2YRBUS i + β4AGE i + β5EDUC i + β5GENDER i + 
β5OWNERSHIPi + εi                                                                       
          (Equation 6.2) 
Where: 
POTAHi -  Perception of Tax authority helpfulness 
BPHISi - Bribe Payment History 
YRBUSi - Number of years in business (employment) 
AGE i  - Age of taxpayer 
EDUC i - Highest educational qualification held by taxpayer 
GENDERi - Taxpayer’s gender 







ABTAi  = α + β1TKNGi + β2NOYIBi +  β3PTAVi + β4BUSREGi + β5AGEi +  ε i                                                                       
          (Equation 6.3)  
Where: 
ABTAi  -  Availability of tax advice 
TKNGi  - Tax Knowledge of the taxpayer 
NOYIBi - Number of years in business (employment) 
PTAVi  - Previous Tax authority visit 
AGEi  - Age of taxpayer 
BUSREGi - Taxpayer’s [business] registration status 
 
To ensure that two or more of the predictor variables in each of the regression models are not 
highly correlated (i.e. posing difficulty in determining which variable contributes to the 
explanation of the relationship being tested), independent tests for Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) is carried out for each predictor of the models (A, B and C) above. 
The results indicate that all the tolerance values are >0.1, with the smallest being 0.765, 
which also implies that all the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are within the acceptable 
levels of under 10 (Hair et al., 1995; Kennedy, 1992; Neter et al., 1989). 
The goodness of fit statistic, which helps to determine how well a model fits the data (Field, 
2009) is also used in this section. The deviance goodness of the fit test on ‘model C’ above 
indicates that the model was a good fit to the observed data X² (492) = 355.526, p=1.0.  
Although the Pearson goodness of fit test indicated the opposite X² (492) = 800.007, p<.001, 
but this did not influence the choice of the method since ‘the deviance statistic is generally 
preferred to the Pearson statistic (Collett, 1991)82. 
Finally, the likelihood-ratio test indicates that the final model (302.313) [statistically] 
significantly predicts the independent variables rather than the intercept-only model 
(397.256), X² (10) = 459, p < .001. 
  
                                                          
82 cited in (Hallett, 1999) 
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6.7.b. (iv). Perception of the Previous Encounter with Tax Office 
This section helps throw more light on research questions one83 and four84- it assesses key 
demographic variables and their impact on tax compliance and tests if the current 
presumptive system is the best way or there are better alternatives to taxing the informal 
sector. 
The odds of people who have received a written tax notice in the past, considering their 
previous encounter with visiting tax officers as good (95% CI, .769 to 3.323) has a 
statistically significant effect X² (1) = 9.864, p = .002. 
Similarly, taxpayers who confirmed they fully understand how to pay their taxes also found 
their previous encounter with the visiting tax officers as positive [95% CI, -.3.587 to -285] 
has a significant effect X² (1) = 5.281, p = .022. The test for model A, also found that men 
considered their past encounter to be more positive with the tax officials than females. 
Another interesting finding from the test is that people who have a history of giving bribes to 
visiting tax officers, including those who have only given in once, have had positive previous 
encounters with the tax officers. In addition, the descriptive statistics initially conducted 
indicate that men are 10 times more likely to give bribes than females. This finding, and the 
fact that men consider their relationship with visiting tax officers as good indicates that 
bribery history in which men dominate, could help explain whether or not taxpayers are 
satisfied with their past interaction with visiting tax officers.  
Furthermore, this is consistent with the observations from the field. The constant heated 
interactions between taxpayers and the tax authority observed shows that field officers do not 
improve taxpayers’ knowledge by their field visits. Again, findings from the interview 
suggest that officers visit can breed corruption due to discretionary powers of field officers 
(6.2.a iv). 
 
6.7.b. (v). Perception of Tax Authority Helpfulness  
The test on the perception of tax authority helpfulness by taxpayers also produced some 
interesting findings as it helps in analysing research question two.  
                                                          
83 Are there more effective ways to tax informal sector economic activities in developing countries than are 
currently employed? 




The odds of people who have given in on bribery demands by tax officers in the past, 
considering the tax officers to be helpful, has a strong statistical significance (95% CI, .081 
to 2.552) has a statistically significant effect X² (1) = 4.129, p = .035. Those with a written 
tax notice in the past considering their previous encounter with visiting tax officers as good 
(95% CI, .082 to 2.541) has a statistically significant effect X² (1) = 4.368, p = .037.  Also, a 
statistically significant effect is recorded among people who are in their first year of business 
- X² (1) = 4.226, p = .040; people who operate as sole traders [X² (1) = 8.930, p = .003] as 
well as those who have A level qualifications or above X² (1) = 961.008, p = .000. However, 
there is no statistical significance in terms of gender or the age of taxpayers. These variables 
do not influence how people perceive ‘how helpful’ the tax authority is to the taxpayers. 
Interestingly, and just as the findings in model A above, bribe history proved to be of high 
significance. People who have paid bribes in the past consider the tax officers (GRA) to be 
very helpful.  
 
6.7.b. (vi). Availability of Tax Information 
As observed in chapter four, tax compliance is based on tax knowledge which is influenced 
by tax education/information. This section assesses the availability of tax information to 
influence peoples’ compliance decision, whether by voluntary (moral obligation – research 
question three) or enforced (increased auditing – research question six). Availability of tax 
information/education is further analysed using composite scores in section 6.7.b. (ix).  
Results from the earlier interview data suggest that there is a lack of appropriate85 tax 
information to aid taxpayers’ compliance decisions. 
The perception of taxpayers, with regards to tax advice /information availability regarding 
their tax payment, is also used to model the relationship between the authorities and the 
taxpayers. The results again produce a strong statistical significance for taxpayers who have a 
bribe payment history (95% CI, .013 to 2.634) a statistically significant effect X² (1) = 3.919, 
p = .048. This result thus suggests that taxpayers with a bribe history perceive there’s good 
tax advice/information available to aid their compliance decisions. 
Just as model B above, people who have been in their businesses for one year or below 
reported the availability and ease of tax advice from the tax office regarding payment [Wald 
Chi Sqr = 9.525, p = .002].  The results also indicate that taxpayers who have formally 
                                                          
85 Tax information which is relevant to the informal sector. Interviewers indicate that most tax education tend to 
be generic and are not specific to informal sector taxpayers (i.e. presumptive based tax specific information). 
202 
 
registered their business with the registrar of companies and the tax authority believe that it’s 
easier to get tax advice, p<0.05. Taxpayers who indicated that they fully understand the tax 
system, particularly areas involving their sector/business (including applicable rates) also 
believe there is easily accessible tax advice from the tax authorities [Wald Chi Sqr = 25.319, 
p = .000]. Taxpayers who are 40 years or under also indicated the availability of information, 
and accessibility to tax advice from the tax authority, p<0.05. 
 
6.7.b. (vii). Relationship between tax officials’ visit and tax knowledge. 
Most taxpayers stressed that there is inadequate tax information to aid their compliance 
decisions, and most taxpayers only get to know about their taxes during the field officers 
visit. 
Interestingly, the initial interviews and field visit discussed in the initial part of this chapter 
found that the tax officials do not educate taxpayers during visits to improve the tax 
knowledge of the taxpayers. To explore this finding further, this section conducts a three-way 
variable interaction log-linear analysis to establish the relationship between taxpayers’ 
gender, tax officers’ visits, and tax knowledge. The introduction of gender is to determine if 
[gender] has any statistical significance for the relationship between tax knowledge and the 
officers’ visits. Determining the association involving multivariable, as in this test, could be 
complex, however, Miller et al. (2002, p.194) emphasise the use of log-linear analysis as one 
of the efficient ways to establishing this form of multivariable associations. 
A three-way log-linear analysis was performed to determine the hierarchical unstructured 
model for the association between gender, tax officers’ visits and tax knowledge. The process 
produced a model which includes the main effects and the two-way associations of gender 
versus past officers’ visits, and officers’ visit versus tax knowledge. The likelihood ratio and 




The model produces a good fit to the data with a non-statistically significant difference X² (3) 
= 2.403, p= .493. The residuals (adjusted residuals) are approximately normally distributed 
as shown on the Q-Q plot shown below 














Effect Estimate Std. 
Error 








.127 .080 1.575 .115 -.031 .284 
Gender*TaxRateAwareness .148 .080 1.839 .066 -.010 .306 
Gender*PastOfficerVisit .064 .080 .794 .427 -.094 .222 
TaxRateAwareness*PastOfficerVisit -.021 .080 -.259 .796 -.179 .137 
Gender .211 .080 2.620 .009 .053 .368 
TaxRateAwareness -.423 .080 -5.260 .000 -.581 -.265 
PastOfficerVisit .738 .080 9.172 .000 .580 .896 
 
Table 6.10 -  Parameter estimates for loglinear test   
Effect Partial Association X² (df=1) Sig. 
Gender*TaxKnowledge 13.479 .000 
Gender*PastOfficerVisit 0.007 0.933 
TaxKnowledge*PastOfficerVisit 0.053 0.818 
Gender 8.137 0.004 
Tax Knowledge 43.643 .000 
Past Officer Visit 147.831 .000 





The test also indicates that gender has no statically significant association on the perception 
of past officer visits, X² (1) = 0.007, p= .933. Unsurprisingly, people’s tax knowledge does 
not improve with on-field officers’ visits as the interview results and the field observation 
suggested in the initial part of this chapter. In addition, there is no statistically significant 
association on the result in the test on the two variables - tax knowledge and tax officers visit, 
X² (1) = 0.053, p = .818. This is quite obvious considering the initial findings from the 
interview and the field observation which both suggest that tax officers field visits have no 
direct impact on improving taxpayers’ knowledge to aid their compliance decisions in the 
future.  
 
6.7.b (viii).Preference for presumption taxation    
The degree at which respondents prefer presumptive tax for their informal sector activities 
(which research question four seeks to investigate) is analysed using the scores of the 
preference for a fixed rate (presumptive tax) over formal assessment (tax based on profit). 
The variable ‘profit-based taxation’ was reverse coded on the Likert scare to bring the 
highest score for the composite score86 to 6, and 0 the minimum. The neutral score is 
therefore 3, which measures the response of taxpayers who are neither in favour nor against 
presumptive taxation. A high score suggests a preference for presumptive taxation.  
As shown in figure 6.8 below, the results indicate that there is a slight bias against 
presumption taxation. The mean score of ( x ) = 2.64 is 0.36 below the neutral score, again 
indicating that over half of the respondents are not in favour of the presumption taxation 
approach as it is currently applied. 
This confirms with results from the initial interviews (section 6.3.b. ii) that taxpayers are 
against presumptive taxation due to how it is being administered (i.e. method of determining 




                                                          
86 Presumption Tax preference composite scores [Q.11  and Q.19R] 
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Figure 6.8 Taxpayers’ preference for Presumptive Taxation 








6.7.b. (ix). Tax Education 
Evidence from the literature (see chapter four) suggest that tax education is influenced by 
knowledge of where to seek tax advice, tax education campaigns and the availability of tax 
advisory services to improve understanding of the tax system. 
Results from the interviews data (see section 6.2.a. v) and field observations (section 6.6.7) 
suggest low tax education which could potentially explain the low tax knowledge and the 
subsequent low compliance rate. This section, building on from section 6.7.b. (vi) above, 
measures tax education from these three variables; 
 
Tax education (TEDUCi) is determined by: 
TEDUCi = KWSTA i + CMRTC i + AOTAS i + ε i                                                                       
 
Where;  
KWSTA i   = Knowledge of where to seek tax advice/information 
CMRTC i  = Current tax education/campaigns in the country 
AOTAS i = Availability of tax advice services 
Using the composite scores of the three items (see next section, part C below for a discussion 
on composite scores), with 5 scores each ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (highest), the 
highest level of tax education is placed at 15, and 3 the lowest. The mean score is ( x ) = 5.36 
(also shown by a movement towards the left by the distribution line in figure 6.9) and the 
Standard deviation (σ) = 2.885. The results suggest that taxpayers’ views about the level of 
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tax education run by the authority are low. This supports the interview data (see sections 
6.2a.(v) and 6.3.a.(i)) which also indicates that most people who fail to comply are those who 
believe they do not have the information to aid their compliance decisions. The results are 
represented in figure 6.9 below.  
Assessing the movement of the two graphs, (figure 6.9 and figure 6.11), there is a clear 
indication that the low level of tax education has manifested into the low level of tax 
knowledge exhibited by the respondents. 
 
Figure 6.9 – Current level of tax education 
 
6.7.b. (x). Tax rate awareness (knowledge) and bribe history  
Initial findings from this study suggest that taxpayers who have paid bribes in the past on 
their taxes believe their previous encounters with the field tax officers were good (6.7.b.(iv)), 
the tax authority are very helpful (6.7.b.(v)) and that there is good tax information to aid 
compliance decisions (6.7.b(vi)). These results are different from taxpayers who have no 
history of paying bribes. Therefore, the study further assesses the impact of positive bribe 
history on tax knowledge. Results from this test help in assessing the impact of the 
presumptive based taxation on compliance decisions (research question four) and the impact 
of regular audits on compliance decisions of the informal sector taxpayers (research question 
six) 
An independent sample t-test is considered appropriate for this test.  The independent t-test is 
used to determine the differences between two samples when the samples do not include the 
same participants (Willians et al., 2008, p.140) (in this case those who have bribe history and 
Low        High 
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tax education). It helps to determine if a sample (i.e. those with bribe history) differs from the 
population (Thomas et al, 2011, p.149) 
The independent sample t-test is used to check taxpayers’ bribe history and awareness of tax 
rates (tax knowledge), t (288) =2.39, p=.017 
As predicted, taxpayers who have given in on bribes in the past about their taxes, are found 
to be those who respond positively about knowing how their tax rates are determined. This 
suggests that taxpayers who give in on bribes, may not want to find out how much their tax 
rates are or how their overall tax is determined. This further indicates that high auditing 
probabilities do not necessarily lead to increased compliance when there exists the 
opportunity for bribes.  
 
 
6.7.c. PART C - the responsive regulation theory and the study 
In this section, results from the study are used to inform and explain the concepts underlying 
the responsive regulation theory (here emphasis is on regulatory pillars of sanctions and 
support). 
In this section, composite scores of variables (relevant to explaining these underlying factors) 
are used in the analysis. 
The composite scores approach has been adopted in several recent studies for analysis, for 
example, Ward et al. (2009) used this analysis for a patient education intervention study; De 
Pauw et al. (2009) adopted the approach to evaluate relationships among personality traits, 
self-esteem, and psychopathology among children. White (2005, p.35) used composite scores 
from the world value survey and Transparency International for a study which measures 
people’s confidence in state institutions and the police. In recent tax morale and attitude 
towards tax compliance research, Stock, (2015 p167-8) used composite scores to assess 
support for progressive taxation and perception of tax evasion. 
In using composite variables for analysis, Song et al. (2017) advised that the composite 
should be meaningful with respect to the context and purpose of the study, and that ‘once a 
composite variable has been created and used in analyses, results should be interpreted at the 





6.7.c. (i). Tax Morale 
The responsible individual  
As observed earlier, the responsive regulation theory asserts that there is a responsible 
taxpayer with underlying moral self that can be unearthed by a good regulator which will 
change the behaviours of tax evaders/avoiders self-regulate more effectively in the future. 
This suggests that the pyramid of support is very important in responding to the compliance 
needs of responsible taxpayers who may just ‘need basic support to compy’. The results from 
the interview data support this. Using the survey data, this section tests this premise (i.e. tax 
morale of the informal sector taxpayers) to help answer question three. Thus, the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes by the taxpayers (termed tax morale) and discussed in chapter four is 
measured in this study to help assess the level of such motivations within the informal sector 
operators. Tax morale in this study is measured by 8 variables contained within the survey 
instrument. 
The tax morale is thus measured by: 
LOTM87 = RTRBi + WTDAI i + ATBP i + ITIAA i + OATTP i + RTUTR i + ATTNC i + 
ATCOMP i + ε i                                                                       
Where: 
LOTMi (8-40) -  Level of Tax Morale 
RTRBi  - Right to register a business with Tax authority 
WTDAI i - Willingness to declare all income if required 
ATBP i  - Attitude towards bribe payment 
IAOTCi  - Influence of auditing on tax compliance 
PTPC i  -  Perception of tax payment and citizenship 
RTUTRi - Reaction to unfair tax rate 
ATTNC i -  Attitude towards tax non-compliance 
ATCOMPi              - Paying and Complaining (using right channels to challenge   
unfairness) 
 
                                                          
87 TaxMorale is measured by the following items in the survey [ItsRightToRegister + WillDeclareIncome + 




The composite scores of the 8 variables (above) are used to measure the level of morality 
among the respondents.   
Each variable is ranked 1-5; therefore, a total (composite) score of 8 represents taxpayers 
with the lowest level of tax morale, whilst a score of 40 indicates the highest level of tax 
morale that one can achieve.  
The Mean score for the 8 composite variables is ( x ) = 23.02 and the Standard deviation (σ) 
= 5.287. With the highest possible tax morale rate of 40 (as per the scores), a mean of 23.02 
indicates that the respondents have a high88 level of tax morale. The results suggest that the 
majority of the taxpayers will comply voluntarily – caeteris paribus. In addition, the 
respondents have negative attitude towards tax non-compliance, and giving bribes to tax 
officials regarding their taxes. The results also show that the taxpayers will declare incomes 
if the tax systems require that and are willing to register with the tax authority. 
The results of the composite scores are also plotted in a histogram and it’s shown in figure 
6.10 below. The concentration of the bars towards the high end of the morale level (40) 
indicates that the level of tax morale among the respondents is high.   
  




                                                          
88 Considering score of 8 represents taxpayers with the lowest level of tax morale, 23.02 thus represents a high 
score relative to the lowest expected score. 
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The results in this section also support the findings from the initial interview conducted 
among the informal sector operators (section 6.2a.(i)) where it emerged that moral obligation 
was the main determinant for the current tax compliance level. 
 
6.7.c. (ii). Tax Knowledge 
Taxpayers’ capacity  
Responsive regulation deemphasizes threats and promotes support and regulatees capacity 
building. Responsive regulation asserts that an empowered taxpayer (i.e. informed taxpayers) 
will voluntarily take their responsibilities. Again, the pyramid of support, therefore, believes 
that education to improve tax knowledge is crucial to improving long term voluntary 
compliance Taxpayer capacity is measured by tax knowledge and tax education (see detail 
discussion in 6.4.2). 
Tax Knowledge (TKNWGi)
89  is also measured using the aggregate scores from 3 items 
which measure taxpayers’ understanding of ‘how to pay’ taxes, ‘when to pay’, and 
understanding of own tax rate’ / liability is determined. The mean scores ( x ) = 5.62 and the 
Standard deviation (σ) = 3.364. 
Figure 6.11 – Tax Knowledge 
       
                                                          
89 TaxKnowledge1=HowToPay + WhenToPay + UnderstandOwnTax. 
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The level of tax knowledge, as shown above, is measured out of 15. Therefore, the most 
knowledgeable taxpayers achieved a score of 15, whilst the least knowledgeable ones get 3.  
The average informal sector taxpayer achieves 5.62, an extremely low score, which again 
conforms with the evidence described above on the low level of tax education in the country 
(see sections 6.2a.(v), 6.3.a.(i), 6.6.7.) The low mean score suggests that the average taxpayer 
in the informal sector has a very limited understanding of the tax system. As shown in figure 
6.11, with the curve measuring the distribution of the tax knowledge towards the left, it 
indicates majority of the taxpayers have very limited understanding of ‘how’, ‘when’ to pay 
their taxes, and above all where they pay them; they do so in most instances without 
understanding of how their rates/liability are determined. 
Furthermore, to assess the impact of gender on tax knowledge, Mann Whitney and Wilcoxon 
tests are used. The results indicate that gender has no significance on the level of tax 
knowledge among the informal sector operators (p =.190, z =-1.312).   
Finally, to assess the impact of auditing on the tax knowledge of taxpayers, Mann Whitney 
and Wilcoxon tests were conducted using the scores from tax knowledge items. Results from 
Mann Whitney and Wilcoxon tests suggest that field tax officers’ visits /audits have no 
impact on tax knowledge (p =.275, z =-1.092).   
 
 
6.7.c. (iii). Taxpayers and tax authority relationship 
Trust in Authority 
Central to responsive regulation theory is regulates trust in authority. It carries the notion that 
trust in authority automatically leads to compliance.  It, therefore, places responsibility on the 
authority for a conscious effort to maintain such a relationship (Demin, 2018, p.17). Also, 
evidence from the study on Australia’s informal economy (Braithwaite, 2003) points out that 
where taxpayers trust the system, compliance improved accordingly. 
Evidence from literature and the initial interviews conducted among informal sector 
operators suggest that one possible explanation of tax noncompliance in the sector is the 
perception operators of the sector hold about the tax authorities. This perception is developed 
further in this section and is measured with 4 items, each with a score of 1-5.  On each item, 
5 is the highest (positive) perception and 1 the lowest (negative) perception towards the tax 
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authority. Therefore 20 represents the highest and most positive perception, and 4 the lowest, 
and strong negative perception. 
 
Where; 
 POTA90i = TRUi + GRAHELPi + TAXADVi+DEFPAYi + ε i 
POTAi   - Perception of tax authority  
TRUi   - Tax revenue usage 
GRAHELPi  - How easy to deal with the tax authority 
TAXADVi - Availability of and access to tax advice 
DEFPAYi   - Tax authority’s willingness to accept deferred payments in difficult 
times 
 
The perception of taxpayers of the tax authority is again measured by the composite scores of 
the survey question; perception of tax revenue usage, how easy it is for the taxpayers to deal 
with the tax authority, availability, and ease of access to tax advice, and the willingness of 
the tax authority to accept deferred payments in periods of genuine financial difficulties. The 
deferment of payment is added to the variables to determine the overall perception because 
since presumption taxation is based on a fixed amount and not on profit, there could be 
situations when the taxpayer does not have the means to pay. Also, this issue came up 
repeatedly during the interview stages of the data collection, hence the need to include it in 
this model. The results from the interview suggest that taxpayers have very limited trust in 
the tax authority especially in areas of tax revenue usage which influence compliance 
decisions (section 6.3.a.ii and 6.3.a.iii, and 6.4.1) same as reported in the results of the 








                                                          




Figure 6.12 Perception towards tax authority 
 
   
 
A higher score indicates a positive perception of the tax authority.  The test produced a mean 
score of ( x ) = 7.91 and Standard deviation (σ) = 3.265. The mean (7.91) shows that there are 
a large number of people who have the lowest possible perception (4) score. 
Thus, the results indicate that a majority of taxpayers have a negative perception of the tax 
authority, which could affect compliance decisions. This is consistent with the interview 
results presented in sections (6.2a.(viii), (6.3.a.(ii)), and (6.7.c.(iii)). A high negative 
perception of the tax authority confirms the hostile relationship between the two parties as 
indicated in the interviews and the field observations. As suggested by responsive regulation 
theory, such relationships will undoubtedly influence the sector operators’ compliance 
decisions (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001). 
 
6.8.0. Summary 
The chapter analysed data from interviews, surveys and field studies to assess factors 
influencing compliance decisions by taxpayers in the informal sector. 
The initial part of the chapter assessed the compliance behaviour of the informal sector 
taxpayers using interviews. The interview results suggest that moral obligation is the highest 
determining factor for tax compliance decisions by informal sector operators.  
- Neg         Pos + 
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Results from the survey data also show that the operators in the informal sector have high tax 
morale, but low tax knowledge and a negative perception of the tax authority, which could in 
part explain the low compliance rate in the sector. 
The results further suggest that overall, in line with existing literature; there are numerous 
factors which influence the compliance decisions of the informal sector taxpayer. The results 
of this chapter are further presented in the next chapter (discussion chapter) where a detailed 
analysis is conducted on the key factors influencing tax compliance decisions in line with 



















7.0. Introduction   
This chapter discusses the results of the study as presented in chapter six, in relation to the 
existing literature. This section also uses underlying theory: Responsive Regulation Theory, 
to help explain the practices within the tax environment of the informal sector in Ghana. This 
discussion is based on the objectives of the study, which is to explore the design of the 
taxation for the informal sector in a developing country context.   
The discussion is presented in three parts - the first section, part A, presents key findings of 
this study, and part B discusses the research questions in relation to the findings and the 
analysis presented in the previous chapter. Based on the discussions of the first two sections 
and the study results presented in chapter six, part C provides an analysis of the practical 
application of the responsive regulation theory within the Ghanaian informal sector based on 
the various compliance postures identified in the study. 
The theoretical position of this study is anchored within the broader (individual) 
compliance decision making theories of taxation as discussed in chapter four. Theories and 
models that look into factors influencing an individual’s compliance decision making, in 
particular, are consulted in the course of the study (see chapter four). Although these 
theories were designed mainly to test formal tax systems, there they assess tax compliance 
from different perspectives. For instance, the findings from this study find some evidence 
for the utility theory - taxpayers in the informal sector are influenced by auditing 
probabilities and fines (see section 6.2a.(ii)). A high auditing probability and heavy fines 
evoke compliance. However, the results further suggest that where there are possibilities 
for taxpayers to pay bribes; auditing and fines become less effective (section 6.7.b.(x)). 
Also, the theory of reasoned action assumes that a taxpayer’s compliance decision is the 
product of perceived outcomes and controls and ignores situations where people comply 
without controls. If the assumption in this theory holds, then the operators of the informal 
sector in developing countries operating in an environment with limited possibilities of 
detection should not be paying at all (see chapter two on informal sector tax challenges). 
Although the results presented in chapter six, indicate that the assumptions in the Theory 
of Reasoned Action are evident within the informal sector context. 
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Furthermore, the psychological contract theory has helped explained some tax compliance 
behaviours in the informal sector. This study found that social contract is a determinant of 
tax non/compliance. For example, it was found that taxpayers will voluntarily comply with 
their taxes if there are visible benefits of tax payment (sections 6.2a.(viii) and 6.3.a.(v)). 
The slippery slope model which measures compliance on a tax authority’s power and trust 
offers some interesting insight into the findings of this study too. This power which is 
assumed to be an antagonistic environment evokes enforced compliance in the informal 
sector through regular audits and heavy fines (section see section 6.2a.(ii)), although power 
(in terms of the ability to detect noncompliance was reported as weak (see chapter six). 
Contrary to power, trust which relates to a synergistic climate to promote voluntary 
compliance was found to be lacking. Heavy corruption, poor past tax authority interactions, 
lack of visible benefits of tax payments, and bureaucracy and system complexities (6.3.a.(iv)) 
have manifested into a low trust in the authority, therefore affecting voluntary tax compliance 
among informal sector operators. 
 
Although these theories and models helped in shaping this study, and have provided some 
interesting insights, as discussed in chapter four, they do not sit comfortably within the 
environment and the context of this study, and as such offer only limited guidance in 
explaining the study results as outlined above, partly because this is an exploratory study. 
As discussed in chapter four, this study focuses more directly on responsive regulation theory 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) to assess compliance decisions, by exploring how the 
regulatory approaches shape the relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority in 
the informal sector and how this interplay manifests into tax compliance/non-compliance.  
 
7.1. Part A – Key findings from this study. 
This section presents the key findings of the study. This then informs the discussions on the 
research questions. 
7.1.1. Moral Obligation 
Results from the study indicate that moral obligation emerged as the most influential 
(determinant factor) for current tax compliance among the informal sector operators (see 
section 6.2a.(i) and 6.7.c.(i).  and figure 6.10). The results further suggest that just as the 
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formal sector, informal sector taxpayers do comply with their tax obligation because of their 
perceived moral obligation as citizens. Although, there are taxpayers who were not compliant 
(despite results classifying them as having high tax morale) because there was no evidence of 
tax revenue usage. It is therefore important for the tax authorities to have a firm view of the 
informal sector and their compliance needs, so effective programmes could be implemented 
to promote voluntary compliance. 
This finding supports the compliance stance of the responsive regulatory theory which states 
that ‘a tax authority that actively engages the democratic will of the people, may not need 
coercion to win compliance’ although taxpayers must appreciate that there exist punitive 
measures to deal with dissident taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2007, p.5). Therefore, an open, 
responsible and transparent tax revenue usage to ensure the visible benefits of tax payment, 
intensive appropriate tax education, consistent billing, and open and transparent tax liability 
assessment could all contribute greatly to ensuring voluntary compliance. 
 
7.1.2. The ‘Past Tax Interaction Influence’ (PTII) 
Taxpayers do come into contact91 with the tax authority in various forms in the course of 
conducting their business (Whait, 2012, p.110), and the results from the study suggest that 
compliance decisions are in part shaped by the experience of such interactions. This is 
consistent with responsive regulation’s assertion that compliance is achieved through trust. 
The theory asserts that a positive relationship creates voluntary compliance without the need 
to resort to enforced measures.  Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), stressed that the relationship 
between the regulatees (taxpayers) and the regulator (tax authority) plays a vital role in tax 
compliance. It is based on the premise that the regulator has the authority to own up to its 
administrative responsibilities and explore different ways to manage this relationship 
This interaction, defined in this study as the product of tax officer’s support, cooperation, 
knowledge, fairness and attitude towards the taxpayer/situation and the taxpayer’s 
perception/response to the officer or the situation is particularly important especially for new 
taxpayers and those with weak tax knowledge (see section 6.3.b.(i)).  
The results from this study (see section 6.3.b.(i)) suggest that taxpayers who have had past 
interaction with the tax authority are likely to comply if the outcome of such interaction was 
positive. Also, new taxpayers who experience a positive first interaction are more likely to 
                                                          
91 This interaction may be in the form of tax collection, auditing, or for support 
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comply in the future voluntarily. Taxpayers not likely to comply after an interaction, are 
those who perceive the (field) tax officers as being dishonest, insensitive to their plights92, 
rude or those who question the integrity of the collection process. Therefore, to improve 
voluntary tax compliance in the informal sector, the tax authority needs to ensure that trust is 
improved among the sector operators. There should be clear indices for determining tax 
liabilities and tax collection officers must apply these indices fairly. In addition, tax revenue 
should be put to good use in order to ensure visible benefits of tax payment. One way to 
ensure the visible benefits of tax payment is by earmarking tax revenue. By earmarking the 
tax revenue for specific projects (or expenditure) the tax authority is committed to ensuring 
that the tax revenue is used on projects and areas beneficial to taxpayers. This will 
subsequently build trust and improve voluntary compliance. Also, those who default on tax 
obligations must be openly punished to serve as a deterrent to future tax evaders. 
The findings indicate that the relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authority is 
generally poor. As the informal sector taxes are mostly administered using tax collection 
officers, as in the case of Ghana, a cordial interaction between the field tax officers (tax 
collectors) and the taxpayers will have a greater influence on compliance decisions. 
In some instances, people are reluctant to pay because they do not see the tax officers as 
honest and question the integrity of the collection process, especially record-keeping. 
Therefore, the cultivation of a more professional and structured relationship between the field 
officers and taxpayers could make the difference between higher or lower levels of 
compliance and evasion. As taxpayers complain of inconsistent treatment, double taxation, 
and rude tax officials, as indicated in this study, the long-term compliance decisions will be 
affected as a result. 
Another interesting finding (see section 6.7.b. (x). and 6.7.b. (v)) is that people who have a 
history of giving bribes found their encounter with tax officers good. Therefore, to design an 
effective tax system for the informal sector, the tax authorities need to appreciate the impact 
of bribery on compliance decisions and adopt strategies that will mitigate this. For example, 
rotating tax collection officers could help reduce the incidence of bribery, as it’s likely that 
such (bribery) practices stem from long-term established relationships between taxpayers and 
tax officers. 
                                                          




The results from the field observation (section 6.6 and table 6.2) demonstrate the significance 
of the interaction between the taxpayers and the tax officers. For example, during the field 
trip, the tax officers did not always apply the same treatment for taxpayers who were in the 
same situation (non-compliance). There were instances of (unnecessary) heated exchanges 
and personal confrontations. It was noted that most of these situations tend to be with 
taxpayers who asked the ‘why, how, when and what’ questions, possibly to enrich their tax 
knowledge in what were not unreasonable ways. Interestingly, the officers responded in 
diverse ways, and mostly in an aggressive manner. The field officers, based on the evidence 
from the field trip, adopted the ‘cops and robbers tactic in promoting compliance (Kirchler, 
2007). Such actions will not promote long-term voluntary compliance. Although these 
actions could deter tax avoiders, the balance has to be right in order not to discourage honest 
taxpayers. Officers must, therefore, be educated to understand which taxpayers require 
additional information to comply and to distinguish those who are asking for this as a way to 
attempt to avoid their tax obligations. In these instances, adopting the responsive regulation 
model as applied by the ATO may be a useful strategy (see detail discussion in four). 
 
7.1.3. Tax revenue usage 
The perception of government spending of tax revenue has a profound impact on taxpayers’ 
compliance decisions. Existing studies suggest that if governments spend tax revenue 
judiciously; voluntary tax compliance is positively affected (Palil, 2010, p.188; Kirchler and 
Wahl, 2010). 
Tax revenue usage has a direct relationship with tax compliance decisions among the 
informal sector operators, based on the findings of this study (sections 6.3.a.(ii) and 
6.3.a.(v)). Taxpayers stressed the importance of the perception they hold about the tax 
revenue usage on their compliance decisions. The findings indicate that informal sector 
taxpayers want direct [visible] benefits for paying taxes, such as the provision of basic 
amenities e.g. quality drinking water, street lighting, roads, sanitation etc. The absence of 
these visible benefits increases tax non-compliance. The perception that revenue is easily 
squandered and that the perpetrators go unchallenged is a big contributor to the non-
compliance decisions as the findings suggest. In general, over two-thirds of taxpayers will 
comply voluntarily and the tax authority will thus spend less on monitoring if the revenue 
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usage is transparent and the people who embezzle tax revenues are punished appropriately 
and openly. Tax authorities in developing countries, therefore, need to ensure that there are 
appropriate checks in place to ensure that tax officers do not embezzle tax revenues, and 
where they do, they are visibly punished to serve as a deterrent. In addition, tax revenue 
spending could be earmarked to ensure the transparency of its use. Citizens will be better 
placed to openly assess how their money is being used. Although the main challenge facing 
most developing countries is that as taxes are pulled together into a consolidated account, 
where the greater part goes into debt servicing, the earmarking of tax revenue becomes 
difficult. 
 
7.1.4. Compliance is through punitive measures – A wishful thinking 
Evidence from previous studies indicates that a lack of reliable data (Tanzarn, 2008), the 
variable nature of informal sector activities (Aryee, 2007), and operators’ deliberate attempts 
to conceal their activities (Russell, 2010) for the purpose of evading taxes, (Andreoni et al., 
1998; Feige, 1979) make it difficult to design a tax system which effectively and efficiently 
captures taxable economic activities (Terkper, 2003) within the informal economy. The 
results from the face-to-face interviews undertaken with tax officials are consistent with 
previous studies. This study found (based on tax officials’ accounts) that the main challenge 
to taxing the informal sector more effectively lies in the difficulty of extracting information 
from informal sector participants. The tax authority has a very limited understanding of the 
informal sector taxpayers’ compliance needs since the data collected for tax system design is 
not usually done in an organised fashion. During the interviews (see chapter six), the tax 
officials stated that the informal sector taxpayers are hugely involved during the design 
phases of taxes specific to the sector. The tax officials indicated that taxpayer representatives 
are selected and debated upon and vote for any tax before it is imposed. However, there was 
no information on who qualifies for selection to attend those discussions (apart from the 
assemblymen/assemblywomen), and when further questions were asked, officers could not 
give consistent answers regarding the population selected to partake in taxation issues 
affecting the informal sector. For example, is it the same individuals who are always 
selected? What business(s) /individuals qualify for selection? What location, income level, 
gender or age groups are selected? How independent and transparent is the selection process? 
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How free is the discussion and voting process? What are the consequences for a taxpayer 
saying no?  
The officers who took part in the interviews are not involved in this process and therefore 
could not give clear answers. 
Lack of evidence to support these key questions makes it difficult to measure the degree of 
involvement of the informal sector operators regarding the issues relevant to them.  
Again, this study found the ‘chicken-or-the-egg’ dichotomy in relation to the ‘lack of 
information’ for taxing the informal sector. The results of the face-to-face interviews with the 
informal sector operators suggest that a lack of data about taxpayers is equally the 
responsibility of the tax authorities. The findings point out that the section of taxpayers who 
have not been complying with their tax obligations attribute this to the lack of information 
that is specific to their sector or nature of the activity. This confirms with the responsive 
regulation theory’s assumption that there are taxpayers who want to do the right thing, or try 
to comply, but do not always succeed, so the approach is to make compliance easy, or to 
assist them to comply using the pyramid of support (see Braithwaite et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 
2008; Healy, 2011; Ivec and Braithwaite, 2015; Davidson, 2016). It is on this premise that 
responsive regulation deemphasizes threats, and instead advocates for support and regulatees 
capacity building (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p.4). 
Again, this study found that the tax authority mainly relies on enforced compliance 
approaches when taxing informal sector operators. There is minimal effort from the tax 
authority to discover and capture useful information to help with policy design for the sector 
to improve voluntary compliance. The strategy is to create compliance through a punitive 
deterring measure, as a result, the relationship has been mainly the ‘cops versus robbers’ 
approach as identified by Kirchler (2007, p.188). This finding supports the previous work by 
Chiumya (2006) that tax authorities usually find the informal sector unprofitable to tax and as 
a result do not usually invest enough resources there to gain a better understanding of it. This 
is despite evidence that the sector’s information needs are different and that using the same 
taxing strategies as the formal sector tends to fail (Aryee, 2007). 
Thus, the broader [and often loose] classification of businesses for tax purposes and the lack 
of appropriate and targeted educational campaigns for the informal sector contribute to low 
tax compliance rates. Also, the tax authorities in developing countries, need to design 
appropriate and more representative data collection approaches for the informal sector to 
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have a better understanding of the sector and its taxpayers’ needs for effective tax policy 
design. 
 
7.1.5.  The two dimensions of informality 
Prior literature has attempted to define the sector, as per the definitions given in chapter two 
– the definitions given are usually based on the nature and the aims of the study being 
conducted.  
The findings from this study identify the two main informal sector operators/activities as 
opposed to the three schools of thoughts (theories) discussed in chapter two – the dualists, 
structuralists and the legalists. These are categorised as A and B operators in this study (table 
7.1) and explained below.  
 
Table 7.1 Type of informal sector operators/activities   
Cat A. Fully informal 
Cat B. Partially informal 
Purely informal/non-registered 
individuals and businesses. 
Their main source of income is 
from the informal sector 
e.g. most shoemakers, and street 
hawkers (they tend not to have 
fixed location for their activity) 
Registered [formal] business with arrangements to 
operate in the informal sector. (i.e. formal 
businesses operating a branch within the informal 
market). e.g. registered businesses employing 
people to sell their products in the informal market 
(Mostly local drug producers and traditional 
healers) 
 This category also includes formally employed 
individuals undertaking undeclared jobs in addition 
to their formal employment  
 
7.1.5a. Category A – Fully informal 
These are the activities of individuals and businesses who operate mainly in the informal 
sector. These are the operators described in chapter two as the dualists.  They operate in the 
informal sector mainly for their survival needs. There was no evidence from the study to 
suggest that they engage in the informal sector because of regulations in the formal sector as 
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suggested by the legalists, or that they are subordinates to formal sector operators as in the 
case of the structuralist view. Survival needs and a lack of opportunities in the formal sector 
(for example lack of skills to get jobs in the formal sector) drive these operators to engage in 
the informal sector.  
 
7.1.5.b. Category B – Partially informal 
Category B comprises of businesses which are fully registered and known to the tax 
authorities. However, they undertake extra activities, mainly by employing individuals who 
sell products and deliver services on their behalf under informal arrangements, therefore 
concealing the proceeds from taxes. This may also include individuals who are employed in 
the formal sector and are subject to PAYE taxes, but with some part-time engagement (for 
example part-time jobs or businesses) in the informal sector. This finding supports both the 
structuralist’s and the legalists’ views of the informal sector proposed by the ILO (1972), 
(see chapter two). For example, from the structuralists’ stance, the informal economy is 
subordinated to the formal economy. Similarly, the legalists assert that informal economy 
operation is sometimes the rational response by businesses to over-regulation, high tax 
burdens, unnecessary bureaucracy and corruption (De Soto, 1990; Kirchler, 2007). The 
results from the study indicate that high tax rates and corruption are the two most influential 
factors influencing decisions to operate in the informal sector despite individuals having 
formal sector engagement.  
The tax compliance behaviours of formal sector workers (or business owners) operating in 
the informal sector was found to be the lowest amongst all the categories of taxpayers 
interviewed. From the findings (see sections 6.3.ai; 6.3.a.iv; 6.3.a.vii), almost all the 
operators interviewed who engage in these practices, do not pay taxes on the extra incomes 
from the informal operations. Some of the reasons provided to justify the non-compliance are 
that paying taxes in the second activity constitutes double taxation. The high tax rate also 
influences voluntary compliance decisions. For example, the current tax-free amount 
(Personal Allowance) is too small (i.e. too high a tax rate on PAYE) from the main 
employment, therefore there’s a ‘sense’ for concealing the income from the informal sector 





7.1.6. Tax Education and Tax Knowledge 
This study assesses the effectiveness of the educational campaigns run by the tax authority on 
the tax knowledge of taxpayers. Tax education, in this case, is measured by the perception of 
the taxpayers regarding the tax authority’s informative and reminder campaigns, and 
knowledge is then assessed by the taxpayers’ understanding of their tax obligations 
concerning what, why, when, how and where to pay. 
The findings from this study point out that most informal sector operators believe the tax 
authorities present messages which are not relevant to their businesses. Thus, most taxpayers 
believe that tax education message content in the country are usually directed towards the 
formal sector /big businesses. Those who comply without any tax education, do so because of 
the actions of the enforcement officers or their moral obligation to do so.  
Unsurprisingly, some qualifying93 taxpayers have never paid any taxes at all despite having 
businesses which have turnovers as high as some businesses in the formal sector. Although 
some did express their desire to comply, an appropriate tax education to aid compliance 
decisions is lacking, and the taxpayers are, therefore, not complying as a result. 
The interview results from the tax officers appear to potentially contradict the results of the 
sector operators’ as the officers claimed to carry on campaigns targeted at the informal sector 
taxpayers consistently through a public address (PA) system on vans which go around and 
give messages, including conveying the messages in different languages alongside regular 
radio campaigns (section 6.5.6). However, few taxpayers confirm this and stated that these 
campaigns are mainly run through a few streets, which are within the market areas / ring 
roads, and most importantly, are carried out within the major cities. Taxpayers not located in 
these areas do not receive any tailored tax information. To improve tax compliance, 
substantial tax education and an easing of access to tax information to raise tax knowledge 
are required. The tax authorities must adopt other mediums such as the radio and TV to 
broadcast more ‘targeted’ messages to the informal sector. 
One major issue linked to tax education is that almost all the taxpayers interviewed were not 
aware of how their tax rates are arrived at. The findings from the field observations also 
suggest that officers do not offer proper education to taxpayers. In this case, not only is tax 
education required to explain to people about the benefit of tax payment but making the 
parameters used for determining tax rates also accessible to taxpayers could be equally 
                                                          




useful. Tax officers, particularly those in the field, should be trained to have sufficient 
knowledge to explain to taxpayers about how these indices are used to determine tax 
liabilities. 
Furthermore, the results from the questionnaire data are consistent with both the interview 
and field observation findings, that the presence of the field officers does not improve the tax 
knowledge of taxpayers. 
The overall tax knowledge of all the study participants could be graded as ‘very weak’. Most 
taxpayers were unable to explain the very basic details of the tax system that applies to their 
situation. 
The GRA website, which promises to be the information hub for the country’s taxpayers, has 
very limited useful information for the informal sector. Therefore, updating the website with 
relevant and up to date information could help educate people about their taxes and how they 
are determined, which may subsequently raise compliance levels as people become aware of 
why, what, how and when to pay their taxes. Thus, with the Ghanaian informal sector 
estimated to be about 80% of the total economic activities in the country (GSS, 2012), the 
government needs to ensure that the tax education for this sector is specific and the content of 
the messages is relevant to the sector operators. Information and documents explaining how 
the presumption tax rates are determined must equally be made available and easily 
accessible to improve voluntary compliance. 
 
7.1.7. Auditing 
The debate surrounding the impact of tax auditing on compliance decisions has been raging 
for years. However, the influences of perceived audit probabilities and prior audit encounters 
[with tax authorities] on tax compliance decisions have been somewhat labyrinthine. Some 
studies have found that there is a positive relationship between auditing and tax evasion 
whilst other report negative impact (see chapter four). 
Results from this study (section 6.2a.(ii)) indicate that the possibility of being audited 
(detected) and the severity of the fines imposed, influence the compliance decisions of those 
operating in the informal sector, which appear to be the same way as the examples reported 
in studies involving formal sector operators. However, the results further suggest that if fines 
are not high, or if there exists an opportunity to pay bribes to inspectors, taxpayers would 
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rather pay their way out than comply, which weakens the argument that high auditing 
probabilities evoke voluntary compliance. 
Ghana currently employs several severe punitive measures for non-compliance, which for 
small businesses and individual includes shop lockdown/closure, stock seizure, taking over 
debtors’ accounts, and the reselling of goods to defray tax liabilities. The results from this 
study (sections 6.2a. (ii)) indicate that harsh penalties could be extremely effective. The 
results also suggest that auditing (and associated punishments such as closing shops) creates 
potential stigmatisation of customers and business partners during heated interactions with 
auditors/inspectors. Business owners who do not want to face the consequences of such 
stigmatisation are thus likely to comply.  
This suggests that tax policymakers need to ensure that there are effective auditing 
mechanisms in place within the informal sector. Such audits not only act as deterrent 
themselves but also should be backed by visible deterring penalties to be even more 
effective. This is supported by the responsive regulation theory which is built on the premise 
that it’s good to trust taxpayers and support them, however, taxpayers also want officers to 
keep distrustful enforcement strategies in place to deal with others who cannot always be 
trusted. Taxpayers need to know that ‘there are strong and trusted institutional mechanisms in 
place to deal with those who cheat builds community confidence and the legitimacy of the 
tax system’ (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001, p.7) 
 
7.1.8. Compliance Process 
In this study (see section 6.2a.(iv)), the compliance process is defined to include the actual 
financial cost, the physical time for filing returns and the psychological (thoughts) of the tax 
burden. 
As seen in section 6.2a.(ix), the financial cost of compliance among the informal sector 
operators is very low in Ghana, which is one of the current tax compliance determinants in 
the sector. Tax payment is through field officers who circulate for tax collection/inspection, 
although there are options to pay at designated tax offices.  
Although the findings suggest that the compliance process, to some extent, influences tax 
payment decisions, some showed concern about paying taxes through field tax officers. As 
the current process involves negotiations, taxpayers question the ‘fairness’ of the system, due 
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to the possibility of giving special treatment to certain taxpayers or those with strong 
negotiation skills (section 6.3.b.(ii)). All the taxpayers interviewed, confirmed to have 
negotiated for lower tax rates, at least once in the course of operation. This again raises a 
concern about trust in the system. Therefore, the intuitive approach (for tax bills) currently 
being used widely by tax officers for the informal sector must cease, and a formal assessment 
process must be followed. Thus, to give taxpayers a guarantee of a fair tax rate and equal 
treatment, the indices used to calculate the presumptive taxes must be clearly explained and 
information on these must be made easily available to the taxpayers. Such information could 
be published on the GRA websites (which has virtually no information on these presumptive 
taxes) and at the local tax offices. Copies of the mode of assessment could also be given to 
the taxpayers. In this case, the taxpayers, by nature of their activity can assess their 
rates/liabilities. Alternatively, a ‘self-assessed’ presumptive taxes could be implemented. 
With this approach, taxpayers, by nature of their activities and the published sets of factors 
for determining the tax liability, can complete a simplified self-assessment tax return. 
However, this may not apply to all businesses or individuals, for example, those who subject 
to the weekly, monthly or quarterly tax stamps.  
 
7.1.9. Low Tax rate 
The low level of the presumptive tax rate in Ghana influences the payment decisions of the 
informal sector operators. This is consistent with previous studies in the formal sector 
(Clotfelter, 1983; Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Ivanova et al., 2005; Takats and Papp, 2008; 
Matthews, 2011). The study results (section 8.2a.(ix)) show that some taxpayers will comply 
voluntarily with low tax rates. This is likely to give misleading information on the true tax 
compliance behaviour in the informal sector. This is because taxpayers ranked the low tax 
rate higher [in terms of factors influencing their compliance decisions] than other tax 
compliance variables such as education and tax knowledge, or auditing which have in the 
past received greater attention among researchers and policymakers. However, there are also 
businesses where a higher tax rate will lead to evasion or being completely out of business. 
The low tax rates must be maintained especially for such small businesses to keep them in 
the tax net and to make them compliant. Also, by including these small taxpayers, it will 
promote vertical equity as everyone will be contributing to state-building.  
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7.1.10. Study findings summary 
Evidence from this section confirms that presumptive taxation as currently used in the 
informal sector, will ultimately to a large extent depend on field tax officers being successful. 
It is therefore crucial that the tax authorities, in designing informal sector taxation, 
understand the impact of human interactions on tax compliance. Officers must be properly 
trained to be firm and also fair when dealing with taxpayers to ensure that, they leave a 
positive experience with taxpayers. The issue of using ‘key contacts’ in the office to evade or 
avoid taxes must be crucially looked into. Field officers must be given appropriate channels 
to report such issues of senior figures influencing tax payments. For instance, 
whistleblowing, and other forms of checks must be put in place to ensure the work of field 
officers is not undermined by the influence of corrupt managers in the tax offices. 
Considering the size and the nature of economic activities in Ghana’s informal sector (see 
chapter three), the government must give it a serious attention to be able to tap the huge 
revenue potential there. The recent introduction of the Taxpayers’ Identification Numbering 
(TIN) system, where everyone needs the TIN to be able to access most government services 
is a good initiative, however, this approach on its own will not achieve voluntary tax 
compliance in the informal sector. For example, an individual can register for the TIN, but 
may not pay any taxes and will still be able to access such services. The key objective for the 
tax authority to pursue is sustained voluntary tax compliance in the sector. As the evidence 
presented in chapter six suggests, voluntary tax compliance in the sector is possible through 
actions which impact the overall tax environment, for example, influencing the values and 
beliefs, promoting education and awareness, and building trust and creating a supportive 
environment for taxpayers. More specifically, the following factors could help promote 
voluntary tax compliance in the informal sector; 
• good and targeted tax education 
• fair, transparent and consistent billing system 
• doing visible things with the tax revenue, especially what benefits the informal sector 
taxpayer 
• enhancing taxpayer and tax authority relationships – a more customer service 
approach to dealing with taxpayers. 
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• doing more to publicize what the tax authority already does with tax revenue 
• openly punishing tax evaders and state officials who embezzle tax revenue etc… 
These factors, among others, will help create trust with the tax authority which will 
subsequently manifest into voluntary compliance. 
The next section uses these findings, the underlying theory, and existing literature to find 
answers to the research questions.  
 
7.2. Part B – Research questions 
This section presents the research questions designed for the research in relation to the 
existing literature and discusses the implications of the findings from the study. 
7.2.1. RQ1  
Are there more effective ways to tax informal economic activities in developing countries 
than are currently employed? 
Results from the study indicate that the current taxing strategies for the informal sector have 
a number of challenges, and where they appear to be effective, is mainly due to high auditing 
rates, and a low tax rate which people find ‘too small not to pay or challenge’ (section 
6.2a.(ix)). 
There are clear indications from the results presented in this study that presumptive taxation, 
for example, lump-sum tax is very unpopular among informal sector taxpayers, even though 
this is the most widely used mechanism to tax the informal sector (Engelschalk, 2005, p.5). 
This study shows that most taxpayers do not approve of the current system partly due to the 
high degree of the power vested in the collection officers who tend to abuse such powers by 
offering favourable treatments to certain taxpayers.  
In addition, Ghana operates a very complex tax system and does not define clear stages for 
moving taxpayers across to a formal or a different segment of the presumptive tax system 
(see chapter six). In most cases, turnover is used as the basis of moving taxpayers from 
presumptive taxation, and professional businesses that could easily keep books and may want 
to voluntarily opt for self-assessment, for example, are not allowed to do so.  
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The resulting impacts are that taxpayers who feel their rates are unfair tend to pay bribes to 
avoid or evade the tax payment completely.  
Most existing strategies of taxing the informal sector adopt the ‘cops and robbers’ approach 
(see discussion in chapter four), by using more punitive and harsh deterrent mechanisms to 
force compliance. With these strategies, there is little or no consideration of the taxpayer 
when designing the approaches. This means that the tax authority misses vital taxpayer 
group-specific characteristics that could influence compliance decisions, and which when 
taken into account could lead to a continuous and sustained voluntary compliance. Such 
approaches have limited effects, and do not in the long term, cultivate voluntary compliance 
behaviours among taxpayers.  
This approach could partly explain the low level of tax compliance in the informal sector. 
Most current tax codes are complex and often ambiguous as in the case of Ghana, therefore 
using a command-and-control approaches (especially in a country with such a high illiteracy 
rate) do not promote long-term voluntary compliance, hence the best approach is by adopting 
a responsive regulation approach where the taxpayer commits to understanding taxpayers and 
designing support or sanctions accordingly (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). 
It is therefore vital that the tax authority embraces a more customer service approach to build 
trust and a positive relationship with the taxpayers.  
 The informal sector taxation system in most economies, particularly those employing the 
same system as Ghana’s fixed/lumpsum system, could have more effective ways not only 
to increase revenue but to promote future voluntary compliance within the sector. For 
example, where the presumptive system is to be used in this sector, defining a clear tipping 
point where taxpayers are moved over to a new tax structure would be ideal.  Effective tax 
education to enrich taxpayers’ knowledge would undoubtedly also improve voluntary 
compliance. Treating all taxpayers as ‘potential evaders’ and adopting a strict and less 
accommodating strategy could have a negative impact on those taxpayers who have no 
intention to evade or avoid taxes. Therefore, adopting a system which awards, recognises 
and supports honest taxpayers, such as the ATO’s Responsive Regulatory System (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992, p. 5), in the informal sector would provide more positive results 
than the current strategies. With this approach, the tax authority commits itself to 
investigation and taking into consideration the issues, motivations, and circumstances of 
the taxpayers (Leviner, 2008, p.369).  As observed earlier, using this strategy, the tax 
authority resorts to situation-specific approaches to tax regulation by adopting a total 
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commitment to assisting the taxpayers in their compliance efforts, and to force compliance 
across the board, even when the taxpayers are highly defiant (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 
p.35–40 and 47–51)94. Although adopting this model for a developing country would be 
costly and the tax authorities may end up collecting taxes only to fund an expensive 
system. However, the tax authorities in these economies could adopt a similar system 
which recognises the effort of honest taxpayers and provides the required support whilst 
openly punishing those who evade taxes to serve as a deterrent to potential evaders. This 
strategy would work better with improved trust and a positive relationship between 
taxpayers and the tax authority.  
In addition to adopting a dynamic approach to taxing the informal sector, bringing the tax 
office to the taxpayers (for example, creating small collection offices in market places) 
could be very useful as this will help reduce tax avoidance /evasion. Due to the frequency 
of the tax payment in most presumptive taxation systems, for example, daily, weekly or 
monthly payments, travelling a distance to tax offices [to make small payments] may 
discourage voluntary compliance and therefore establishing a sub-tax office (or a tax 
kiosk) could be useful for busy taxpayers. The taxpayers in these situations are also able to 
go to these ‘sub-offices’ not only for payment but for advice. In addition, as observed in 
this study, allowing taxpayers who have reached a stipulated threshold and also 
professional businesses to file formal assessments will be appealing (see section 6.6.9.c). 
For instance, it would not be effective to allow professional businesses which can keep 
proper accounts (e.g. guest houses, travel and tour operators etc.) not to file for formal 
assessment, and rather tax them on presumption because they exhibit certain characteristics 
which are within the presumptive approach such as location of business or number of 
employees. Therefore, not only the physical locations, the number of employees or the 
turnover, but also the nature of business should be used to move businesses out of the 
presumptive system. Simply, individuals and businesses, which demonstrate the ability to 
produce good accounts, may be considered for formal assessment (see section 6.6.9.c), as 
this will reduce the administrative costs of the tax authority (see section 3.5.2) on 
restrictions for formal assessment). 
 
                                                          




To what extent does the relationship between a taxpayer and the tax authority shape 
voluntary compliance?  
The taxpayer and tax authority relationship defined in this study as the Past Tax Interaction 
Influence (PTII,) is the outcome of the previous interaction(s) between the tax officers from 
the tax authority and the taxpayers (6.3.b.(i)). The PTII includes the support, cooperation, 
fairness and attitudes of the tax officer towards the taxpayer and the resulting taxpayer’s 
perception/response to the officer or the situation in the form of compliance or otherwise.  
Different studies have shown that a strong relationship exists between tax compliance and tax 
authority interactions in the formal sector, for example, (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Loo 
and Ho, 2005; Torgler and Valev, 2007). The results of this study are consistent with these 
findings. The results indicate that taxpayers in the informal sector are more likely to comply 
voluntarily in the future if their previous interaction with the tax authority was good (sections 
6.3.b.(i); 6.7.c.(iii)). The results from the composite scores (section 6.7.c.(iii)) indicate a 
strong relationship between previous tax authority encounters (i.e. relationship) and future 
tax compliance. 
This outcome can be explained using responsive regulation which holds the notion that 
compliance is achieved through mutual trusts between taxpayers and tax authority and a 
conscious desire for corporation between the two, and where the regulator has the authority 
to own up to its administrative responsibilities and explore different ways to manage this 
relationship (Demin, 2018, p.17). 
The evidence of this study thus suggests that with a positive previous interaction (encounter), 
taxpayers are more likely to comply in the future. It is therefore advisable for the tax 
authority not to adopt a generalised response to dealing with all taxpayers in the informal 
sector.  By adopting a responsive regulation approach, the tax authority can tailor supportive 
measures to help virtuous and committed taxpayers, whilst employing deterring measures 
such as regular audits and fines for the capitulative compliance group. Finally, those 
taxpayers who are disengaged can be subject to strong deterrence measures such as heavy 
fines, license revocations or prison terms to discourage future evasion practices. 
The current approach employs more of enforced compliance across the board (see (sections 
6.2a.(iii), 6.3.b.(i)), thus ignoring the support needs of honest taxpayers. In this case, as 
suggested (see section 7.3.1), adopting the responsive regulation model to support and 
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reward honest taxpayers whilst punishing defiant taxpayers to serve as a deterrent for 
potential future evasion behaviours, would be a good objective to pursue. 
 
 
7.2.3. RQ3  
To what extent does moral obligation contribute to the tax compliance decisions of the 
informal sector operators? 
As discussed earlier, most recent studies in tax compliance look at the taxpayer not as a 
utility maximiser, but as one whose compliance decisions are shaped by an intrinsic drive to 
do so. For example, studies by Kirchler (2007), Frey and Torgler (2007), Pope and 
McKerchar (2011), Alm and McClellan (2012) all found that tax compliance decisions 
cannot be only explained by the economic deterrent variables. However, each of these prior 
studies was conducted within a formal sector setting. 
Among all the tax compliance variables analysed for this study, moral obligation appeared 
the highest determinant of tax compliance decisions among informal sector operators (see 
sections 6.2a.(i), 6.2.10 and 6.8.0). 
This study supports previous findings that taxpayers in the informal sector, just like those in 
the formal sector have the moral drive to comply with their tax obligation and do not comply 
purely by the impact of auditing and other punitive measures as previous studies suggest (see 
sections 6.2a.(i) and 6.2.10). This also supports a study by Alm (2013), that even in the 
formal sector the percentage of taxes which are subject to thorough audit is often under 1 
percent of all returns, and where people are caught for tax avoidance, the penalties are not 
often visibly imposed so are only known to the tax authorities and may not be substantial 
enough as a percentage of the tax evaded to discourage tax crimes (Alm, 2013, p.4). This 
refutes the models and theories treating the taxpayer as a utility maximiser, who weighs up 
the economic benefits of successful evasion. Considering the informal sector and the ease of 
concealing taxable activities, the current level of compliance cannot be explained by only 
punitive and deterring measures. The study results indicate that in complying with tax 
obligations, taxpayers in the informal sector are equally influenced by the same level of 
moral obligation as those in the formal sector. 
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This implies that adopting more auditing and punitive measures to influence compliance will 
be unpopular among most taxpayers in the informal sector. Most of these taxpayers (i.e. 
those with high tax morale) will, therefore, need factors which will encourage them to 
comply with their taxes, suggesting that the responsive regulation theory’s pyramid of 
support will be useful compliance strategy for the informal sector. Other factors such as 
responsible tax revenue usage, ease of access to tax information, open and transparent billing, 
support from the tax authority, etc. will all play vital roles in promoting voluntary 
compliance among the informal sector operators. This also suggests that the tax authorities 
need to ensure that enforced compliance is applied carefully, and not across the board. 
Although not all taxpayers may prefer enforced compliance approaches, people would want 
to see enforced compliance approaches to deal with tax evaders to bring trust in the overall 
system and also to influence taxpayers’ perception towards the tax authority’s ability to use 
its powers.  
 
7.2.4. RQ4 
How effective is presumptive based taxation on informal sector operators’ compliance 
decisions? 
Presumption taxation is by far the most common form of taxing the informal sector in most 
countries (Stern and Ahmad, 1991, p.276; Makedonskiy, 2005). The reason for its popularity, 
as observed in chapter two is mainly due to the high tax collection costs for the sector, 
capacity constraints, and incentive constraints. This question (RQ5) assesses the 
effectiveness of the strategy in taxing the informal sector from the perspective of the 
taxpayers.  
The findings from this study indicate that over half of the informal sector operators are not in 
favour of presumption taxation as it currently exists in Ghana (see sections 6.3.b.(ii) and 
6.7.b.(viii). The main reasons for the dislike are a lack of understanding of the indices used to 
determine the presumption tax rates as noted earlier and the use of the intuitive approach 
where field tax officers could decide, at their discretion, one’s tax liabilities instead of the use 
of the formal presumptive system (see section 6.3.b.(ii)). 
The study found that presumptive taxation in the informal sector is likely to fail where the 
system is not well explained and the process for deciding the coefficients and indices upon 
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which the presumption rates are determined, are not communicated properly or are non-
existing.  
As it stands, the presumptive system currently being applied in Ghana is not effective as a 
majority are against it. People who currently comply do so due to the low rate or high 
auditing probabilities within the area where they operate (see sections 6.2a. (ii) and 6.2a. 
(ix)). This implies that an increase in tax rate or a reduction in auditing could result in a 
substantial reduction in tax revenue. 
To ensure the effectiveness of the presumptive tax system within the informal sector, the tax 
authority needs to ensure that the system (the basis of the presumption) is well communicated 
and centrally planned. Also, clearly defining the basis of the presumption and adopting a 
consistent billing approach will reduce the power and corrupt practices of the field tax 




What social/demographic variables influence tax compliance in the informal sector of 
developing economies?  
The prior literature within the formal sector (see section 5.6.2) shows that demographic 
variables have a profound impact on tax compliance. For example, in analysing the 
relationship between gender and tax compliance, Richardson and Sawyer (2001), Frey and 
Torgler (2004) and Torgler and Valev (2007) all found women to be more compliant.  
The results of this study indicate that women are less likely to give bribes in presumptive 
taxation environments (see section 6.7.b.(iv)). Given the opportunity, men are more likely to 
pay bribes to tax officials than to comply when there is limited tax education in the system, 
suggesting that women are more compliant than men. This implies that for an effective 
system, the discretionary presumptive tax approach as being currently applied in Ghana 
needs to be replaced with a formal presumptive system where the basis of assessment is open 
and transparent. To positively influence male taxpayers, the tax authority could adopt 




Age, according to Torgler (2003, p.358) also has a significant influence on tax compliance 
decisions, with younger taxpayers (under 29 years) more likely to evade taxes. Contrary to 
previous findings (such as Ritsema et al., 2003; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Devo, 2005), 
this study supports Feinstein, (1991) that age does not have any impact on the compliance 
decisions among informal sector operators. Therefore, having age-specific provisions within 
the tax system may not have any positive impact on overall tax compliance levels in the 
informal sector. 
The results also suggest that marital status influences peoples’ compliances choices with 
married people (particularly women) exhibiting the highest level of tax morale. This mirrors 
the findings from a study by Torgler, (2003, p.224).  
Since the current presumptive system in Ghana (just as in many developing economies) is 
administered through field officers and is coupled with the issue of bribery, the tax 
authorities need to ensure that potential opportunities which may evoke bribe payments are 
addressed. For example, constantly rotating95 tax officers between zones, or openly 
publishing the indices used to determine the tax liabilities could all help reduce bribery and 
corruption. 
Also, those officers and individuals who engage in bribery and corrupt activities should be 
openly punished to serve as a deterrent to others and to build confidence within the system. 
 
7.2.6. RQ6 
What are the impacts of increased auditing mechanisms on voluntary tax compliance by 
informal sector operators? 
The results from this study indicate that the possibility of being audited (detected) and the 
severity of the fines imposed, influence the compliance decisions of those operating in the 
informal sector (section 6.2a.(ii)). This mirrors the results reported in studies involving 
formal sector operators (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; Murphy, 2008). It is less clear whether 
this strategy will aid long term voluntary compliance (see section 6.2a.(ii)) and is subject to 
decreasing motivation potentially as each period passes without any auditing or as taxpayers 
fail to see audits being imposed on their peer groups or on those they see to be tax evading.  
                                                          
95 Although officers admitted during the tax officers’ interviews (see chapter six) that they are rotated, they 
confirmed that this is not so frequent. 
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To discourage future evasion practices, the tax authorities need to ensure that those who 
evade taxes are punished openly with a fine which is much higher than the tax evaded for it 
to serve as a deterrent. 
Interestingly, the study finds that regardless of the nature of the fines, if there exists an 
opportunity to pay a bribe, there are a group of taxpayers who would rather pay their way out 
than comply with the tax assessment received. In the same way, taxpayers who have a history 
of giving bribes during tax audits are less likely to comply in the future. (see section 
6.7.b.(x)). This further weakens the argument that high-auditing probabilities evoke 
voluntary compliance as suggested in many previous studies (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, 
p.330; OECD, 2004; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, p.3).  
Increased auditing, which Kirchler (2007) described as a cops and robbers approach has the 
tendency to create a hostile environment between the agents (taxpayers and tax authority). 
This suggests that administering informal sector taxation with only visiting officers as the 
sole collection method may be less effective. Thus, the possibility of bribery and the 
associated lack of trust in the system because of the possible abuse of tax officers’ 
discretionary powers could impede voluntary compliance. This is because a high level of 
human interaction could create corrupt behaviour. Allowing alternative (and less human 
interaction) methods such as mobile payments could help reduce the incidence of corruption.  
In addition, to reduce the level of corruption and the discretionary powers exercised by the 
tax officers, adopting a modified presumptive system could be more effective. For example, a 
self-assessed presumptive tax approach where the taxpayers undertake a self-assessment 
(based on the indices determined by the tax authority) and forward to the tax authority how 
much tax is to be paid (see section 6.6.a). The tax authority, in this case, could use the tax 
officers only for monitoring purposes to ensure that what taxpayers have declared on the 
assessment forms complies with their business activity and turnover. Also, adopting mobile 
money for tax payment takes away the ‘middlemen’ role played by the field officers which 
breeds most bribery and favouritism practices. 
Finally, imposing heavy fines on taxpayers who bribe officers as well as openly punishing 
tax officers who engage in bribery and favouritism could also help reduce the incidence of 
losing tax revenue through these practices. 
 
Having discussed key findings from this study and answered the research questions, the next 
section of this chapter takes a critical view of the key findings and link them to responsive 
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7.3. PART C - Applying Responsive Regulation in Ghana’s informal sector  
As results from this study indicate, the responsive regulation approach is by far the best 
approach to dealing with the huge informal sector tax non-compliance. This supports 
previous work by Ventry (2008), Book (2009), Leviner (2009), and Holmes (2011). Since 
key information about the taxpayer’s business is barely known, using the conventional harsh 
and often punitive/deterring measures will be less effective, as study evidence in chapter six 
suggests. 
As shown in section 6.7.c. (iii), central to responsive regulation theory is regulatees trust in 
authority. Thus, responsive regulation is built on the assumption that trust (by high morale 
taxpayers) in authority will automatically lead to compliance.  Therefore, for improved tax 
compliance in Ghana, the tax authority must take practical steps to build such trust. Also, as 
advised by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) for improved compliance, the tax authority should 
understand the taxpayers’ specific compliance needs, for example, the high illiteracy rate 
among the Ghana informal sector operators (see section 1.2, 2.5 and 5.8). 
Also, as observed in section 7.1.1., taxpayers in the informal sector have high tax morale and 
therefore adopting an approach that rewards honest taxpayers whilst making sure there exist 
a system that will deal with dishonest taxpayers will also help promote compliance as 
observed by Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2001, p.7). 
Furthermore, both the interview and the statistical analysis suggest low tax knowledge 
among the taxpayers – thus, there are taxpayers who want to do the right thing (comply) but 
are not supported (see section 7.1.4), therefore the responsive regulation with its pyramid of 
support will be very useful in building relationship and promoting long-term voluntary 
compliance whilst maintaining the sanctions for other taxpayers. 
In summary, Ghana’s informal sector taxation challenges could be partly addressed by 
adopting a responsive regulation approach. As it stands, the GRA has penalties and sanctions 
for non-compliance taxpayers, but there is no recognition for those in the informal sector 
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who are compliance, although there exist the Annual Taxpayers’ Awards96 and the Ghana 
Club 10097 to recognise corporate taxpayers.  
A model of responsive regulation approach encompassing the pyramid of sanctions and 
pyramid of support for Ghana could take the form as shown in figure 7.1 below. 
 











Sanctions Pyramid     Support Pyramid 
Source: Author’s recommendations 
As shown in the figure above, the tax authority could balance support and sanctions to 
respond to different taxpayer compliance behaviours in the informal sector.  As the results of 
this study (see chapter six) suggest, there is high tax morale in the informal sector, indicating 
that a significant proportion of informal sector operators want to comply. Based on the data 
                                                          
96 See link of most recent awards https://bit.ly/2XGQpET 
97 The Ghana Club 100 (GC 100) is an annual compilation of the top 100 companies in Ghana to give due 
recognition to successful enterprise building and was launched in 1998 by the Ghana Investment Promotion 
Centre (GIPC). The GC 100 is about corporate excellence, across all aspects of the organisations, but tax 
clearance (full tax payment) is the key requirement to be nominated and it’s organized by the GIPC with the 
GRA. See link: http://gipcghana.com/about-gc-100 
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analysis. And the two pyramids above, these taxpayers can be split into two with each given 
different responses to enhance compliance; 
7.3.1. High Morale and High Knowledge Taxpayers - These are the ‘ideal taxpayers’ that 
the tax authority spends less on in terms of administration. They must be recognised 
and rewarded to ensure sustained compliance. This group represents the ideal 
taxpayer group, and they must be kept satisfied to help enhance revenue and 
encourage other taxpayer groups to improve their compliance behaviours. 
7.3.2. High Morale and Low Knowledge Taxpayers - These are taxpayers who have the 
desire to pay but are constrained by weak tax knowledge. They must be educated 
about what, why and when, and must be supported on how to comply. For example, 
tax officers could provide one-to-one support [to illiterate taxpayers] on how to 
comply, whilst providing general tax education to improve their tax knowledge. 
Apart from these two taxpayers, the analysis in chapter six also suggests other taxpayer 
groups, based on their compliance postures – Low Morale and High Knowledge, and Low 
Morale and Low Knowledge Taxpayers. By using the responsive regulation approach (i.e. 
the support and sanctions pyramids above), the tax authority could adopt several approaches, 
see figure 7.2 below, to deal with these taxpayer groups. 
 









Source: Author’s recommendations 
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7.3.3. Low Morale and High Knowledge Taxpayers - These are taxpayers who clearly 
understand the taxes but may opt to evade or under-report, or in the case of those 
subject to presumptive taxes, they may under-declare their assets to pay low 
presumptive tax rates. These taxpayers tend to increase the administration cost of the 
tax authority. For this group, the tax authority must adopt strong 
enforcement/deterring measures such as regular inspections and heavy fines (or 
imprisonment in extreme cases). 
7.3.4. Low Morale and Low Knowledge Taxpayers - This may be taxpayer group who have 
no interest in paying taxes and therefore unwilling to understand the tax laws. 
Adopting a mixture of education (to improve knowledge) and enforcement (to 
improve compliance) measures could be useful. 
 
7.4.0. Summary 
The findings from this study show that there are several factors which influence the 
compliance behaviour of the informal sector taxpayer – which are mainly the same as those 
affecting formal sector taxpayers.  The constant taxpayer-tax authority interactions, as in the 
case of the current presumptive taxation system in Ghana imply that having a good previous 
interaction could positively influence taxpayers’ compliance decisions.  
The informal sector has huge revenue potential which could be a good source of domestic 
resource mobilisation for developing countries if appropriate steps are taken, for example, 
good and targeted tax education, fair and transparent billing with a clear and published basis 
of assessment, enhanced taxpayer-tax authority relationships, effective and visible evidence 
of tax revenue usage, etc. 
As found in this study, not all taxpayers in the informal sector are motivated by the economic 
benefits of evasion, therefore adopting a blended strategy as outlined in the responsive 
regulation theory could have a strong impact. In this case, honest taxpayers are rewarded and 
supported (using the pyramid of support) whilst those who evade are punished, for example 
with heavy fines to deter future tax evasion practices (using the pyramid of sanctions).  
Finally, a discretionary presumptive tax system breeds corruption and the abuse of 
discretionary powers by tax officers. This tends to lead to a lack of trust in the tax system 
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which subsequently (and negatively) influences compliance decisions. As suggested in this 
section, adopting a modified presumptive tax system where taxpayers could do self-
assessment or where all the basis of assessment are published and are available for taxpayers 
could help reduce the abuse of such discretionary powers. In the same way, openly punishing 
people engaging in corrupt practices would bring confidence in the system which will 































8.0. Introduction  
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the study which are based on the findings 
in relation to the research objectives. 
As observed throughout this thesis, taxing economic activities in the informal sector poses 
significant challenges to all tax authorities whether in developed, emerging or developing 
economies. However, authorities in developing countries are exposed to an even more 
difficult challenge due to a lack of data about informal sector operators and their activities 
which is seldom available in sufficient detail. Tax avoidance and evasion are very high 
among operators in the informal sector, and any attempt to make them compliant with the tax 
laws tends to be very difficult, costly and some authorities see it as unprofitable to undertake 
tax compliance programmes. What fuels this low tax compliance rate is the fact that most 
operators in this sector are illiterate, operate on small scales, and keep little or no formal 
records. Unlike the formal economy where tax avoidance dominates tax non-compliance 
strategies (Garman and Forgfue, 2009), individuals and businesses, especially small scale 
enterprises operating in the informal sector, normally resort purely to illegal practices to 
escape taxation (tax evasion) (Tooma, 2008). They avoid taxes by mainly concealing taxable 
economic activities from the authorities.   
In response to these challenges, and in an attempt to bring these taxpayers (informal sector 
operators) into the tax net, many tax authorities, particularly those in developing countries 
use a presumptive form of taxation as this study and previous studies (Stern and Ahmad, 
1991, p.276; Makedonskiy, 2005; Brautigam et al., 2008) suggest. This form of taxation has 
the advantage of reducing the administrative costs to the tax authorities as well as the 
compliance cost of the taxpayers (Tanzi 1985, p.235; Terkper, 2003, p.230). However, this 
comes at a cost in terms of avoidance and evasion opportunities, corruption (Terkper, 2003) 
inequity of application and the promotion of the discretionary power of tax officials (World 
Bank, 2011). 
As noted earlier, in previous research on informal sector taxation, the emphasis is on the 
systems of taxation rather than the ‘taxpayer’ – little is thus known of the tax compliance 
issues of the informal sector taxpayer. For example, informal sector taxation studies (such as 
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Khan; 1993; Rajaraman and Bhende, 1998; Pashev, 2006; Shlomo, 2007; Joshi and Ayee, 
2008; McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; De Mel et al., 2013; and Joshi et al., 2014), have mainly 
attempted to find ways of designing effective tax systems or structures to deal with the 
‘complex’ tax environment of the informal sector but attempts to understand the informal 
sector taxpayers’ compliance needs are somewhat limited. Why is this the case?  Are 
informal sector taxpayers influenced by the same key tax compliance factors that are faced 
by formal sector taxpayers such as (a) intrinsic motivations (tax morale issues), (b) tax 
knowledge (tax education and general awareness of their tax obligation and how to meet 
them), (c) Perception of fairness and equity (of the tax system both horizontal and vertical), 
d) the tax compliance process and cost (d) and tax authority versus taxpayers’ interactions 
(relationship)? By understanding the compliance decisions of the taxpayers in this sector, this 
study proposes that our understanding of the informal sector operators, and the best way to 
tax economic activities in this segment of the economy, will improve. Finding an answer to 
the key question, which most of the existing literature has tried to answer: what is the most 
effective way to tax informal sector economic activities? - will, to an extent be determined by 
our understanding of the informal sector taxpayers and their compliance needs.  
To make a specific contribution to this gap in the literature, this study, therefore, explored 
informal sector taxation in developing countries particularly the design of informal sector tax 
systems and the key factors which influence the compliance decisions of the sector operators. 
Using three forms of data collection techniques, the study provides evidence to develop the 
existing literature about informal sector tax compliance.  
The evidence from this study was gathered from a developing country context (Ghana). 
Ghana shares several key characteristics with other developing countries especially in the 
area of taxing economic activities (Nielsen, 2011). The country’s stable economic and 
political environment implies that the results may be useful to, or comparable with, countries 
at the same level of development.  
The study adopted Ayres and Braithwaite’s responsive regulation theory to help interpret the 
results and to explain how responsive tax compliance strategies positive interactions between 
taxpayers and the tax authority shapes compliance decisions.  
Using interviews, survey responses, and observation techniques, the study assesses the tax 
compliance determinants of informal sector taxpayers, particularly the influences of intrinsic 
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motivations, tax knowledge, tax education, fairness and equity issues, as well as the impact 
of the tax authority versus taxpayers’ interactions on compliance. 
This chapter summarises the results of the study, and how it can be useful to Ghana and 
countries of similar economic standing. It also outlines the contributions made to the 
knowledge on informal sector taxation, details the limitations of the study and proposes 
various areas for future research. 
 
8.1. The key evidence which came out of the study 
The study provides evidence that tax revenue usage has a particularly strong influence on tax 
compliance decisions among the informal sector operators. The results point out that visible 
benefits of tax payment are a very powerful determinant for future compliance decisions. The 
findings indicate that informal sector taxpayers want direct (visible) benefits for paying their 
taxes, such as the provision of basic amenities e.g. quality drinking water, street lighting, 
roads, sanitation, etc. The absence of these visible benefits significantly increases the 
likelihood of tax non-compliance rates among informal sector taxpayers. The study asserts 
that visible government spending of tax revenue is positively correlated with voluntary tax 
compliance in the informal sector (see sections 6.2a.(viii), 6.3.a.(v)). 
The perception which taxpayers hold about the tax authority has a direct relationship with 
their compliance decisions from the evidence gathered in the survey data of this study (see 
section 6.7.b. (iii); 6.7.b. (iv); and 6.7.c. (iii); and 6.7.b. (v)) The more positive the perception 
taxpayers hold of the tax authority, the higher the voluntary compliance level, therefore 
reducing the cost of tax administration particularly in the areas of monitoring and detection. 
This evidence indicates that tax authorities using more enforced compliance strategies 
generate higher negative perceptions and lower levels of trust among taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the study suggests that low tax compliance in the informal sector is partly due 
to the low level of trust taxpayers have in the state. Relating these results to the ‘trust’ as 
described in the responsive regulation theory, the low trust in authorities is linked to the 
general perception and opinions held by taxpayers that tax revenue is not used for the 
common good by the tax authority which negatively affects compliance decisions (María-
Dolores et al., 2010; Kirchler et al., 2010). This also correlates with the evidence from 
existing national and international tax compliance studies which employ different 
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methodologies, for example, interview research (Lavoie, 2008), Survey (Murphy, 2004; 
Torgler and Schneider 2005) and an experimental study (Pitters et al., 2007), which all 
conclude that trust is positively correlated with tax compliance. 
Lack of appropriate tax education particularly on how tax rates are determined (in the case of 
presumptive taxation, the indices used to determine the tax liability) has a significant 
influence on compliance. This is evidence from the practical application of responsive 
regulation in Ghana (see section 7.3) which suggests that there are taxpayers who have the 
desire but may lack the relevant tax knowledge to comply. This study finds that most 
informal sector taxpayers who avoid/evade taxes do so at least in part due to a lack of 
understanding of how their tax rates are determined and a lack of information about how to 
challenge tax authority decisions. The evidence from the study suggests that the tax 
authority’s tax education campaigns mainly target the formal sector or mostly are too general 
and not specific enough to address the particular needs of those in the informal sector. 
Furthermore, the study provides additional evidence that moral obligation is the most 
important determinant of tax compliance decisions by informal sector operators. The intrinsic 
motivation, the feeling of citizenship, and the desire to contribute for the state benefits 
enjoyed rather than high auditing probabilities and heavy fines are what influence the 
compliance decisions of most taxpayers (see section 6.2a.(i), 6.2.10, and 6.7.c.(i)). In other 
words, informal sector taxpayers are influenced in the same way as the other taxpayers in the 
economy and tax compliance determinants such as tax morale, tax education/knowledge, 
perception of fairness and equity all play a significant role in the compliance decisions of the 
sector operators. For example, studies by Kirchler (2007), Torgler et al. (2007), Braithwaite, 
(2009), Pope and McKerchar (2011). Alm and McClellan (2012), and Modugu et al. (2012) 
all conclude that economic deterrent approaches cannot on their own help explain tax 
compliance, rather the taxpayer’s free will about the need to contribute to society as a 
responsible citizen is also needed to complete the full picture in describing the compliance 
level found. Interestingly, an existing study on informal sector taxation tends to emphasise 
the ‘system’, rather than the taxpayer, and this has not aided our understanding of the sector 
operators.  The findings from this study, therefore, suggest that understanding the taxpayers 
and their compliance needs is equally important in promoting voluntary tax compliance 
within this sector in the long term. 
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This study also finds that voluntary tax compliance among informal sector taxpayers is 
directly linked to the cost of compliance. The lower the cost of compliance, the higher the 
compliance levels, and vice versa. This evidence supports the current presumptive tax 
approach used by the Ghana Revenue Authority and other countries where tax officers are 
sent out for the tax collection in the informal sector, resulting in little compliance cost (see 
6.2a.(iv)). 
Furthermore, this study’s results point out that individuals and businesses with lower incomes 
prefer formal assessment methods compared to those with higher incomes.  Businesses with 
higher receipts (based on the results), tend to favour the lump sum presumptive based 
taxation which gives fixed tax liability regardless of profits. On the other hand, small 
businesses favour formal assessment, as these individuals and businesses believe it will take 
them completely out of the tax bracket whilst larger ones believe a formal assessment could 
increase their tax liability.  
Overall, the results from this study suggest that most taxpayers in the informal sector will 
often prefer presumptive taxation to formal assessment, but with some modifications. For 
example, a system which allows the taxpayers to ‘self-assess’ using a published set of indices 
for determining the amount of tax liability.  In addition, presumptive taxation with a limited 
influence of field tax officers appears popular mainly due to the amount of discretionary 
power exercised by the tax officers within discretionary presumptive tax regimes as in the 
case of Ghana. As discussed in section 6.7.b(viii) taxpayers who prefer the current 
presumptive system do so mainly due to the low rate, simplicity, and the low compliance 
costs. However, these factors will not sustain the tax system, since they are not supportive of 
a long term voluntary compliance building strategy. For example, a small increase in the tax 
rate or a slight rise in compliance costs could see a disproportionate decline in tax revenue. 
The study finds no relationship between demographic variables such as age and religion on 
tax compliance in the informal sector. Although during the initial interviews some 
respondents related their tax compliance decision to the tithe payment at church, which is 
voluntary. However, other variables such as marital status and gender show a degree of 
association with tax compliance. Women are found to be more likely to be compliant to their 
tax obligations than men, and married individuals, especially women, are less likely to evade 




8.2. The results of this study compared to the findings of other studies  
The study provides evidence that is contrary to some of the existing literature on informal 
sector taxation, (for example Aryee, 2007). The informal sector taxpayers in Ghana are found 
not to be as different from formal sector taxpayers in the economy as other studies suggest 
and are influenced by the same tax compliance variables. These results suggest compliance 
strategies targeting the informal sector should not only be limited to the system or structures 
of taxation. Tax morale and other factors influencing compliance which are found to be 
effective in the formal sectors will be effective in developing compliance in informal sectors. 
Evidence from the study contradicts the findings from tax compliance studies, for example, 
Ritsema et al. (2003), Richardson and Sawyer (2001) and Devo (2005), which suggest that 
age has a significant relationship with tax compliance. This study refutes this assertion and 
instead confirms Feinstein’s (1991) findings that age does not have any significant impact on 
the tax compliance decisions of informal sector operators. 
The findings of this study are, however, consistent with existing literature in that marital 
status influences people’s tax compliance choices with married people (particularly women) 
exhibiting the highest level of tax morale and subsequently compliance. This confirms 
previous studies (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Frey and Torgler, 2004; Torgler and Valev, 
2007) which found that women are more likely to comply with taxes than men. 
Furthermore, the findings from this study suggest that the possibility of being audited 
(detected as non-compliant) and the severity of the fines imposed, influence the compliance 
decisions of some of the operators of the informal economy, the same way as reported formal 
sector studies (see Kirchler and Wahl, 2010 and Murphy, 2008). However, the influence of 
these strategies tends to be short-lived, making them a less useful tool for promoting 
voluntary compliance within the informal sector in the long-term. Although further analysis 
confirms that if fines are not high, people are less likely to comply. 
On tax revenue usage and its impact on tax compliance, the findings from this study are also 
consistent with those of recent studies on tax compliance which suggest that if governments 
spend tax revenue judiciously, voluntary tax compliance is positively affected (e.g. Palil, 
2010, p.188; Kirchler and Wahl, 2010). 
Tax morale is found to be a strong determinant of tax compliance in the informal sector. This 
finding supports the work by Frey and Feld (2002); Torgler (2002); Kirchler (2007); Pope 
and McKerchar (2011) who collectively illustrate that most people comply with their tax 
249 
 
obligations due to their intrinsic drive (moral obligations) rather than being solely driven by 
external compliance forces. 
 
8.3. Presumptive taxation – A modified approach 
The presumptive taxation approach as it’s currently being applied in Ghana’s informal sector, 
faces several challenges, although there are a number of factors which support the use of the 
system as an effective tax collection approach in the context faced. For example, with the 
high level of illiteracy among the informal sector operators, adopting a formal tax system 
will pose a difficult hurdle if a self-assessment approach is adopted. This will subsequently 
raise compliance cost as individuals and businesses in the sector may have to pay for the 
services of tax advisors, which could have a negative impact on compliance decisions. 
Evidence from the study indicates that most of the operators of the informal sector in Ghana 
have very low incomes. With 57% of the respondents having a monthly income of GHC500 
(i.e. GBP 81)98 or less, presumptive tax is by far the ideal option as a formal assessment is 
not feasible. A formal assessment may be more expensive in both cost and time to file tax 
returns and could be unpopular among the informal sector operators. In addition, such an 
approach may pose administrative challenges, as it may be too expensive to administer by the 
tax authorities, relative to the revenue generated.   
However, many issues need addressing if a presumptive tax system is to be made more 
effective in the county.  
First, before the tax liability is determined, tax officers go around and make a judgment 
based on the size of the shop/business, its location and how much stock is available and 
assess the tax on this basis. This poses one major issue – tax officials usually use their 
discretion and this has the tendency to create unfair practices. 
In response to overstatement of tax liabilities, Davies and Burnett (2014)99, suggest that the 
method to determine the tax liability should be transparent with guidelines on how tax 
officers assess and how judgments are made, whilst offering the taxpayer the basis to agree 
or disagree and an opportunity for clarification and a place to make formal complaints. A 
                                                          
98 Currency converted from www.xe.com on 15/02/2018. 




presumptive tax system which is currently being successfully employed in Kosovo (Davies 
and Burnett, 2014) is operated on the following two principles: 
▪ One:  The presumptive tax is self-assessed by the taxpayer, not the revenue officer. 
The tax officer provides the forms but the taxpayers complete the details and then 
provide how much they are going to pay [which is based on their own assessment]. 
With this approach, the tax authority can conduct its audit at any point to confirm the 
information presented, for example, by comparing third party sources of information 
such as accessing custom data (in the case of shipping companies), checking 
contracts, assessing supplier information, etc. 
▪ Two: The taxpayers take the money to the bank or other designated pay points 
(including online) and pay themselves rather than paying the tax officials directly. 
In the context of Ghana or other developing economies, payment methods pose challenges as 
most taxpayers feel an extra burden on them especially when there are regular small amounts 
involved as taking these to the bank each time could be daunting.  
Another modification which could make presumptive tax systems more effective in 
developing economies is by introducing Point Of Sales Technology (POST) – enabling 
taxpayers to be issued with receipts on the spot by the officers. Receipts must reconcile with 
the recorded transactions on the machine which the officer takes to the bank later which help 
deal with ‘leakage’ problems. As an added security, this system could also be linked directly 
to the tax authority’s system which could help the monitoring of tax revenues collected by an 
officer at any point in time. Introducing the Point of Sales Technology (POST) would 
involve few stakeholders, such as the local tax authority, the banks, and the revenue 
collection officers, and the success of it thus depends on each fulfilling their obligations.  
In addition, other payment methods such as payment by mobile phones could also prove 
useful as this will also help eradicate the issue of tax officers embezzling tax revenue. Such 
approaches, by reducing the leakages in the collected tax revenue, will further offer 
confidence in the tax system and subsequently improve compliance. 
The idea of enabling direct payment to the tax authority is that they mitigate corruption 
where particularly tax officers do the assessment and take payments, an issue which was 
raised many times in this study. 
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Another issue this study uncovered within the informal sector tax system in Ghana is that 
certain ‘professional’ businesses could easily file tax returns and be taxed the same way as 
other businesses. Businesses such as legal firms, accountants, daycare centers (i.e. nurseries), 
and travel and tour operators, who by nature of their businesses can undertake formal 
assessments could be moved into the formal assessment system. The interviewing officers 
did not provide a definitive answer as to when people and businesses should be moved over 
from the presumption to the formal assessment system. In response to this, Davies and 
Burnnet (2014) suggest that ‘even when there’s threshold, people with income below that 
should be allowed to move over as long as they have good record keeping, but once they 
decide to do so, they have to stay for a certain period, for example, three years, before going 
back, to prevent people going backward-and-forwards. Without imposing a time limit on 
when people could revert could thus be producing the potential for under or overpayment and 
will subsequently increase tax compliance burdens on all parties. Implementing this in the 
current informal tax system in Ghana could have a positive compliance response while at the 
same time reducing administration costs. 
  
8.4. Academic contributions  
This study has made contributions to the tax compliance literature particularly in areas 
relating to understanding taxpayers operating in the informal sector and on presumptive 
taxation systems in developing countries by demonstrating that, contrary to some existing 
literature and the resulting taxing approaches used in some countries, informal sector 
taxpayers may not be as different from other (formal) taxpayers than has been proposed who 
therefore deserve a similar approach. Therefore, designing a tax system for the informal 
sector should consider key tax compliance variables which are normally given attention in 
the formal sector tax design.  
The study also contributes to existing knowledge in taxation by elaborating on specific 
characteristics of individuals operating in the informal sector which are relevant to tax 
compliance decisions, for example, taxpayers who have a bribery history are more likely to 
evade taxes. The study also suggests various factors which appear to have little influence on 
compliance decisions in this sector, for example, age and religion. 
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In addition, the study identified four types of taxpayers within the informal sector (see 
section 7.3). This suggests that the low level of tax compliance in the informal sector could 
be partly explained by the lack of understanding of specific approaches to deal with different 
taxpayer groups. For example, as noted in section 7.3, taxpayers who have low tax morale 
but high tax knowledge may need more enforcement approaches compared to those with high 
tax morale but low tax knowledge who may need education and support to improve their tax 
knowledge. This is the first study to identify these types of taxpayers in the informal sector 
from a developing country setting. 
In terms of the methodology and approach, this is the first study which specifically targets 
informal sector tax compliance in developing countries from the perspectives of the taxpayer. 
The study is so far, the only informal sector taxation research which focuses on the taxpayer, 
rather than primarily the tax system itself, to investigate tax compliance determinants. This is 
also the first study in informal sector taxation which adopts three approaches to collect and 
triangulate data – interviews (17 taxpayers, 8 tax officials), observations (10 taxpayers’ 
interactions observed) and a survey (334 participants). With a high level of similarity in 
economic activities across the country’s informal sector to those of other developing 
countries, the results from this research can thus be generalised as representing the informal 
sector taxation in developing economies - particularly those of Sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
In its contribution to improving our understanding of taxation of the informal sector, this 
study, in addition to the above points, has assessed the impact of tax morale on tax 
compliance in the informal sector and finds that tax morale positively influences compliance 
in the informal sector far more than other extrinsic (external) variables such as high auditing 
probabilities and heavy fines. This result further suggests alternative ways of designing the 
tax systems for the operators in the informal sector which tax authorities could consider. For 
example, the investigations undertaken in the study have helped to enrich our understanding 
of informal sector taxation and to see that the conventional approach which emphasises 
treating taxpayers in the informal sector as potential evaders/avoiders and therefore 
concentrates on punitive measures, is not as effective as it could be. This in part explains the 
low compliance rate in the sector mostly described in studies as the ‘hard-to-tax’. In effect, 
this study further enriches tax administrators’ understanding of the needs of the informal 
sector taxpayers and as such offers guidance to authorities to design the tax systems for the 
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informal sector to include approaches to reinforcing taxpayers’ tax morale to improve 
compliance rates rather than solely spending more on enforcement. 
Furthermore, the study’s results also suggest that where there exists the possibility to offer 
bribes, taxpayers will pay their way out rather than comply even when the tax rates are below 
the bribes paid. This helps shape our knowledge that with a low level of tax knowledge, the 
government could lose substantial tax revenue. Therefore, tax administrators are enlightened 
through this study that by better educating taxpayers in the informal sector, particularly with 
regards to how their tax rates are determined, taxpayers are more likely to comply than 
giving in to bribes to tax officers who may portray their tax liabilities much higher than 
should be the case, thereby making bribe payments an attractive option to the taxpayers.  
With these factors, the study has made various contributions to the field of taxation with new 
empirical evidence about key determinants of tax compliance decisions of informal sector 
operators and suggests main approaches to improving voluntary tax compliance in the 
informal sector, especially those of developing countries. The study results could, therefore, 
be useful as a guide by tax authorities in designing an appropriate form of taxation for their 
informal economies. Detailed policy implications are discussed in the next section. 
 
8.5. Policy implications – the usefulness of the study for tax administrators  
A part of the results from this study support some of the previous work on tax compliance 
whilst other parts help uncover new issues relevant to tax compliance in the informal sector. 
For example, the importance of tax education and tax knowledge on tax compliance were 
previously demonstrated as being valuable contributors to voluntary tax compliance in the 
formal sector taxation context, this indicates that suitable and targeted tax education from the 
tax authority helps enhance tax knowledge which subsequently impacts positively on 
voluntary compliance among informal sector operators also. The implication for the tax 
authorities is that there should be targeted tax education campaigns to educate informal 
sector operators, especially issues on how their tax liabilities are determined. This study has 
however demonstrated that the current campaigns which target the formal economy have 
little impact on those in the informal sector and therefore specific education needs to be 
created to target the informal sector’s needs. 
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The results from this study suggest that informal sector taxpayers are more influenced to 
comply with their tax obligations by tax morale than the fines and or auditing probabilities. 
Policymakers and tax administrators could help to improve tax education and emphasise the 
variables which improve tax morale such as recognition, and effective tax revenue usage 
rather than resorting to even more rigorous enforcement strategies and more punitive 
measures which may have short term results but will not improve voluntary compliance in 
the long term. 
The study results suggest that informal sector taxpayers are particularly concerned about the 
way their taxes are determined as in most cases tax officials use their discretionary powers 
[and taxpayers’ negotiation skills] and this subsequently affects their compliance decisions, 
this offers useful insight to the tax authority in determining presumptive tax rates. For 
example, tax authorities could adopt a presumptive system for the informal sector which is 
‘self-assessed’. This approach (self-assessment) recognises the needs of the sector operators 
as it actively involves the taxpayers during the design and implementation process. Again, a 
modified presumptive system such as a ‘self-assessed’ form of presumptive taxation would 
be more effective than most strategies being currently employed to tax the informal sector. 
This is because the approach takes away the discretionary powers of the field tax officers to 
favour a certain group of taxpayers and will promote fairness in the tax system. With this 
approach, the taxpayers may feel more involved and the feeling of being involved in the tax 
planning process could positively influence voluntary compliance, and subsequently reduce 
the cost of tax administration. As observed by Oats and Pemberton, (2012, p.57) there is a 
degree of discretionary power that smooths the process of revenue collection in every tax 
jurisdiction, however, too much discretion could negatively influence tax morale as it could 
potentially erode trust and create costly uncertainty.  
This study’s results indicate that corruption, especially the perception of field tax officers 
embezzling tax revenue, is a strong determinant in reducing voluntary tax compliance among 
informal sector taxpayers. The findings suggest that taxpayers will better trust a system 
which limits the tax officers’ ability to handle cash. Therefore, the tax authorities could 
improve taxpayer confidence by implementing innovative ideas such as a point of sales 
technology where a device will be used to record taxes paid electronically which is 
automatically linked to the head office and the taxpayer has to sign on the device to confirm 
the total taxes collected by the tax officers. In the same way, mobile tax payment using 
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mobile phones could equally boost confidence and subsequently improve voluntary tax 
compliance. 
Trust in the tax authority is reported to be very low in this study, which subsequently 
influences compliance decisions. Therefore, measures should be put in place to improve on 
trust, which supplements authority power, in order to achieve maximum compliance. 
Addressing trust among taxpayers, Oats and Pemberton (2012, p.53) stressed that ‘securing 
the trust of the taxpayer population includes ensuring providing certainty and reliability in 
the interpretation and application of tax rules. It also includes ensuring consistency between 
the tax policy as widely understood and the way that policy is operationally implemented by 
the tax administration at a practical level’. As noted earlier, the discretionary presumptive tax 
system as currently applied in Ghana gives too much power to the tax officers who usually 
abuse it and this tends to affect trust levels and subsequently compliance decisions. See 
chapter two for discussion on the discretionary presumptive tax system and its application in 
Ghana respectively. Trust can be established within a presumptive tax system in the informal 
sector by publishing the factors used to determine tax liabilities, in this case, tax officers, 
could do little to influence the amount an individual must pay.  
As indicated by this study’s results, cash transactions are the most common form of 
transaction among the informal sector operators in the developing countries.  This medium of 
payment has been described as ‘intrinsically the most difficult for revenue agencies to 
identify and monitor’ (Russell, 2010, p.13). As a response, tax authorities in developing 
countries should, therefore, work with telecommunication companies, banks, and other 
financial institutions to develop and promote alternative payment mechanisms to reduce the 
sector’s demand for cash. For example, adopting tax payment through mobile money. 
Visible benefits for tax payment could also help reduce tax non-compliance according to the 
results of the study. As a policy response, governments could improve compliance levels by 
ensuring that the informal sector taxpayers are given visible benefits for the taxes they pay. 
For example, sanitation or lighting provided to the community market, etc., particularly at 
local government levels, could be an effective way to promote voluntary compliance. 
The study finds that the relationship between the taxpayers and the tax officers is vital to 
promoting compliance. Therefore, tax authorities looking to promote tax compliance in the 
informal sector need to ensure that their field tax officers are given appropriate professional 
training to ensure that they exhibit the required professional standards and not to be defensive 
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or aggressive as found during the field observations (see section 6.6). In the field, tax officers 
represent the tax authority, and any negative perception could have negative repercussions on 
voluntary compliance in the long run. 
For effective tax policy design, the tax authority needs to see the informal sector and the 
overall regulatory environment as ‘one field’, where people’s future behaviours are shaped 
constantly by the interactions they have with others within the tax environment (Kraal, 
2013).  Thus, the informal sector tax field is comprised of agents – who are made up of 
individuals, groups and institutional structures, including the tax authority. A taxpayer’s 
decision to comply, in this case, may be influenced by the regulatory environment which is 
shaped by his/her interaction with the others and the associated rules governing the (tax) 
environment. A more responsive regulatory environment could help build stronger and 
positive relationships between taxpayers and the tax authority. Thus, honest taxpayers could 
be supported to be compliant whilst non-compliant taxpayers could be gradually moved into 
the compliant zone using a series of strategies – supporting, rewarding or punishing. 
Gracia and Oats (2012) described the [tax] regulation environment as ‘a relational process 
that creates, negotiates and enforces the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
practice (p.305). This boundary according to Gracia and Oats (2012) depicts compliant and 
non-compliant regulatees (whom tax authorities try to move into the compliance zone using a 
series of strategies).  The compliance boundary in this context is not imposed on either the 
tax authority or the taxpayers as they both engage with it and through constant interaction 
and interpretation, contribute to its development and positioning as well as shaping the wider 
tax field. This, therefore, suggests that, as a policy response, the tax authority must ensure 
that their role in shaping the ‘compliance boundary’ is anchored in transparency, respect, and 
fairness. A hostile regulatory approach will create a ‘belligerence compliance boundary’ 
which will undoubtedly have a negative effect on long-term voluntary compliance decision. 
The findings from the study could be a useful guide for other governments in developing 
countries particularly those within Sub-Sahara Africa where economies, cultural and other 
social factors are similar to that of Ghana. These countries could use this study as a 
benchmark to promote tax compliance in their informal sectors.  
Overall, this study has helped shape our understanding of informal sector taxation 
particularly in a developing countries context and the findings which have emerged from the 
research could offer useful guidance for decision-makers and tax administrators.  
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In conclusion, the study supports the use of a presumptive form of taxation for the informal 
sector but with some modifications as suggested in this section rather than the current and the 




The study involved interviewing tax officials of different levels within the country’s tax 
system. This was very useful as it helped shape the research, especially in providing the 
perception of the tax officials towards the informal sector. An attempt to interview the key 
policy-makers in Ghana’s finance ministry, including the Minister of Finance, failed. This 
could have given a stronger insight into the policies and approaches currently being applied 
to the sector, which are normally passed by the Ministry and the tax administrators have the 
sole responsibility of implementing these policies. It would also have allowed more testing of 
proposed developments to the presumptive tax system with officials responsible for taxing 
the informal sector. 
The study uses observation to collect part of its data. The observation was carried out to 
enable a better understanding of their possible application in the Ghanaian setting. This 
offered a very interesting and useful insight into the relationship between the tax officers and 
the taxpayers during the collection process. However, to fully understand this interaction, it’s 
believed that more observation trips may be required. Also, observing more tax officers and 
different taxpayers on different days and in different situations could potentially influence the 
understanding of the interactions. Unlike the taxpayers who were observed, the field tax 
officials were aware of the researcher’s presence, this could influence their behaviour 
towards taxpayers and how they handled the various situations that emerged. 
Although the country’s informal economy is similar in all of its 10 regions, a study which 
was undertaken in all 10 regions instead of only the 2 which this study is limited to, could 
extend and deepen the study results. 
Considering the survey data collection and the interviews with the informal sector operators, 
a snowballing approach was the only feasible sampling method deemed viable to access the 
operators in this sector. This means the researcher had limited influence on the participants 
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especially those involved in the interview. This could have had a potential impact on the 
study results. 
Furthermore, the ‘search and identify’ approach used during the interview phase has some 
limitations. The strategy might cause some taxpayers (for example those working from home 
or in locations, not within the defined parameters) to be excluded entirely from the sample 
frame thereby increasing sampling error. This issue was, however, balanced with the mix 
methods approach of a survey and field observation employed in the data collection.  
The drop-off and pick-up approach used for the survey data collection could also in part 
influence responses. As discussed in chapter six, with high illiteracy rates, some respondents 
could not complete the questionnaire and had to be supported by the research assistants who 
read the questionnaires and ask for their possible response options. Compared to situations 
where respondents could fill in questionnaires without any intervention, the presence of the 
research assistants in such situations could have had an impact on the responses. 
Tax morale was measured by a series of 8-Likert scale questions. Misunderstanding of 
questions and possible response biases means that this may not give true and accurate results 
and the conclusion may thus not give a true representation of the informal sector taxpayers. 
Furthermore, tax knowledge was measured using the aggregate scores of three variables – 
understanding of one’s tax rates alongside when and how to pay. Issues such as knowledge of 
tax policies/laws and complaints procedures which could equally shape one’s tax knowledge 
were not measured. A study which includes and extends such variables could impact on the 
outcome. 
Also, tax compliance measurement is a judgment based measure using a series of indirect 
questions. Considering the sensitive nature of the subject, respondents may not feel 
comfortable answering the questions without any control or direct contact.  The responses 
may not be a true reflection of actual taxpayers’ behaviour in the informal sector. 
‘Acknowledging this constraint, however, it is believed that this is the most suitable way to 
predict taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, as direct questions might lead respondents to 
answer the questions dishonestly and could be potentially embarrassing for respondents’ 
(Palil, 2010, p.283). 
Finally, there was no data according to the GRA about taxes collected from the informal 
sector, as tax revenues are pulled together. This made it impossible to make any reference to 
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tax revenues generated from the sector, which could have had a useful impact on assessing 
the effectiveness of the current system. Having data that captures tax revenue from the sector 
each year will be vital to make comparisons and to assess the effectiveness of each of the 
numerous strategies the GRA have been using to tax the sector in the last few years.  
 
8.7. Areas for future research 
This study, which is the first to look into informal sector taxation in developing countries 
from the taxpayers’ and tax authorities’ perspectives could be used as the foundation for 
further detailed research into the field of informal sector taxation within developing 
economies. 
In the past, some tax compliance studies have been undertaken in developed countries using 
an experiment as the main method (for example Cummings et al., 2005, Wartick et al., 1998 
and Alm et al 1992) There has been no research into the informal sector in developing 
countries using this approach. Therefore, a critical look at this phenomenon using 
experiments could offer some interesting results.  
In spite of the similarities between the economies of developing countries, a study which 
looks at the informal sectors of two or more developing countries at the same time, especially 
from different regions/continents may help improve the understanding of and offer detailed 
insight into, the informal sector taxation in the developing economies context. 
In this study, there was evidence found of registered businesses in the formal sector having 
individuals and business subsidiaries in the informal sector which are used in part to 
evade/avoid taxes. However, this was not developed fully in this study. Future research 
which looks specifically at how formal sector operators use subsidiaries in the informal 
sector to evade taxes could also offer a different perspective of the situation and further 
improve our understanding of informal sector taxation. 
In chapter three it was observed that association taxation was very popular in Ghana from 
1987 - 2004 and this was also reported in section 6.2.a.iv of the interview data analysis by a 
respondent. Although no data was collected to assess this, however, a study looking at the 
impact of Associational taxation and how it may impact on tax compliance in the informal 
sector of developing countries could provide some useful insight for policymakers.  
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Furthermore, benefits in kind and non-monetary exchanges [as forms of payment] are 
common practices within the informal economy but not attention was given to this area 
during this study. Future work could seek to address this phenomenon to assess their real 
impact on tax compliance within the informal sector. 
Levels of perceived corruption and tax revenue usage came up as strong variables which 
decrease tax compliance rates. Therefore, a full study which undertakes a detailed 
investigation into these variables either separately or jointly could offer a very useful insight 
into tax non-compliance. Also, by limiting a study to only these variables, their true impact in 
relation to informal sector taxation could be made clearer. 
This study was conducted from an inductive perspective and uses the responsive regulation 
theory to help explain taxpayer versus taxpayer interactions and how these shape compliance 
decisions. Using this theory or any suitable theory to undertake a ‘theory led’ inquiry into the 
sector could offer new paradigms and better our understanding of the informal taxation 
within developing economies. 
Finally, the informal sector as observed from chapter two forms the greater part of the 
economic activities of most developing countries. There is, therefore, an urgent need for 
academic work into the informal sectors of these countries to help policymakers in designing 
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Appendix 1 - Summary of Informal sector causal theories and policy recommendations 






Informal economy is the result of 
exclusion from economic 
opportunities in the formal 
economy due to the imbalances 
between population growth and 
industrial employment, and 
peoples’ skills in relation to the 
structure of the economic 
opportunities presented because of 
that growth.  
There is minimal (or no link) with 
formal sector. Operators have only 
survival needs as a motive. 
Exclusion from 
modern economic 
opportunities due to 




and/or people’s skills 





Regulation should be 




access to resources, 
including capital, in 





The informal sector is the response 
to a hostile legal system and 
bureaucratic procedures within the 
formal sector. It is a rational and 
market-led response to 





Less state regulation 
and more free market 
policies to enable 
accelerate growth of 
informal entrepreneurs 
(particularly through 




Adopters of this view conform to 
the premise that the informal 
economy comes about due to the 
growth of capitalism and firms’ 
desire to reduce cost and/or gain 
competitive advantage 
Growth of capitalism 
and attempts by 
formal firms to 








the informal and 
formal economies in 
order to address 
unequal relationships 
between ‘big business’ 
and subordinate 
producers. 




Appendix 2 - Income tax rates and allowances – effective from January 2016 











First 2,592 Free NIL 2,592.00 NIL 
Next 1,296 5 64.80 3,888.00 64.80 
Next 1,812 10 181.20 5,700.00 260.00 
Next 33,180 17.5 5,806.50 38,880.00 6,052.50 
Exceeding 38,880 25       
 











First 216 NIL NIL 216 NIL 
Next 108 5 5.40 324 5.40 
Next 151 10 15.10 475 20.50 
Next 2,765 17.5 483.88 3240 504.38 
Exceeding 3,240 25      
                                                     Exchange rate in January 2017 is £1 = GH¢ 5.6100  
 
Source (GRA, 2016) 
 
 
                                                          
100 (FxExcchange, 2017) 
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Appendix 3 - Formal sector (business) tax rates in Ghana 
Resident Companies  
Corporation tax  
Standard rate 25% 
Rate applicable to companies listed on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange 
22% (1st three years) 
Rate applicable to companies in hotel industry  22% 
Rate applicable to companies that engage in 
non-traditional exports 
8% 
Rural and community banks and free zone 
developers and enterprises 
8% (after tax holiday period) 
Financial institutions in respect of income from 
financing farming enterprises and leasing 
companies 
20% 
Agro-processing companies and cocoa by-
products companies 
0%-20% (after tax holiday period) 
Petroleum income tax Not exceeding 50% (subject to rate per 
Petroleum agreement) 
Capital gains 15% 
Dividends 8%* 
Royalties Taxed as ordinary income (Residents) 
Rent on properties 8%* 
Resident Individuals  
Income tax 0-25%** 
Capital gains 15% 
Dividends 8%* 
Interest  Exempt (Paid by Financial Institutions and 
Government of Ghana on bonds; otherwise taxed as 
ordinary income) 
Royalties Taxed as ordinary income 
Non Resident Companies  
Company income As for residents but only on Ghanaian 
source income. 15% withheld at source 
on part or whole amount. 
Branch repatriated profits tax    
Tax on shipping, aircraft, cable, radio, optical 
fibre, satellite communications operations 
10%* 
10%* of gross receipts 
Capital gains As for residents but only on Ghanaian 






Management and Technical Service Fees 15%* 
Natural resource payments 10%* 
Rent 10%* 
Individuals 15%* 
* Tax is withheld at source.       Source: (KPMG, 2012) 
  *  Tax is witheld at source.  ** Individual income tax bracket applicable  
























Appendix 4 - Ghana Revenue Authority offences and penalties 
  Offences          Sanctions/Penalties  
1.  Failure to maintain 
records  
5% of tax payable by that person for each year  
2.  Failure to furnish a 
return by due date  
For each day that the return remains outstanding – a penalty 
of GH¢2.00 in the case of companies   
GH¢1.00 in the case of self-employed  
3.  Failure to pay Income 
Tax on Due date  
- Failure of not more than 3 months - penalty of 10% 
plus unpaid tax  
- Failure exceeding 3 months   
      penalty of 20% plus unpaid tax 
4.  Failure to pay 
Withholding Tax on Due  
Date  
- Failure of not more than 3 months- penalty of 20% 
plus unpaid tax   
- Failure Exceeding 3 months- penalty of 30% plus 
unpaid tax        
5. Self-Assessment  
. Understating estimated 
tax payable by instalments   
30% of the difference between tax in respect of the estimated 
chargeable income and the tax calculated on 90% of the 
actual chargeable income, where the estimated chargeable 
income is less than 90% of actual chargeable income  
6.  Making False or 
Misleading statement   
Double or treble the amount of the underpayment of the tax, 
which may result if not detected.  
 Court Sanctions    
Offences  Sanctions/Penalties  
 1.  Failure to comply with 
the Act (Section 148)  
Where the underpayment is more than      
GH¢500.00 – a fine of between  
GH¢100.00-GH¢600  
 - In any other case - a fine of between  
GH¢20.00-GH¢200.00   
 2.  Failure to pay tax   
     (Section 149)  
 -Where the amount involved is more than  
GH¢100.00 –   
- a fine of between GH¢50-GH¢200   
 or term of imprisonment between 3 months and not more 
than one year or to both.    
- In any other case  
- a fine of between GH¢ 10-GH¢50 or imprisonment 
between one – three months or to both.  
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 3.  Making False or 
Misleading Statement     
(Section 150)  
  
 -Where the statement or omission is made without reasonable 
excuse, resulting in underpayment of tax exceeding  
GH¢100.00  
- a fine of between GH¢50-GH¢200 or imprisonment 
between 3months – 1 year or to both 
- In any other case – a fine of between GH¢10-GH¢50 or 
imprisonment between I month – 3 months or to both. 
- Where the offence is made knowingly or recklessly and 
the resultant underpayment of tax is more than 
GH¢100 –   
- a fine of between GH¢100-GH¢400 or imprisonment 
between 1 – 2 years or to both.  
- In any other case: 
- a fine of GH¢20 – GH¢100 or imprisonment between 6 
months – 1   year or to both. 
 4. Impeding Tax 
Administration  
 -Where a person, without reasonable excuse, obstructs an 
officer of IRS in the performance of duties under the Act   
 -or impedes the administration of the Act, commits an 
offence and is liable to  
 a fine of between GH¢50-GH¢400 or imprisonment of not 
more than 2 years or to both.  
 5. Aiding and Abetting   -A person who aides or abets another person to commit an 
offence which results in an underpayment of tax exceeding  
GH¢100. is liable to   
  - a fine of GH¢100-GH¢200 or imprisonment of between 1-
2years or to both  
-In any other case –  
-  a fine of between GH¢20-GH¢100 or imprisonment of 
between 6 months – 1 year or both  
Failure to withhold tax   Personal liability to pay the tax due but not withheld  











Appendix 5 - Example of presumptive taxes in selected countries. 
Country Kind of system Remarks 
Albania Lump sum or gross turnover Fixed tax for micro businesses = annual turnover 
 Tax under 2 million Lek (US$14,000) 
  4% gross turnover tax for small businesses = annual 
  turnover 2-8 million Lek (US$57,000) 
Armenia Lump sum Fixed payment for small-scale activities such as 
  hairdressers, gas stations, commercial fishing, and 
  trading activities conducted in locals with trading 
  areas less than 30 square meters 
Azerbaijan Gross turnover tax 2% gross turnover tax when turnover less than 300 
  times the minimum tax-exempt wage (US$ 6400) 
Belarus Lump sum Lump sum tax for stores that are single owned and 
  total trading space less than 25 square meters, plus 
  public catering enterprises, and at markets and sales 
  Exhibitions 
Bulgaria Lump sum For individuals in specific business sectors with 
  
annual turnover under 75,000 BGN 
 
France Lump sum 
The taxpayer must furnish information with respect to 
the preceding year: purchases, sales, value of closing 
inventory, number of employees, amount of wages paid, 
and number of cars owned by the taxpayer etc. 
Georgia Lump sum For enterprises with turnover less than GEL 24,000 
  (US$ 11,000) 
Hungary Lump-sum Small entrepreneurs may choose an itemized 
  presumptive tax in lieu of personal income tax and 
  VAT 
Kazakhstan Lump sum or gross income tax Special regime based on simplified return for 
  individuals with not more than 15 staff and gross 
  income max. T 4.5 million and legal persons with not 
  more than 25 staff and gross income max. T 9 million. 
  Lump-sum tax for gambling business. 
Kosovo Lump sum tax Any taxpayer other than an insurance company with 
  gross receipts less than 15,000 DEM 
Kyrgyzstan Gross turnover tax SMEs (total revenue up to 3 million Soms,  
  approximately US$ 63,000) may pay from 5 to 10% 
  gross turnover tax instead of all national taxes. 
  Individual entrepreneurs can optionally obtain a patent 
  and pay a monthly gross turnover tax, i.e., in retail 
  trade 4% 
Lithuania Presumptive tax Optional for firms with gross income less than 
  100,000 LTL (US$ 26,000) 
Moldova Lump sum Individual entrepreneurs can buy patents which involve 
  a monthly fee 
Romania Gross income tax Micro enterprises with less than 10 employees and an 
  annual turnover less than Euro 100,000 
Russia Uniform (unified) tax Uniform tax for entrepreneurs and companies in 
 Single tax selected industries – retail trade, public catering, car 
  maintenance, transportation services, personal and 
  veterinarian services: 15% imputed income tax. 
  Single tax for entrepreneurs and companies with up to 
  100 employees and 11 million RUR (US$ 352,000) 
  turnover: 6% gross turnover tax, and 15% gross 
  turnover minus expenses tax. 
  Both taxes replace profits/personal income tax, 
  property tax, sales tax and single social security tax; 
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  exempt firms and entrepreneurs from VAT, and 
  provide tax credit for pension contributions. 
Turkmenistan Lump sum Lump sum licence for entrepreneurs without a legal 
  entity and with an annual turnover of less than 72 
  million manats (US$ 14,000) 
Ukraine Unified (gross turnover) tax, Unified tax for companies with up to 50 employees 
 fixed tax; trade permit; small and turnover less than UAH 1 million (US$ 190,000) 
 enterprise tax and individuals with up to 10 employees and turnover 
  less than UAH 500,000: 6% gross turnover tax which 
  does not exempt actor from VAT, or 10% gross 
  turnover tax, which does exempt firms from VAT. 
Uzbekistan Gross turnover tax or lump Unified tax on gross revenues for wholesale trade 3- 
 sum tax 5% of turnover (depending on location), for public 
  catering 7-10% of turnover (depending on location). 
  Lump sum tax for individual entrepreneurs without a 
  legal entity 
























Appendix 6 - Tax Compliance Survey Questions 
 
                                                                                                                                                     






Dear valued Respondent, 
You have been selected to participate in a study on the Ghanaian economy by a researcher from the 
University of Birmingham, UK, and permit me to say a big thank you for your time as you complete these 
questions.  
I would like to first of all assure you that this is purely for academic purposes ONLY, and your participation in 
this study will have no impact on you or your business. Your identity, your business details or your location will 
not be disclosed to anyone.  After completion of this questionnaire, the Research Assistant who handed this to 
you will come and collect it. 
The purpose of the study is to understand Government approaches to small business taxation and the 
resulting responses of the owners of small scale enterprises. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you do not have to answer all the questions asked 
if   you do not want to, however, I would greatly appreciate it if you could complete all the questions and as 
honestly as you can, to help the outcome of the study.  
It will take no more than 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
I will also like to assure you that the completed forms will be kept securely at the Researcher’s office at the 
University of Birmingham for the purpose of the study, and will be securely destroyed afterwards. 
The Research Assistant will be coming on the …………………………….. to collect your completed questionnaire. 





Alex Ampaabeng (Researcher) 
 
This Research is being conducted at the University of Birmingham, UK, under the supervision of:  
- Professor Andy Lymer 




Department of Accounting & Finance 
Birmingham Business School. 
University Of Birmingham. 















PART A  
1. Is Your Business activity registered? (Tick one) 
□Yes □ No 
1a. If yes, who with? (Tick all that apply) 







1b. If No, Why Not? 
□ Not aware of need to register □ Cost of registration □ To avoid State interference/Taxman                        
 
□ Other (please state)………………………... 
 
2. How long have you been in this business? (Tick one) 
□ Up to 1 year □ 2-5 years □ 6-10 Years □ Over 10 Years 
 
3. Which of the following describes the ownership of your business? (Tick one) 
□ Sole Owner □ Partnership □ Family business □ Other (please state)…………………………………  
4. Who makes all the major decisions in the business? (Tick one) 
□ Owner only  □ Partners □ The entire family □ Other (please 
state)………………………………… 
    
5. Do you keep any financial records of your business e.g. receipts, statement, orders/invoices? 
□Yes □ No 
  
a) If you answered Yes to Q5 above, briefly explain what you do: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……  
b) If your answer is NO, please briefly explain why: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. Do you have business bank account for your business? (Tick one) 
□Yes □ No 
 
Please state your opinion for questions in tables using the following scales: 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree  
3. Unsure / on the fence 
4. Agree  
5. Strongly agree  




Disagree          Agree 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
6a. If you do not have a bank account, do you have any micro-finance account or part of a ‘Susu’ 
group? (Tick one) 
 
7. What payment method do you mainly accept from your customers? (Tick one) 
 
 
8. The nature of my business influence my tax payment decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I believe it’s right to register a new business 1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART B  
10. I believe my business tax rate is fair 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Fixed tax rate promotes fairness 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I prefer my tax rate decided by a visiting tax officer than direct from GRA 
/ Inland Revenue 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 When they have to, visiting tax officers are always fair in issuing tax bills  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PART C  
14. Are you aware of the tax rate relating to your business? (Tick one) 




14a. If Yes to 14 above, have you paid tax before on your business? (Tick one) 




14b. If No to question 14 above, how does this influence your compliance decision? (Tick one) 
□ I do not pay 
as a result  
 □ I pay because I 
have no option  
□ I try to pay as little 
as possible 




15. What do you think could make people with small business like yours not to be tax 
compliant in Ghana? (Tick one) 
□ High 
Tax rate 
□ Perceived misuse of tax 
revenue/corruption in country 
□ Not understanding how 
their tax rate is calculated 
□ Perception of what 
is received in return 
 
 
□Yes □ No 





Disagree         Agree 
 
16.   The tax payment process is simple 1 2 3 4 5 
17.  The tax payment process influence my payment decision 1 2 3 4 5 
18.  If required, I will declare all my income for tax purposes 1 2 3 4 5 
19.  Paying taxes based on percentage of  profit made is better than at a fixed rate 1 2 3 4 5 
20.  My tax compliance cost is reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 
21.  I have received reminder notice(s) from GRA regarding my taxes in the past 1 2 3 4 5 
22.  I fully understand how to pay my taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
23.  I do not need any advice about when to pay my taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART D  
24. If you are approached by tax collector or Government official that for a small fee, s/he 
will write off all your business taxes for the entire year, and you would not have to 
worry about being caught, what would your response be? (Tick one) 
□ I definitely will 
accept the offer 
□ depending on his 
fees, I may opt for it 
□ I may be suspicious, 
else will opt for it 
□ I will refuse it & 
pay my normal tax 
   
 
 
25. How many of your friends/business partners/family, do you think may be interested in 
the offer in question 23 above? (Tick one) 
□ Almost all □ About 50% of them □ Just one or two □ None 
 
26. Would regular visits by tax officers affect your tax payment behaviour? (Tick one) 
□ Yes, definitely □ Very little influence □ Not sure □ No influence 
    
    
27. Have you ever been approached by a tax official demanding personal payment/bribes 
regarding your business taxes? (Tick one) 
□ Yes, always □ Yes, few times □ Yes, just once □ Never 
    
28. Have you ever given in on bribery demands or offered some payment to tax collectors? 
(Tick one) 
□ Yes, many times □ Yes, few times □ Yes, just once □ Never 
    
    
29.   Tax Payment is a basic duty of every citizen 1 2 3 4 5 
30.  If one think that tax is unfair, it is justifiable not to pay at all. 1 2 3 4 5 
31.  Not paying taxes is the worst thing a person can ever do to the state. 1 2 3 4 5 
32.  Even if tax rate is unfair, one needs to pay first and then complain later or ask 
for refund 
1 2 3 4 5 
33.  I pay taxes because I want to be seen paying something 1 2 3 4 5 
34.  The main reason I pay my taxes is to avoid a potential penalty (e.g. pay a fine 
or have my business closed) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART E  
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Disagree          Agree 
Disagree          Agree 
35. Have you ever been sent a written tax bill directly from the Ghana Revenue Authority? 
(Tick one) 
□Yes □ No 
 
36. Have you been visited by a Tax Official before? (Tick one) 
□Yes □ No 
  
37. If Yes to the question above, which authority? ((Tick all that apply) 
□ Metropolitan Assembly □ Inland Revenue / GRA □ Other (please state)…………………… 
 
38.  There are adequate tax information from the GRA  1 2 3 4 5 
39.  I understand the tax system, particularly areas relating to my business 1 2 3 4 5 
40.  I know where to seek free tax advice, when needed 1 2 3 4 5 
41.  Overall, Tax education in the country is good 1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART F  
42.   The tax revenue collected by the GRA is well spent. 1 2 3 4 5 
43.  The tax office /Ghana Revenue Authority are always helpful 1 2 3 4 5 
44.  Previous encounter with tax officers was good 1 2 3 4 5 
45.  It’s easy to get tax advice from the Tax office/GRA 1 2 3 4 5 
46.  When faced with financial constraints, it’s always possible to negotiate with 
Tax authority to arrange and pay at a later date  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PART G  
47. Gender (Tick one) 
□ Male □ Female 
 
48. Which age group do you fall within? (Tick one) 
□ Under 25 years □ 25-40 Years  □ 41-50 Years □ Over 50 years  
     
 
49. Marital status (Tick one) 
□ Married □ Single  □ Cohabiting □ Other (Please state)……………………………  
     
 
50. Highest educational qualification you currently hold (tick one) 
 
51. Your Religious denomination (Tick one) 









□ Masters’ Degree & Above    
  




52. Your average monthly income (Tick one) 
□ Under 
GH¢132 
□ Between GH¢133 - 
GH¢500 






53. Occupation / Type of business (please be specific)………………………………… 
 
 

























Appendix 7 - Informal sector operators Interview Questions 
 
PART A – BUSINESS ACTIVITY, REGISTRATION & INCOME 
1. Is Your Business activity registered? 
□Yes □ No 










□ Other (Please 
state)................................... 
 
1b. If No, Why? 
□ Not aware of   
Registration 
□ No need for me □ Cost □ Other (Please 
state).............................. 
 
2. How long have you been in this business? 
□ Under 1 year □ 1-5 years □ 5-10 Years □ Over 10 Years 
 
3. Is your income regular? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
4. How does this pattern of income flow influence your tax payment behavior? 
5. What is your average monthly income? 
□ Under 
GH¢120.00 
□ Between GH¢180.00 - 
GH¢300.00 






PART B – TAX KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION 
6. How will you describe your understanding of the Ghana tax system?  
7. What do you think are your obligations within this tax system? 
8. Can you explain any experience(s) you have had with the Ghana Tax Authority? 
 9. In what ways does these [interactions] influence your tax compliance decisions? 
10. Has any of your friends, family or business partners had any experience with the GRA 
you would like to share? 
11. To what extent do these experiences and interactions influence you? 
312 
 
12. How will you describe the access to, and availability of tax related education or 
information from the GRA  
13. What role do these information play in your tax payment decisions?  
41. Your general thoughts/Opinion about the Ghana tax system for businesses and 
individuals in your circumstance?  
 
PART C –COMPLIANCE PROCESS AND COST 
15. Have u ever filed for a tax return? 
16. Can you describe your experience in the process of filing the returns? 
17. This is anonymous conversation; please tell me how much income you do declare. If you 
have not undertaken tax returns before, how much will you declare if you have to? 
18. Can you tell me what motivates you to declare some of your income? 
19. Are there any fears on concerns which play part in your decision to declare some of your 
income? 
20. What factors will make you declare all income? 
21. How will you describe your employment status? 
22. To what extend does this [employment status] influence your tax payment decisions 
23. Have you been audited recently? 
24. How was your experience? 
25. Does this influence your future decisions in any way? 
26. What percentage of your income is related to?  
i) non-monetary:     
ii) Barter?   
27. What sort of percentage of your small business in cash do you not declare? 
28. If you are engaged in cash in hand activity or undeclared income sources, please describe 
factors which influence your decision to do so  
29. What factors will you like to see that will influence your decision to operate formally  




31. Overall how will you describe the possibility of your business activity being audited? 
32. To what degree does this influence your behavior? 
33. What is your perception of tax revenue usage by the state?  
34. To what degree does this influence your tax payment decisions?  
35. How will you describe [your] tax compliance process? (i.e. what key words will best 
describe the process)? 
36. How does the process of compliance influence your decisions?  
37. How will you describe the tax rate for businesses and/or individuals in your situation? 
38. Do these rates pay any part in your tax payment decisions?  
39. What factors do you think when they are present, will make you or people operating in 
your sector declare all their income?  
40. What do you think will influence you and people in your situation not to pay tax?  
41. If you were to design the tax system for the GRA, what would you have proposed that 
you believe will make people as you comply (i.e. what will be your ideal tax system)?  
42. How will self-assessment influence your tax payment behavior? 43. How do you make 
decisions about how you pay your taxes?  
44. What key factors influence your tax payment decisions?  
45. How will you describe the cost to you in the compliance process in terms of?  
 i) Finance: 
ii) Time:  
iii) Other costs:  
45. Do these costs influence play any part in your decisions?  
 
PART – D – SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
1. Gender 
□ Male □ Female 
 
2. Which age group do you fall under? 
□ Under 25 years □ 25-50 
Years  
□ Over 50 
Years 





3. Marital status 
□ Married □ Single  □ Cohabiting □ Divorced/Widowed  
     
4. Do you have any children or dependants 
□ Yes □ No 
 
5. How would you describe your ethnic background? 














      
6. What is your current nationality?........................................................................ 
 







□ Masters Degree & 
Above 
 
     
 
8. What is your Religious denomination  
 
□ Christian □ Muslim □ Traditionalist/Occult □ Non-Believer/Atheist  
     
 
9. What does that mean in your fate? / Are u a practicing?  













Appendix 8 - Interview questions for tax Officials   
 
1. What in your opinion is the right definition for a business classified as ‘informal 
sector’ operator? 
2. What will be your best description of the informal sector tax compliance rate in 
Ghana? 
3. What will you say it the biggest problem  to taxing the informal sector 
4. How are the informal sector tax payers involved in the tax planning? 
5. I have been told [through my initial interview] by number of tax payers in the 
informal sector that when they delay payment, without notice, tax officials usually 
come with padlocks and police officers to close their shops.  
5.i  Why are notices not sent to remind tax payers? 
  5.ii  Why are the police involved in the first instance? 
6. Almost all tax payers interviewed have told me their tax rates are not sent from the 
Authorities, but are determined by the visiting officers. Why visiting tax collecting 
officers and not the GRA are determines the tax rate an individual or business should 
pay? 
7. Tax payers have stressed that the amount of tax they pay is regardless of their income, 
and few are considering leaving their business as they are unable to pay the taxes 
levied on them. How is the issue of affordability addressed in the tax design for 
operators of the Ghana informal sector? 
8. What measures are in place to ensure that tax payers in this sector (amidst potential 
officers’ favours) are taxed fairly knowing amount paid is not based on their income? 
9. How successful has the current informal sector taxing strategies? 
10. Are there any education/awareness/training programmes targeted at the informal 
sector operators? 




12. How successful, do you think are these mechanisms above in reducing non-
compliance? 
13. What strategies are the GRA adopting to promote voluntary tax compliance among 
the informal sector operators? 
14. How often are tax officials sent out to businesses in the informal economy? 
15. Are the visiting tax collecting officers rotated overtime? 
16. Which segment /group is least compliant of their tax obligations within the 
underground economy? 
17. What do you think needs to be done to improve compliance rate among the operators 

















Appendix 9 - Tax experts interview on Presumptive Taxation   
    Date: 18/02/2014 
Theme: Exploring the design, implementation, and general policy recommendations for 
Presumptive taxation in developing countries. 
 
Interviewer: Alex Ampaabeng (PhD Student)     Moderator: Prof. Andy Lymer 
(Supervisor) 
 
Interview Participants - from Adam Smith International: 
    
 
Summary 
The interview explores the design, the implementation and general policy recommendations 
for presumptive taxation in a developing country context. The interview involved  
 and  who both work for Adam Smith International, the 
international advisory firm which specialise in offering practical advice on economic and 
government reform across countries. The interview help gain first-hand information from 
people who on daily basis offer practical advice to state and central governments, most of 
which are centered on developing countries. The questions for the interview were derived 




Questions / Responses 
1.  I have been reviewing some your previous work with the World Bank in Kosovo, you 
suggested in number 58 of your policy recommendations (IMF, 2011) that tax system 
should minimise contact with the tax officials to limit corruption. 
One of the biggest challenge interviewing some of these small businesses and 
informal sector operators, is how corrupt the tax officials are and the presumptive 
system do give tax officers powers as it was clear in Ghana that there isn’t [or not 
easily accessible] clear coefficients and indices which determines the [presumption] 
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rate that a business or individual must pay, so it tend to be a kind of negotiation 
between the tax officers and the taxpayers to reach an agreement [implying contact is 
always going to be highly maintained]. What will you recommend for a country like 
Ghana in this instance, to help tackle any kind of such corrupt behavior or at least to 























2.  The point of sales technology came up in my interview where one respondent 
recommended this kind of technology, which is a kind of machine similar to what we 
use in the UK for ‘Signed for’ and ‘Special delivery’ letters from Royal Mail, where 
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the recipient appends signature. In this case the taxpayer signs against their 
names/account for the amount paid to the officer which is electronically recorded. My 
































4.  As Ghana has not implemented any of these technologies such as the POS as it 
stands, what will you recommend as the best auditing mechanism for these visiting 




5. How do we audit business which abuse presumptive taxes and may underreport in 





6.  What should be the key determinants/triggers to moving businesses from presumptive 














7. I spoke to some tax officer who believe some businesses will not be literally moved 
over due to government policy to maintain certain level of revenue. What is your take 
on this? 
   
 
 
8.  As you are aware, countries like Ghana do not have any social benefit system, and 
people have to hawk (sell in the streets) to survive. I spoke to people making as little 
as £2 a day during my field work, but may pay 30p 40p in tax [tickets] a day, 
considering your experience in developing country taxation, do you think it’s 







9.  What I have noticed in most tax regimes, is that when it comes to tax complaints, 
taxpayers are asked to put in writing, which I think could be difficult to countries like 
Ghana and other developing economies, either due to illiteracy or nature of the 
system, what will you recommend to be the best way to dealing with taxpayer 














   
















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
A. Tax Morale/Ethics: 











             Non-payment bad 16.09 15.848 .398 .338 .711 
             If unfair, pay and complain later 15.70 13.978 .646 .822 .645 
             To be seen paying something 15.72 13.063 .527 .390 .674 
B. Tax Education      
Understand own tax 11.19 35.013 .776 .649 .840 
Availability of tax information 11.25 36.227 .734 .636 .846 
Knows where to seek advice 10.12 33.656 .719 .535 .847 
Overall tax education 11.31 38.788 .571 .429 .866 
Understand of how to comply 11.00 35.091 .715 .554 .847 
Do not need advice 11.04     36.455 .555 .381 .870 
Easy to get tax advice 10.92 37.622 .535 .336 .871 
